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ABSTRACT
Explicit approaches to risk analysis within the water utility sector, traditionally
applied to occupational health and safety and public health protection, are now seeing
broader application in contexts including corporate level decision making, asset
management, watershed protection and network reliability. Our research suggested that
neither the development of novel risk analysis techniques nor the refinement of existing
ones was of paramount importance in improving the capabilities of water utilities to
manage risk. It was thought that a more fruitful approach would be to focus on the
implementation of risk management rather than the techniques employed per se.
Thus, we developed a prescriptive capability maturity model for benchmarking
the maturity of implementation of water utility risk management practice, and applied it
to the sector via case study and benchmarking survey. We observed risk management
practices ranging from the application of hazard and operability studies, to the use of
scenario planning in guiding organisational restructuring programmes. We observed
methods for their institutionalisation, including the use of initiation criteria for applying
risk analysis techniques; the adoption of formalised procedures to guide their
application; and auditing and peer reviews to ensure procedural compliance and provide
quality assurance.
We then built upon this research to develop a descriptive1 capability maturity
model of utility risk analysis and risk based decision making practice, and described its
case study application. The contribution to knowledge of this stage of the research was
three-fold, we: synthesized empirical observations with behavioral and normative
1
Although the model retained its normative character, in the sense that it distinguished between high and low maturity risk
management, it was rooted in firmer empirical grounds. We emphasise its descriptive nature, as scholarly work of this nature is
lacking in risk management, as we shall highlight later.
iv
theories to codify the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making; placed
these processes within a maturity framework which distinguishes their relative maturity
of implementation from ad hoc to adaptive; and provided a comparative analysis of risk
analysis and risk based decision making practices, and their maturity of
implementation, across a range of utility functions.
The research provides utility managers, technical staff, project managers and
chief finance officers with a practical and systematic understanding of how to
implement and improve risk management, and offers preliminary guidance to regulators
concerning how improved water utility governance can be made real.
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1Chapter 1
Critical overview of thesis
21. Critical overview of thesis
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The provision of safe, reliable drinking water, the overarching goal of the
international water utility sector (AWWA et al. 2001), is within the bounds of the
developed world’s science, technology, and financial resources. Nevertheless, a
nagging prevalence of water quality related outbreaks remains in the developed world,
with “causes” ranging from technical failures through to institutional lapses and rarely,
in the extreme, negligence on the part of operating and managerial staff (e.g. Hrudey
and Hrudey, 2004). Regardless of the particular manifestation of these incidents, they
all derive from limited organisational capacities, or appetites, to learn how to prevent
failures, in other words, to manage risk. Conventionally, utilities manage risk
implicitly through codifying their basis for safe operations within standard design and
operating procedures. The drivers of said procedures’ evolution are two-fold: the
introduction of improved methods and technologies (e.g. novel treatment processes);
and experiences gained from reflecting on past mishaps. From a risk management
perspective, we2 are principally concerned with the latter.
This latter cycle begins with a contamination event or near miss, following which
incident analysis is undertaken to determine its primary or root cause, and ends with a
technical, operational or administrative solution (e.g. adapting design standards or
operating procedures) designed to prevent its recurrence. This cycle exists at both the
utility and sector level, the latter being reflected in changes to national or industry-wide
codes, standards or regulations where learnings are considered generalisable. As Lee
2
Throughout the thesis, we refer to multiple authors to maintain consistency, as the published chapters were lead rather than sole-
authored by the PhD recipient.
3(1998) notes, whilst this retrospective approach to managing risk is necessary, it is a
mistake to consider it sufficient. Procedures, guidelines and regulations can proliferate
to the point where they become incomprehensible, and, absurdly yet predictably,
resources are diverted towards preventing the incidents that have happened, rather than
those most likely to happen (Lee, 1998). Furthermore, a reliance on learning by trial
and error in isolation from more proactive strategies is arguably unsound where public
health is at stake (i.e. if it is not too little, it is certainly too late). Although illustrated in
a distinct water quality context, these concepts are generalisable to all aspects of the
design, operation and management of water supply systems (e.g. from process
engineering to occupational health and safety management).
Recognition of the limitations of post-hoc analysis has brought a paradigm shift
within the water sector from reactive to proactive risk management, wherein utilities
have sought to identify potential weaknesses and eliminate root causes of problems
before they cause a failure (as reviewed in MacGillivray et al., 2006; Hamilton et al.,
2006a,b; Pollard et al., 2004). This shift is being driven by the introduction of water
safety plans, codes of good corporate governance, the debate on self-regulation and,
more broadly, a growing recognition that the provision of safe drinking water deserves
to be treated as a “high reliability” societal service, subject to the rigours and controls
inherent to the nuclear, offshore and aerospace industries (Pollard et al., 2005). It is
this changing landscape that drives the need for a method for benchmarking and
improving organisational competencies in risk management, and for empirical
observations of utility risk management to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
41.2 LITERATURE REVIEW (CHAPTER 2)3
The author’s research began with a comprehensive review of risk analysis
strategies and techniques for application in the water utility sector at the strategic,
programme, and operational levels of decision making. This served to identify the
breadth and rigour of existing risk analysis techniques, paying particular attention to the
decision contexts of their application, i.e. how they informed decision making. We
observed that explicit approaches to risk analysis, traditionally applied to occupational
health and safety and public health protection, were now seeing broader application in
contexts including corporate level decision making, asset management (Booth and
Rogers, 2001; Lifton and Smeaton, 2003), watershed protection (IMPRESS
Management, 2002; Lloyd and Abell, 2005; WHO, 2004) and network reliability
(Stevens and Lloyd, 2004; Stahl and Elliott, 1999). The review suggested that neither
the development of novel risk analysis techniques nor the refinement of existing ones
was of paramount importance in improving the capabilities of water utilities to manage
the plethora of risks to which they are exposed. It was thought that a more fruitful
approach would be to focus on the implementation of risk management rather than the
techniques employed per se, i.e. to focus on the institutional capacities of utilities to
employ risk analysis and management techniques for more credible, optimal decision
making. Here, the field of capability maturity modelling showed great promise.
A capability maturity model (CMM) (Paulk et al., 1993) is a simplified
representation of an organisational discipline (e.g. software engineering, risk
management) which codifies industry practice within a process-based framework.
3
Note that as the research progressed, a broader range of literature was reviewed, including: risk analysis and management
frameworks, both within and beyond the sector, decision theory and its application to risk based decision making, capability
maturity modelling, and quality management principles. This research is discussed throughout the thesis.
5These models are constructed according to maturity levels characterised by the extent
to which each process is repeatable, defined, controlled and optimising (although the
terminology varies). In essence, they allow distinctions to be made between
organisational capabilities based not on the specific practices adopted to, in our case,
manage risk, but rather with reference to the maturity of the processes within which
those practices are applied (i.e. their degree of institutionalisation). The capability
maturity modelling concept is finding increasing acceptance in industry and academia.
Notable applications include software and systems engineering (Paulk et al., 1993;
Software Engineering Institute, 2002a), workforce development and management
(Software Engineering Institute, 2002b), offshore design safety (Sharp et al., 2002),
reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003), and construction (Sarshar et al., 2000). Capability
models enable organisations to establish their current level of process maturity and
identify the steps necessary to progress to a higher level, building on their strengths and
improving on their weaknesses. Their primary applications are for benchmarking
purposes, enabling organisations to compare themselves against other companies in
their sector and beyond, or simply as reference models for developing process
improvement plans.
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
The aim of the research was to develop and apply a capability maturity model for
benchmarking risk management practice within the water utility sector. An alternative
benchmarking approach, the development of a performance measurement framework
for water utility risk management, was initiated but subsequently discontinued
(Appendix A). The objectives were:
61: Develop a prescriptive capability maturity model for benchmarking risk
management practice within the water utility sector.
2: Apply the prescriptive model to the sector via a case study and benchmarking
survey, with the purpose of deriving empirical observations of utility risk
management practices and their methods for institutionalisation.
3: Refine the model from a prescriptive to descriptive state based on the data
obtained from its application.
4: Apply the revised, descriptive model within a second case study, again with the
purpose of deriving empirical observations of utility risk management practices
and their methods for institutionalisation.
1.4 DEVELOPMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY
MATURITY MODEL (CHAPTER 3)
Chapter 3 describes our development of a risk management capability maturity
model (RM-CMM) for the water utility sector. The model was a prescriptive
codification of water sector risk management practice, within a process-based maturity
hierarchy. It was developed by abstracting the principles of capability maturity
modelling observed in other disciplines, including software and systems engineering
(Paulk et al., 1993; Software Engineering Institute, 2002a), workforce development and
management (Software Engineering Institute, 2002b), offshore design safety (Sharp et
al., 2002), reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003), and construction (Sarshar et al., 2000).
This was achieved through literature reviews (MacGillivray et al., 2006; Pollard et al.,
2004; Hamilton et al., 2006b), scoping interviews with water utility managers, and
7prior knowledge of maturity modelling in similar utility sectors. The model was
composed of eleven risk management processes, themselves comprised of practices
(Table 1.1). These processes were separated into five maturity levels, from learner to
best practice. These maturity levels, characterised by reference to attributes (Table
1.2), reflected the extent to which each process is repeatable, defined, controlled and
optimising (i.e. their maturity of implementation, or degree of institutionalisation). It is
important to understand what these levels represent in practice as this was crucial to
assessing the maturity of an organisation. Whilst the precise definition of the maturity
hierarchy was process specific, levels 3 and 4 in risk analysis are displayed in Table
1.2. The descriptions of the full maturity hierarchy for each process are found in
Appendix B.
8Table 1.1 Descriptions of the RM-CMM processes, their related practices, and their rationale for inclusion within the model
Process Description* Practices Rationale for inclusion
SRP The process by which the
Board, the executive and




1. Develop a corporate vision for risk management.
2. Establish a risk management framework setting out the core roles, responsibilities,
accountabilities and mechanisms for risk management throughout the organisation.
3. Identify key risk and opportunity elements at the strategic level.
4. Develop corporate strategy to manage identified risk and opportunity elements.
5. Allocate resources for implementing corporate risk management strategy.
6. Establish risk policies and guidelines to inform operational procedures.
7. Develop criteria indicating how success and failure in risk management will be
measured at the corporate level.
Hamilton et al. (2006b) describe how these frameworks can
introduce greater rigour, consistency and standardisation to the
discipline. The researchers further note their potential for
adaptation to suit “user needs.” This final point is crucial, as our
scoping interviews suggested that risk management frameworks
were not simply shoehorned within utilities.
ERAC The process by which the
utility establishes criteria for
evaluating the significance
and acceptability of risk.
1. Define high level risk areas for the business and assets.
2. Define the level of risk that is acceptable to the various stakeholders across key risk
categories (e.g. financial risk thresholds, technical requirements for safety and reliability,
ALARP, etc.).
3. Allocate risk acceptance criteria to key components of the business and assets.
Criteria for evaluating the significance of risk are required to
establish their relative priority during risk analysis, whilst criteria
for evaluating their acceptability are required to inform decisions
as to whether they should be mitigated or accepted.
RA The identification and
assessment of risk.
1. Identify risks inherent in business and technical operations. A range of techniques are
available for this purpose (e.g. what-if analysis, scenario planning, HAZOP, HACCP,
etc.). This task should be informed by a risk register, which is continually updated.
2. Assess risks for likelihood of occurrence, likelihood of consequences and overall
impact on the utility’s corporate objectives. A range of techniques are available for this
purpose (e.g. FMEA, FMECA, NPV-based analyses, compliance assessments, pollutant
modelling tools, etc.)
3. Evaluate assessed risks with respect to defined acceptance criteria.
Risks left unidentified are excluded from explicit management.
Their assessment is required to understand the mechanisms
through which they arise (and so inform measures for their
reduction) and to establish their relative priority (and so allocate
resources optimally).
RBDM The identification and
evaluation of options to
manage risks.
1. Select risk response strategies based on output from risk analysis (e.g. avoid, retain,
reduce, transfer, exploit).
2. Develop selected response strategies according to context and situation (e.g. a selected
strategy of reducing currency risk may be developed into a complex hedging strategy).
3. Establish indicators to track the progress and effectiveness of risk response strategies.
Risk analyses that do not inform decision making are mere
exercises in compliance and creating the illusion of good
governance.
94. Review risk response strategies in light of risk monitoring output.
RR Implementing the selected
risk management option(s).
1. Define roles, responsibilities and timescales for implementing risk response strategies.
2. Prioritise and allocate resourcing for the implementation of risk response strategies.
3. Implement risk response strategies.
Risk based decisions are hollow gestures if left unimplemented.
RM Reviewing and updating risk
analyses.
1. Define criteria for risk monitoring activities (i.e. detailing when, what and how to
monitor).
2. Collect and update data relating to the evolution of watched and mitigated risks.
3. Compile and analyse data for watched and mitigated risks to enable evaluation of the
progress and effectiveness of risk response strategies.
Risks are not static, but evolve over time, both objectively (e.g.
real changes in risk) and subjectively (e.g. as greater information
becomes available, their analysis should be updated).
IRM The integration of risk
management process
interfaces; the cross-
functional integration of risk
management; integration of
risk management with broader
business operations.
1. Define and integrate the risk management process interfaces (e.g. ensure that the
outputs of the risk monitoring process are sufficient to inform a review of risk response
strategies). Techniques for this purpose include technical exchange, peer reviews, etc.
2. Define and implement the desired level of cross-functional integration for risk
management (i.e. the extent to which risk should be managed with respect to functional
vs. organisational considerations). Integration is achieved through the establishment and
utilisation of methods for cross-functional co-ordination, solution building, conflict
resolution, etc.
3. Integrate the process of risk management within broader business operations (e.g.
through establishing initiation procedures, reward and accountability mechanisms, etc.).
Risk management process interfaces should be integrated to
ensure the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Cross-
functional integration of risk management activities is required
because managing risk in organisational “silos,” is ineffective as
risks are highly interdependent and cannot be segmented and
managed by entirely independent units. Integration with broader
business operations is required to ensure risk management is an
integral part of organisational activities, rather than a “bolt on.”
SCRM Two aspects: (i) product
supply risk management:
addressing the way utilities
obtain the raw components
required to develop a product;
(ii) service supply risk
management: managing
services provided by other
organisations throughout the
supply chain – e.g.
outsourcing agreements.
1. Identify and define the risk interfaces between the organisation and suppliers of
services and products.
2. Establish (risk-based) pre-qualification, selection and retention criteria for work
performed by contractors, suppliers and others.
3. Establish (risk-based) deliverables and performance standards for suppliers of
products and services (e.g. requirements for reliability, safety and technical competence).
4. Communicate the benefits of active risk management processes to supplier
organisations.
Many organisational failures can be traced back to minor and
apparently insignificant services and components sourced from
suppliers.
CRM Managing the risk
implications of business (e.g.
1. Define and implement an organisational strategy for the management of technical and
business change.
A range of factors (e.g. globalisation, regulatory and market
restructuring, novel technologies) are serving to fundamentally
10
*NB: “Utility friendly” examples of these process descriptions were used in the questionnaire application of the RM-CMM (Appendix C).
Key: Strategic risk planning (SRP); Establishing risk acceptance criteria (ERAC); Risk analysis (RA); Risk based decision making and review (RBDM); Risk response (RR); Risk monitoring (RM); Integrating risk
management (IRM); Supply chain risk management (SCRM); Change risk management (CRM); Education and training in risk management (E&T); Risk knowledge management (RKM).
re-engineering) and technical
(e.g. changes in design or
technology) change.
2. Establish (risk-based) criteria for acting upon change opportunities.
3. Identify and define the risk implications of changes in the operating, regulatory and
market environment (e.g. novel treatment technologies, alterations in compliance levels,
evolving market structures, emerging competition, etc.).
4. Develop and execute plans to manage the risk implications of technical and business
change.
alter the context in which water utilities operate.
E&T Development of the skills and
knowledge that enable staff to
perform their risk
management roles.
1. Define education and training requirements for effective risk management (i.e.
competency requirements).
2. Design education programmes and training vehicles to impart the required knowledge.
3. Track the progress and effectiveness of education and training in risk management.
4. Define and implement development opportunities for staff (i.e. education and training
opportunities that extend beyond their role requirements) to optimise risk management
across the organisation.
Regardless of the technical complexity of the methods employed,
risk management remains in many respects an expert discipline,
and so the development of competencies is required for its optimal
implementation.
RKM The collection, storage and
access of input and output risk
data.
1. Define data / information requirements for effective risk management.
2. Design, develop and implement knowledge management systems and infrastructure to
capture, compile and analyse the required data / information.
We include the former aspect on the premise that in the absence of
pre-defined data requirements, risk data collection is likely to be
ad hoc and largely restricted to the needs of business as usual.
The latter aspect is drawn from discussions of various risk
communication and reporting protocols and the use of databases
for storing risk assessment outputs.
11
Table 1.2 The attributes characterising process maturity within the RM-CMM, and
how they are described at L3 and L4 in risk analysis
Attribute Attribute description Attribute at level 3: Risk analysis Attribute at level 4: Risk analysis
Scope The execution of key




A defined, documented process is in
place containing criteria, methods and
guidelines for the identification,
assessment and evaluation (with respect
to acceptance criteria) of a broad range
of risks across core business areas,
guided by a risk register. The
organisation is conversant with and goes
beyond the regulatory requirements for
risk analysis.
A controlled process is in place containing
detailed criteria, methods and guidelines to
manage the identification, assessment,
evaluation (with respect to acceptance
criteria), establishment of causality and
linking (common cause and dependent) of
risks at all levels of the company and
across all functional boundaries of the
business, guided by a company-specific
risk register.
Integration The level of process
embedment within the
organisation.
Procedures are in place to initiate risk
analysis processes.
Risk analysis is initiated automatically as
part of core business processes (e.g.




ensuring that the process
is being performed
correctly, validation
refers to ensuring that the
correct process is being
performed.
Basic mechanisms are in place to verify
that risk analysis is performed as
required, largely reliant on lagging
indicators. The expertise for validation
is generally lacking.
Verification and validation systems are in
place to verify the efficiency of risk
analysis activities and to validate their
expediency (e.g. the organisation tracks
that tools and techniques are being used
correctly and that the correct tools and




The manner in which
feedback, both internally
and externally sourced, is
collected and used to
question and revise
processes.
The risk analysis tool suite is reviewed
and modified on an event-driven basis.
Feedback is actively used to improve the
execution of risk analysis (e.g. gaps
identified and risk analysis tools and
techniques improved in response).
Stakeholder
Engagement
The process of engaging
stakeholders, both
internal and external, with
the purpose of leveraging
the process.
Risk analysis processes generally reside
within the responsible unit, with limited
cross-functional or external
consultation.
Risk analysis processes generally reside
within affected disciplines, and
stakeholders work together to define and
implement an integrated approach to risk




both implicit and explicit,
which influence process
performance.
Detailed knowledge of risk analysis
resides only within the responsible unit.
Most involved staff exhibit a good level of
competence in the selection and
application of risk analysis tools and
techniques, and have access to support
from internal or external expert risk
practitioners.
Resources Extent and use of
resources (e.g. people,
pounds and tools)
Adequate resources are provided in
support of risk analysis, with both
qualitative and quantitative tools and
techniques available.
Sufficient resources are provided in
support of risk analysis, a portion of which
is made available for R + D for risk
assessment. A broad range of qualitative
and quantitative tools and techniques are
available and applied, including







Risk analysis outputs are compiled and
disseminated in a format that supports
decision-making.
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and
disseminated in a clear, concise and
actionable format that supports real-time
decision-making, and their reporting is co-
ordinated with other risk reporting
mechanisms (e.g. risk status updates).
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1.5 APPLICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY
MATURITY MODEL (CHAPTERS 4, 5 AND 6)
1.5.1 Industrial case study (Chapter 4)
Our RM-CMM was prescriptive, being derived by abstracting the overarching
principles of capability maturity modelling to fit the context of risk management
within the water sector, rather than descriptive (i.e. empirically derived). In our view,
it was important to move beyond the rhetoric on risk management, whether academic
or practitioner, in order to improve practice on the ground. And so this stage of our
research was concerned with the case study application of the model within a water
and wastewater utility, in order to derive empirical observations of both utility risk
management practices (e.g. what steps were involved in the application of risk
analysis, one process of risk management) and of their methods for institutionalisation
(e.g. how was risk analysis institutionalised as a process). We consider this extension
of the model’s application beyond its immediate target context (i.e. the water utility
sector) both necessary (given the organisational structure of the case study utility) and
more importantly valid, as the underlying principles of risk management and
capability maturity modelling should remain constant regardless of the utility sector to
which they are applied (of course, the model’s application to, say, a financial
organisation would be more questionable). The research methods informing the
model’s application included questionnaire, interview and document analysis (see
Appendix D for a sample interview transcript; company documents used are not made
available due to confidentiality issues).
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1.5.2 Benchmarking survey (Chapter 5)
Given the inherent limitations of case study research in terms of generalisability,
a survey based application of the RM-CMM was the next logical step in our quest for
empirical data. Eight water utilities from the UK, Australia and the USA participated
in the study. This was supplemented by the participation of an electricity utility
regarded as best practice in risk management. The sample was intended to reflect
good risk management practice; hence we do not suggest that our analysis was
representative of the sector as a whole. The scope of analysis varied by utility, and
included organisational, business unit, and functional perspectives, although was
predominantly the former. A survey-type research design was adopted, whilst the
research methods included questionnaire, interview and document analysis (see
Appendix E for a sample interview transcript, Appendix C for a sample questionnaire
response).
1.5.3 Summary of findings
The research findings may be placed into two groups. Firstly, we derived
empirical observations reflecting our prescriptive codification of risk management
processes, ranging from the application of classical risk assessment methodologies
such as hazard and operability studies, to the use of scenario planning in guiding
organisational restructuring programmes. Secondly, we derived empirical
observations reflecting how those processes may be institutionalised with reference to
our maturity hierarchy, including the use of initiation criteria for applying risk
analysis techniques, the adoption of formalised procedures to guide their application,
and auditing and peer reviews to ensure procedural compliance and provide quality
assurance.
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The findings provide utility managers, technical staff, project managers and
chief finance officers with a practical and systematic understanding of how to
implement and improve risk management, and offer preliminary guidance to
regulators concerning how improved water utility governance can be made real.
Further, through seeking to align risk management practice on the ground with our
prescriptive model, the research provided the required empirical basis for evolving
our model from a prescriptive to a descriptive state.
1.5.4 Limitations and their implications for subsequent research
One key insight emerging from the application of the RM-CMM was that risk
management was best treated not as an overarching discipline, but rather as one which
takes discrete forms in varying functional contexts (i.e. that explicitly considering the
context within which risk management was applied was critical, and that this was best
done at the functional level). And so a view formed that adopting a functional, rather
than organisational, approach to evaluating risk management capabilities was
justified. This shift in focus is illustrated in Chapter 6, where we place the findings of
our benchmarking survey (in relation to the risk analysis process) within the context
of specific water utility functions (e.g. asset management, process engineering).
The research was further limited by, on reflection, inadequate effort by the
author to relate the empirical findings to the broader literature. This was supported by
correspondence with a utility asset manager in response to preliminary findings, who
stated: “it seems to me that your report is focusing on the quality
management…aspects as applied to risk management. I don't see that you have
considered the effectiveness of risk management as actually applied to assets. The
focus appears to be on making sure everything is well documented – rather than
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making sure what [is being done] is actually worth documenting.” Whilst an
exaggerated concern in the sense that the concepts underlying capability maturity
modelling go beyond simply “document what you do and do what you document,” the
common yet misplaced critique of quality management principles, the underlying
truth was that greater effort was required to draw upon the broader literature to
evaluate the strengths and limitations of the risk management practices observed (e.g.
the application of hazard and operability studies, one observed risk analysis practice)
and their methods for institutionalisation (i.e. the attributes defining process maturity,
such as initiation criteria guiding the application of hazard and operability studies).
Finally, the research was limited by the prescriptive nature of our model.
Whilst we found empirical support for our process descriptions and maturity
hierarchy, challenges to its design, of both a theoretical and empirical nature, were
encountered. These can be placed into five principal categories, those relating to: the
selection of processes; the selection of practices which comprised the processes; the
selection of attributes which defined process maturity; the distinctions between
maturity levels; and the approach to evaluating maturity. We return to these later.
Understanding the implications of all of this for our model required a return to first
principles, beginning with a more critical evaluation of what risk management is, and
therefore what the scope of the author’s research was.
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1.6 DESIGN AND APPLICATION OF CAPABILITY MATURITY
MODEL FOR BENCHMARKING RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK
BASED DECISION MAKING PRACTICE (CHAPTER 7)
1.6.1 Re-conceptualisation of risk management
Before outlining the revised model, and the rationale for the changes adopted, it
is important to describe our re-conceptualisation of risk management. The lexicon of
risk is at times bewildering, and there are myriad definitions of risk management.
Previously, we had deferred from explicitly defining risk management in the context
of our development of the RM-CMM, on the premise that its essential meaning was
prima facie evident – namely, the management of risk – and that engaging in
semantics would divert time and resources from the research problem (i.e. the
meaning was constant, regardless of its articulation). However, the prior applications
of the RM-CMM suggested a need to re-define the scope of the research, the starting
point of which was a re-examination of the meaning and purpose of risk management
itself. A view formed in the authors’ minds that many existing definitions of risk
management appeared to suffer from the tyranny of consensus, being chosen not so
much to elucidate a truth, but instead to be so broad and abstract as to satisfy all
stakeholders that their own particular view of risk management was a subset within,
so placing them beyond reasonable critique. Of course, one should not disregard the
past too readily, and the underlying philosophy and practical utility of the discipline
can be found within the literature when one looks beyond this tendency to connote
rather than denote. That is, namely, that risk management is concerned with
preventing failures.
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However, what was needed was not simply a definition of risk management, but
rather a deeper conceptualisation. Failures are prevented by understanding how they
may arise, and adapting behaviour to prevent their occurrence. In other words, risk
management is concerned with “learning how to prevent failures.” Drawing upon
Confucius, we conceptualise three means by which water utilities learn to prevent
failures, through (i) reflecting on their past mishaps, which is bitterest; (ii) reflecting
on those of other utilities, which is easiest; and (iii) a priori, using foresight to reflect
on potential future mishaps, which is noblest. Our subsequent research addresses the
final means on the premise that prevention is better than cure (hence noblest). We
consider this final means, a priori or proactive risk management, to be comprised of
three processes: risk analysis; risk based decision making; and implementation of risk
based decisions (Figure 1.1). In short, risk analysis looks to the future to determine
what can go wrong, the potential consequences and their relative likelihood, and the
overall level of risk. Risk analysis informs risk based decision making, which
involves the identification and evaluation of risk reduction options and, where deemed
necessary (i.e. where the risk is considered unacceptable), selection of the optimal
option(s). Of course, fine decisions are hollow gestures if left unimplemented, and so
implementation of risk based decisions completes the cycle.
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Figure 1.1 Re-conceptualisation of a priori risk management processes
1.6.2 Research methods for design and application of revised maturity model
The initial objectives had been to revise the RM-CMM based on the empirical
findings from its prior applications, before testing the revised version within a final
industrial case study. However, given the broad nature of the empirical and
theoretical challenges to the RM-CMM design, derived from its initial applications
and a return to the literature respectively, the grounded theory methodology (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967; Straus and Corbin, 1994) was adopted for the final case study.
Under this approach (Figure 1.2) data collection, analysis and conceptualisation (i.e.
the re-coding of processes, practices, maturity attributes and maturity levels within the
model) were not undertaken sequentially, but instead iteratively until a point of
saturation was reached, which culminated in the revised model. In essence, this




Risk based decision making
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In brief, we revised the prescriptive RM-CMM model towards a descriptive
maturity model of risk analysis and risk based decision making through an iterative
synthesis of: the capability maturity modelling literature (Paulk et al., 1993; SEI,
2002a/b; Sharp et al., 2002; Strutt et al., 2006; Sarshar et al., 2000); risk analysis and
management frameworks, both specific to the sector (NZMOH, 2001; NHMRC, 2001,
2004; WHO, 2002, 2004) and beyond (AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; COSO, 2004; UKOOA,
1999; FERMA, 2003; NIST, 2002; MHU, 2003; Joy and Griffiths, 2005; NEA/CSNI,
1999); decision theory (Slovic et al., 1977; Clemen, 1996; Watson and Buede, 1987)
and its application to risk based decision making (Aven et al., 2006; Rosness, 1998;
Arvai et al., 2001; Aven and Kørte, 2003, Bohneblust and Slovic, 1998; Amendola,
2001; Renn, 1999); quality management principles (Crosby, 1979, 1996; Hoyle, 2001;
ISO, 2000); and empirical observations derived from our prior benchmarking survey
and initial case study (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and, critically, those observations derived
from the final, in-depth case study.
One utility responsible for the provision of water and wastewater services
participated in this final case study. The sample comprised of seven utility functions:
engineering; project management; drinking water quality management; network
planning; asset management; emergency management; and occupational health and
safety management. The empirical observations were derived from interview and
document analysis (see Appendices F and G for sample interview transcripts). Of the
sample of seven functions, emergency planning was removed from the analysis due to
contradictions in the data and the limited sample of interviewees (two, compared to a
minimum of three elsewhere), whilst network planning was discounted owing to
limited documentation obtained. Although the focus of our research was on water
supply, by the very nature of the utility’s organisational design it extended to embrace
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aspects of their wastewater services (as, for example, the project management and
engineering functions deliver both water and wastewater system designs and projects).
Again, we consider this a valid extension, as the underlying principles of risk analysis,
decision theory, and capability maturity modelling remain constant.
Figure 1.2 Basic illustration of the progression from the RM-CMM to the revised
capability maturity model for benchmarking risk analysis and risk based decision
making practice
NB: The role of these various inputs in informing the coding of the revised model are evidenced in: Tables 1.3,
1.4, and 1.6, which show the theoretical basis for the coding of risk analysis and risk based decision making and
those attributes which define their maturity of implementation; and Tables 7.5, 7.6 and Appendix H which show
the empirical observations derived from the final case study. See also section 1.64 for a discussion of the
progression from the RM-CMM to the revised model.
Iterative synthesis:
RM-CMM => revised
capability model of risk



















1.6.3 Architecture of capability maturity model for benchmarking risk analysis
and risk based decision making practice.
The revised model incorporates the processes of risk analysis and risk based
decision making. These are considered two of the three a priori risk management
processes under our re-conceptualisation (Figure 1.1). The implementation of risk
based decisions process was not included due to data limitations which were
compounded by the fact that implementation mechanisms can be expected, indeed
were observed, to vary markedly depending on the nature of the decision to be
implemented (i.e. operational vs. capital vs. procedural, etc.). As noted, this model
differs in a variety of ways from its precursor, the RM-CMM. These changes, along
with their justification, are summarised in section 1.64. However, the author’s
adoption of this revised model does not simply reflect a shift in focus from the prior
research, it also amounts to a recanting of the RM-CMM (again, see the rationale for
this in section 1.64).
Within the model, risk analysis and risk based decision making are composed of
a series of practices. These practices, taken together, map out each process flow
(whereas in our prior model, the practices were, in essence, elements of each process
flow, rather than their totality). Risk analysis (Figure 1.3; Table 1.3) comprises
system characterisation, hazard identification, hazard precursor identification, control
evaluation, consequence evaluation, likelihood evaluation, and risk evaluation. Risk
analysis is always part of a decision context (Aven and Kørte, 2003). Thus, risk based
decision making (Figure 1.3; Table 1.4) is concerned with the identification and
evaluation of risk reduction alternatives, followed by the application of managerial
review prior to selecting the optimal risk reduction measure(s). These are informed
by criteria establishing the acceptability of risk and setting out stakeholder values and
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concerns used to assess the relative merit of alternative risk reduction options. Both
processes are separated into five maturity levels, from ad hoc to adaptive. These
levels (Table 1.5), characterised in terms of the practices undertaken and attributes
reflecting their maturity of implementation (Table 1.6), codify the extent to which
each process is repeatable, defined, controlled and adaptive (i.e. maturity of
implementation, or degree of institutionalisation). Whilst the characterisations of the
maturity levels (Table 1.5) and the process maturity attributes (Table 1.6) provided
are specific to risk analysis, the same principles apply to risk based decision making
(see Appendices I and J for the characterisations of the maturity levels and process
maturity attributes relating to risk based decision making, respectively). The
theoretical basis for the model’s development is summarised in the aforementioned
Tables; regarding its empirical basis, refer to Tables 7.5 and 7.6 for observations
relating to the undertaking of each risk analysis and risk based decision making
practice across a range of the final case study utility’s functions, and Appendix H for
observations of the process maturity attributes relating to risk analysis from this same
case study.
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Figure 1.3 Flow charts of the practices which comprise the risk analysis process (left)
and the risk based decision making process (right). Those encased are considered









Establish criteria for evaluating alternative risk
reduction options
Identify risk reduction options
Evaluate options
Managerial review and option(s) selection
Establish risk acceptance criteria
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Table 1.3 Descriptions of the risk analysis practices and of the rationale for their






To establish and describe the system with which risk
analysis is concerned (e.g. workplace, engineering
process, project).
A comprehensive system understanding is a sine qua
non for generating risk analysis outcomes that are valid
and accepted by stakeholders.
Hazard
identification
Identifying situations, events, or substances with the
potential for causing adverse consequences, i.e.
sources of harm or threats to the system.





Whilst hazard identification is concerned with what
can go wrong, precursor identification focuses on
how and why things can go wrong, in other words
identifying possible routes to and causes of failure.
The potential existence of a hazard does not in itself
constitute a risk, as each hazard requires a process or
pathway (precursor) to lead to its realisation. Thus, the
value of this practice lies in both confirming the
existence of pathways to failure (and therefore that a risk
exists) and informing the development of risk reduction
options focussed at root causes.
Control
evaluation
The identification and assessment of existing
technical, physical and administrative controls which
may either reduce the likelihood of a hazardous
event occurring, or serve to mitigate its severity of
consequences. Assessment should address both the
criticality of the controls (e.g. based on their inherent
capacity to reduce risk, whether they are proactive or
reactive, etc.) and their adequacy of design,
management and operation.
An evaluation of existing controls: informs the
evaluation of associated risk levels; serves to inform the
development of risk reduction options through
identifying latent and active control weaknesses (i.e.
through serving as a gap analysis of existing risk
reduction measures); and captures the historic basis for
safe, reliable system operation.
Consequence
evaluation
Identifying the nature of the consequences of a
hazardous event occurring (e.g. financial,




The evaluation of the likelihood (i.e. frequency or
probability) that a hazardous event will occur and
lead to a defined severity of consequence.
Risk evaluation Combining measures of likelihood and consequence
severity to derive an overall measure of risk, either
qualitative (e.g. high, low) or quantitative (e.g.
expected loss of life, value at risk).
Deriving and combining measures of consequence and
likelihood are required to establish the overall level of
risk associated with a given hazard, so that management
resources may be allocated accordingly and to assess the
desirability of potential risk reduction measures (e.g. to
see if they satisfy the ALARP criteria).
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Table 1.4 Descriptions of the risk based decision making practices and of the







Establishing criteria for evaluating the
acceptability of risk.
In the absence of such criteria, on what basis are decisions





Establishing criteria used to evaluate
the relative merit of alternative risk
reduction options (e.g. forecast risk
reduction, technical feasibility, cost of
implementation, latency of effects,
environmental impacts, etc.) and,
where deemed appropriate (e.g. where
multi-attribute analysis is subsequently
undertaken), weightings to establish
their relative importance.
A range of risk reduction options may be considered for a
particular decision context; the decision as to which is
considered the best option is influenced by many factors.
Different concerns and values often need to be considered
simultaneously, and their relative importance may be valued
differently by various stakeholders (Faber and Stewart, 2003).
Making this explicit in the form of criteria can improve the
credibility and defensibility of decision making, minimise the
possibility that decisions will be second guessed or that their
rationale be forgotten, remove barriers to stakeholder buy-in,
and ensure the existence of an audit trail (SEI, 2002). More
broadly, it enables value rather than “alternative focussed”
decision making, the latter being characterised by the selection
of an “optimal” option from a set of implied or poorly defined
criteria (Arvai et al., 2001).
Identify risk
reduction options
Generating alternative solutions for the
decision problem.
Options not generated are excluded from subsequent evaluation
and, ultimately, implementation.
Evaluate options There are three elements to this:
forecasting the impact of each option
against the individual evaluation
criteria, determining the cumulative
“goodness” of each option (e.g. via
cost-benefit analysis, multi-attribute
analysis); and determining risk
acceptability.
Systematically evaluating the individual and cumulative merits
of alternative options should provide for more credible,
defensible and rational risk based decision making.
Determining risk acceptability follows as it is risk reduction
options, not risks, which are unacceptable or acceptable
(Fischoff et al., 1981), i.e. the acceptability of risk cannot be
determined without considering the costs and benefits of




The application of managerial
judgement in reviewing the premises,
assumptions, and limitations of
analyses, prior to the final decision
(after Aven et al., 2006).
In line with Mintzberg (1994), we consider that decision
analysis should compliment, but not replace, the knowledge,
intuitions and judgement of decision makers, and further, that
risk based decisions should not reflect theoretically or
analytically derived perspectives that run counter to sound
professional judgement (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2003). More
specifically, given that risk is, at a fundamental level, an
expression of uncertainty, and that the analysis of risk and
decision alternatives is further subject to aleatory, epistemic and
operational uncertainty (Amendola, 2001), the outputs must be
treated diagnostically rather than deterministically, i.e., they
should provide decision support, not decisions.
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Table 1.5 Descriptions of the risk analysis process maturity hierarchy within our
revised model, from ad hoc to adaptive
Validation A broad range of mechanisms are in place to capture feedback potentially challenging the validity
of the risk analysis process (e.g. benchmarking surveys, professional networks, external peer




Norms and assumptions underpinning the design of the risk analysis process are openly questioned,
critically evaluated and, where appropriate, revised in light of validation findings (i.e. double loop
learning).
Verification Verification extends beyond rigorous mechanisms to ensure procedural compliance (e.g. sign offs
supplemented by in-depth audits) to provide formal quality control of risk analyses (e.g. peer




Root and common causes of errors in the execution of risk analysis (e.g. deficient communication,
overly complex procedures, lack of education and training) are identified and resolved.
Modifications to the design of the process are identified, evaluated and implemented within periodic
and event-driven reviews, but remain largely reactive and externally driven (i.e. mirroring changes
to codes, standards, guidelines, etc.).
The critical and key risk analysis practices are explicitly undertaken.
Procedures Procedures exist to guide the execution of risk analysis, with an appropriate degree of
standardisation, detail, and complexity.
Roles and
responsibilities
Risk analysis roles and responsibilities are allocated with sufficient regard for staff competencies
and authorities.
Initiation Criteria Cyclical and event-based criteria are in place to guide the initiation of risk analyses.
Resource
management
The requisite monetary, human and technical resources are identified, acquired and deployed in
support of risk analysis.
Input data
management
The requisite data inputs are identified, acquired and deployed in support of risk analysis.
Output data
management
Risk analysis outputs are collected, stored and disseminated in a manner that supports decision-
making, satisfies audit requirements, and facilitates organisational learning.
Verification Basic mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with risk analysis procedures, focussing on
outputs rather than tasks performed (e.g. sign offs on receipt of completed risk analyses).




Non-compliances with risk analysis procedures are resolved on a case by case basis (i.e. treated as
isolated errors requiring sanction to prevent their recurrence). Improvements to the design of the




A broad cross section of internal and external knowledge, experience, skills and perspectives is
reflected within risk analysis, based on explicit guidelines or criteria for stakeholder engagement.
LEVEL 3:
Defined
Competence Staff exhibit adequate knowledge, skills and experience in risk analysis. Education and training in
risk analysis is planned and executed based on established competency requirements.
LEVEL 2:
Repeatable
The critical risk analysis practices are explicitly undertaken.
LEVEL 1:
Ad hoc
Risk analysis is absent; or the critical practices are implicitly or incompletely performed.
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Table 1.6 Descriptions of the risk analysis process maturity attributes and their rationale for inclusion within our revised model
Attribute Description Rationale Key aspects
Procedures The rules guiding the execution
of risk analysis.
Procedures serve to capture and disseminate knowledge
of the optimal conduct of risk analysis so that it is
maintained within the organisational memory rather
than as hidden expert knowledge (NEA/CSNI, 1999),
and so ensure its consistent, efficient conduct.
Appropriate standardisation and formalisation of procedures taking into
account personnel experience and knowledge; participation of end users
(e.g. risk analysts) in their development; matching detail with complexity of
work; making explicit the rationale for conducting risk analyses; being




Assignment of personnel to risk
analysis roles and
responsibilities.
To avoid the “not my job” phenomenon (Joy and
Griffiths, 2005), and ensure risk analysis receives
appropriate focus and resource allocations.
Matching role descriptions and assignment of responsibilities with
personnel competencies and authorities (NEA/CSNI, 1999). Supporting




Stages or conditions which
initiate risk analysis.
To ensure risk analyses is undertaken as required,
rather than being initiated on an ad hoc, over zealous,
or reactive basis, or marginalised as “make work.”
Identifying where risk analysis is necessary vs. where adherence to codes
and standards can be said to discharge the duty (Health and Safety




The planning, acquisition, and
deployment of funds,
techniques and staff in support
of risk analysis.
Resourcing of risk analysis is particularly critical
during periods of reduced budgets and downsizing,
which may bring an emphasis on economic rather than
safe operation (NEA/CSNI, 1999).
Sufficiency and availability of financial resources; access to sufficiently
competent human resources; and a range of risk analysis techniques which
reflect the complexity of the organisation’s activities and working




and storage of risk analysis data
inputs.
The systematic identification and capture of data
requirements serves to ensure analyses are underpinned
by objective data evaluation, rather than reflecting best
guesses in the guise of “expert judgement.”
The definition of data requirements / data sources for risk analysis, either at
the process level or, where not practical, on a case by case basis, and
mapping these to data collection and storage systems.
Output data
management
The collection, storage and
dissemination of risk analysis
Risk analysis outputs must be systematically recorded
to inform decision makers, for audit and training
Documenting in-depth the risk analysis outcomes, not simply the overall
level of risk (e.g. sources of data, assumptions used, methods followed,
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outputs. purposes, and to facilitate future reviews (COSO, 2004;
CSA, 2004). Further, this ensures staff have current
knowledge of the human, technical, organisational and
environmental factors that govern system safety
(Reason, 1997).
etc.). Although in theory the storage media is unimportant as long as the
outputs are easily retrievable (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003), IT-
based data systems (risk registers) have significant advantages, particularly
in facilitating information flow between and across layers and boundaries of
the organisation (COSO, 2004).
Verification Ensuring compliance with risk
analysis procedures, and
providing quality control of the
execution of risk analysis.
The mere existence of procedures is not in itself
enough to ensure that staff actions will be consistent
with them (Hoyle, 2001; ISO, 2000). Errors of
omission or commission (e.g. due to misunderstanding
instructions, carelessness, fatigue or management
override), may cause deviations. Similarly, procedural
compliance does not ensure the quality of execution of
risk analysis.
Implementation of mechanisms to ensure adherence to procedures (e.g.
auditing, “sign offs”) and to sanction non-compliance. Quality control
mechanisms (e.g. peer reviews, Delphi panels) should be implemented with
explicit methods for controlling (e.g. establishing group consensus
iteratively) or evaluating (e.g. quality criteria) the quality of analyses. An
appropriate balance between the resources required, the constraints of
bureaucracy, and the benefits of process control should be struck.
Validation Assessing the fundamental
correctness of the risk analysis
process design (e.g. that the
correct techniques are being
applied, that the correct
initiation criteria are in place).
The willingness and means to question the validity of
current risk analysis practices is required to show due
diligence and ensure that current practices are
legitimate, and is further a prerequisite to the continual
improvement of risk analysis.
Formalised approaches to validation include: statistical or mathematical
approaches to validating technical methodologies, independent peer
reviews, and benchmarking surveys; and informally may draw upon:
professional networks, trade and scientific literature, etc.
Organisational
learning
The manner in which the
organisation identifies,
evaluates and implements
improvements to the design and
execution of risk analysis.
Mechanisms for verification and validation are mere
panaceas if their findings are not acted upon, i.e., if
they are not used to rectify deficiencies in the design
and execution of risk analysis.
Reviews should: be undertaken at specified intervals and on an event
driven-basis; consider a broad range of internal and external feedback;
focus on improving the validity of the risk analysis process and the
effectiveness of its execution, not on ensuring it complies with a given
standard; treat errors of omission or commission in the execution of risk
analysis not as isolated lapses requiring sanction to prevent their re-
occurrence, but as opportunities to identify and resolve root and common
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causes of error; and be supported by a learning culture, wherein current
methods and approaches to risk analysis, and their underlying assumptions,




stakeholders, both internal and
external to the utility, for the




The legitimacy of risk analysis outputs depends upon
appropriately broad stakeholder engagement, as risk is
an intrinsically multi-faceted construct, whose
comprehensive understanding is often beyond the
capabilities of individuals or small groups.
A team approach to risk analysis which pools the knowledge, skills,
expertise and experience of a range of perspectives is preferable (Health
and Safety Laboratory, 2003; MHU, 2003; Joy and Griffiths, 2005).
External stakeholders may be engaged to: capture expertise (e.g.
consultants); confer additional legitimacy on the analyses; communicate
due diligence (e.g. regulators); and capture community values and ensure
they are incorporated within the analysis.
Competence The ability to demonstrate
knowledge, skills, and
experience in risk analysis to
the level required (Health and
Safety Laboratory, 2003).
The legitimacy of risk analyses outcomes depends to a
large extent on the capacity of staff to critically
evaluate available information and to supplement it
with their own knowledge and plausible assumptions
(Rosness, 1998) , i.e. on staff competencies.
Definition of required staff competencies in risk analysis; evaluation and
implementation of appropriate education and training vehicles to develop /
maintain those competencies (e.g. class room learning, external
workshops); providing “on the job” training under adequate supervision;
designing and implementing methods for evaluating the efficacy of
educating and training (e.g. for measuring that the required competencies
have been imparted).
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1.6.4 Summary of the distinctions between the RM-CMM and the revised capability
maturity model
Our revised capability maturity model differs in a variety of ways from its
precursor, the RM-CMM. Aside from the general progression from prescriptive to
descriptive, these changes can be placed into five principal categories, relating to: the
selection of processes; the selection of practices which comprised each process; the
selection of attributes which define process maturity; the distinctions between maturity
levels; and the approach to evaluating process maturity. We summarise these in turn.
1.6.4.1 Changes in the selection of processes
Firstly, the models’ are distinct in terms of the processes included: the revised
model incorporates the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making.
These are considered two of the three a priori risk management processes under our re-
conceptualisation (Figure 1.1). The implementation of risk based decisions process
(“risk response” in the language of the RM-CMM) was not included due to data
limitations which were compounded by the fact that implementation mechanisms can
be expected, indeed were observed, to vary markedly depending on the nature of the
decision to be implemented (i.e. operational vs. capital vs. procedural, etc.). This
contrasts with the RM-CMM, which considered risk management to be comprised of
eleven processes (which included the three discussed above). Therefore, a relevant
question to ask here is: what happened to the other eight processes? There are three
categories of reasoning for their exclusion from our revised model: processes removed
as the initial rationale for their inclusion was considered invalid; processes re-
incorporated within the maturity hierarchy (i.e. re-formulated as attributes defining
process maturity) or within the retained processes; and processes removed as they were
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simply redundant. We describe these in turn (although in some cases, combinations of
these reasons were applied).
In the first category, the processes of supply chain risk management and change
risk management were removed as, with our revised view that risk management is not
an overarching discipline, but rather one taking discrete forms which vary according to
the functional context of its application, they became simply the application of risk
management to supply chain and change management functions, rather than distinct
risk management processes. Strategic risk planning was removed because, whilst it
centred on the development of the risk management framework, the practices included
were a scatter gun of strategic requirements rather than a discrete process, some of
which were redundant as they were incorporated within the maturity hierarchy (e.g.
allocate resources for implementing corporate risk management strategy). Integrating
risk management was removed as the three practices it considered were either:
redundant (the institutionalisation aspect, which is at the core of the maturity hierarchy
concept); no longer considered valid (cross-functional integration, as we now consider
that the form of risk management should be fit for purpose, i.e. tailored to fit the
functional context in which it is applied, rather than being normalised across the
organisation to fit a common format); or had found no meaningful empirical support
through the RM-CMM’s application and so presumed irrelevant (the integration of risk
management process interfaces).
The establishing risk acceptance criteria process was reformulated on the basis
that the two aspects it addressed were, theoretically and empirically, unrelated. To
explain, the development of criteria for evaluating the significance of risk, observed in
practice to involve the development of risk ranking techniques (intended to normalise,
e.g., environmental and financial risks to a common denominator), was quite distinct
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from developing criteria for evaluating the acceptability of risk (e.g. the ALARP
principle, cost-benefit principle). They are theoretically distinct in that the
determination of whether a risk is acceptable cannot be based purely on its evaluated
significance, i.e. the acceptability of risk cannot be determined without considering the
costs and benefits of maintaining vs. reducing current risk levels. And so the latter
aspect is now coded within the risk based decision making process of our revised model
as a practice, whilst the former is one element of resourcing, an attribute defining the
maturity of implementation of risk analysis (in terms of sufficiency of techniques
available). Risk monitoring was no longer considered as a discrete process, but rather
as the revision of existing risk analyses, and so is represented within the revised
maturity hierarchy of risk analysis (i.e. that criteria for initiating risk analyses should be
both cyclical and event-based). Risk knowledge management, or the collection and
storage of input and output risk management data, is similarly now incorporated within
the revised maturity hierarchy (i.e. the attributes of input and output data management).
Finally, education and training in risk management, i.e. the development and
maintenance of staff competencies in risk management, is also incorporated within the
revised maturity hierarchy (as seen in the characterisation of the maturity attribute
competence at L3 for risk analysis and risk based decision making). This reflects: that
the limited nature of education and training in risk management observed within our
research suggests it would be counter-intuitive to consider it as an independent and
therefore critical process; and that competencies in risk management is a somewhat
abstract concept, as compared to competencies in risk analysis or risk based decision
making, which is more tangible.
An important point to recall is that numerous standpoints could be taken
advocating the inclusion of process x or y within our re-conceptualisation of risk
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management, as numerous activities central to the management of risk could be
formulated as processes. The reductio ad absurdum of which is that the allocation of
roles and responsibilities in risk analysis could be viewed as a distinct process. This is,
strictly speaking, true, however, our re-conceptualisation of risk management explicitly
considers only three processes – those considered critical – one of which,
implementation of risk based decisions, is not included in our revised model, for
reasons discussed above.
1.6.4.2 Changes in the selection of practices
There were also changes in the practices which comprised the processes of risk
analysis and risk based decision making. Within the revised model, risk analysis and
risk based decision making are composed of a series of practices. These practices,
taken together (Figure 1.3), explicitly map out each process flow (whereas in our prior
model, the practices were, in essence, elements of each process flow, rather than their
totality). The substantive nature of the changes renders their complete discussion
inappropriate. Instead the reader is referred to Chapter 7 for a discussion of the risk
analysis and risk based decision making practices coded within the revised model, and
of their theoretical and empirical basis.
1.6.4.3 Changes in the selection of attributes which define process maturity
We now turn to distinctions relating to the selection of attributes which define
process maturity. The RM-CMM considered eight attributes to define process maturity,
whilst the revised model considers eleven. Note that many of the attributes in the final
model were simply extensions, clarifications or adaptations of the prior attributes,
whilst others were reformulated from processes now removed (e.g. input and output
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data management, two maturity attributes of the revised model, were reformulated from
the risk knowledge management process of the RM-CMM). This progression was
informed by our empirical observations, in particular from the final case study (as
evidenced in Appendix H) and a return to the literature (as evidenced in Table 7.4 and
Appendix J). Importantly, the revised attributes and their rationale for inclusion were
more explicitly defined, information was provided on their key aspects, and their
definitions were more closely related to their descriptions within the maturity hierarchy
(i.e. the coding was tightened, see Table 7.3 and Appendix I).
1.6.4.4 Changes in the distinctions between maturity levels
The final category of changes relates to how we have defined the distinctions
between maturity levels (i.e. how L1 is distinguished from L2, from L3, etc.). As an
exhaustive description of these changes would be banal, we note only those prominent
changes. The revised model explicitly considers completeness of process execution as
one aspect characterising process maturity. Specifically, to reach L2 maturity in risk
analysis or risk based decision making, those practices designated as critical must be
explicitly undertaken; to reach L3 maturity, one requirement is that both the critical and
key practices are undertaken. The distinction between key and critical practices is
somewhat arbitrary, but is based on the premise that the key practices are non-essential
(yet valuable) components of each process, whilst the critical practices are essential. A
further change may be categorised as general refinements in the maturity hierarchy.
Here, the maturity hierarchy was refined based on the revised attributes, and re-scaled
in terms of their manner of representation within the hierarchy (i.e. how the attributes
were characterised at each maturity level).
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1.6.4.5 Changes in the approach to evaluating process maturity
The final category of changes relates to the approach to evaluating process
maturity. The revised model requires that in order to achieve a given maturity level, all
positive requirements of that level and those preceding levels must be satisfied. This
contrasts with the approach to evaluating process maturity adopted in our application of
the RM-CMM, which was based on the “highest degree of fit.” This revised approach
is more in line with the traditional approach to process maturity evaluations in the
CMM field, and emphasises that the weakest link can be the lowest common
denominator in determining the value derived from a process.
1.6.5 Research findings
Here, we focus on the empirical data derived from the revised model’s
application within the final industrial case study. In this regard, the research findings
may be summarised as: juxtaposing empirical observations on the practices which
constitute the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making across a range
of utility functions; providing a comparative analysis of the strengths and limitations of
said practices with reference to the broader literature (e.g. the strengths and limitations
of checklist-based approaches to hazard identification in occupational health and safety
management); empirical observations on the steps required for the mature
implementation of those practices across a range of functions (e.g. relating to how risk
analysis may be initiated within engineering, and quality control achieved within
project risk analysis); and evaluating the implications of the presence or absence of
those maturity characteristics with reference to the broader literature (e.g. discussing
the implications of the lack of a defined framework for risk based decision making).
Whilst the generalisability of the empirical findings is naturally a concern given the
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limited sample, the effort taken in setting the findings within the context of the broader
literature ameliorated this in part. More broadly, concerns relating to the
generalisability of the model must be balanced with the knowledge that whilst this final
case study did inform its development, so to did: the empirical findings from the prior
benchmarking survey and initial industrial case study; the capability maturity literature;
risk analysis and management frameworks; decision theory and its application to risk
based decision making; and quality management principles (Figure 1.2).
1.7 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
1.7.1 Design and application of RM-CMM
In light of our recanting of the RM-CMM, its contribution is best viewed as a
vehicle for obtaining the empirical observations derived from its application in the
initial case study and subsequent benchmarking survey, and as a precursor to the final
model. Note that our recanting does not invalidate those empirical observations; it
simply means that they were imperfectly coded. To recap, we methodically derived a
portfolio of observations on water utility risk management practices, and their relative
maturity of implementation. The novelty of these findings are striking, given that
whilst the premise that institutional capacities rather than technical aspects are a
fundamental limiting factor in implementing risk management has many proponents
(e.g. Garrick, 1988; Luehrman, 1997; Strutt, 2006), there is a dearth of descriptive
research on both the practical form of risk management within the water and related
utility sectors and how it may be institutionalised, and those that exist tend towards the
anecdotal rather than analytical (e.g. Dalgleish and Cooper, 2005; Aabo et al., 2005).
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Here, we are compelled to address the recent development of a selection of risk
management capability maturity models (e.g. IACCM, 2003; RMRDP, 2002). We
believe that these models insufficiently reflect the basic principles of capability
maturity modelling. The most critical point is that they are not explicitly process-
centred. Furthermore, they do not closely reflect the clear distinctions between
maturity levels as set out by the Software Engineering Institute and developed further
by subsequent researchers (Paulk et al., 1993; SEI, 2002a/b; Sharp et al., 2002; Strutt et
al., 2006; Sarshar et al., 2000), instead characterising risk management maturity on a
graded scale of good-to-bad practice. Of course, the CMM approach is not the sole
means for improving risk management, and these critiqued models have found support
within industry. Thus, we do not imply that the IACCM and RMRDP models are
without value, indeed their simplicity and modest time demands may prove attractive to
many organisations. However, our research was not an extension of these models, but
rather a novel application of capability maturity modelling to the discipline of risk
management as applied within the water utility sector.
1.7.2 Design and application of capability maturity model for benchmarking risk
analysis and risk based decision making practice
Naturally, we focus on the contributions of our revised model and its application,
which were three-fold. We have: synthesized empirical observations with behavioral
and normative theories to codify the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision
making; placed these processes within a maturity framework which distinguishes their
relative maturity of implementation from ad hoc to adaptive; and provided a
comparative analysis of the risk analysis and risk based decision making practices, and
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their maturity of implementation, across a range of water and wastewater utility
functions.
We begin by discussing the contribution to knowledge regarding the revised
model itself, before considering the empirical observations derived from its application.
In essence, the model is composed of two elements: practices which together constitute
the process flows for risk analysis and risk based decision making (i.e. the codification
of risk analysis and risk based decision making); and maturity levels, characterised with
reference to attributes, which describe their relative maturity of implementation (i.e.
degree of institutionalisation). Novelty is found within these elements independently,
and in their synthesis, as we outline below.
1.7.2.1 Novelty in coding of risk analysis
We begin by discussing our codification of risk analysis (Figure 1.3; Table 1.3),
whose contribution and novelty is best described with regard to prominent risk
management frameworks which adopt a strategic, organisation-wide focus (e.g. COSO,
2004; AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; FERMA, 2003) and those frameworks for drinking water
quality management which adopt a risk-based approach (NZMOH, 2001; NHMRC,
2001, 2004; WHO, 2002, 2004). Consider first our initial practice, system
characterisation. This practice is concerned with establishing and describing the system
with which risk analysis is concerned, and is included as we propose that a
comprehensive system understanding is a sine qua non for generating risk analysis
outcomes that are valid and accepted by stakeholders. Analogous steps are found in
those strategic risk management frameworks (e.g. AS/NZS: establish the context;
COSO: internal environment), however ours diverges due to its intended functional
focus. In other words, those steps in the aforementioned strategic frameworks are
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concerned with establishing the organisational context for risk analysis (e.g.
establishing the organisation’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; the
organisation’s wider goals and capabilities, etc.), whilst our model, being intended for
application within a functional context, adopts an altogether more operational focus to
system characterisation (e.g. characterising the workplace, engineering process, or
project with which risk analysis is concerned). This practice, when applied to a
drinking water quality management function, is analogous to “system assessment and
design stage” and “water supply system analysis,” elements of WHO’s water safety
plan approach and the NHMRC framework for drinking water quality management,
respectively, although of course these latter frameworks focus only in part on the
application of risk analysis to drinking water quality hazards (being concerned with
broader aspects of drinking water quality management, such as operational procedures,
monitoring, and verification of drinking water quality).
Similarly, our inclusion of the practice hazard precursor identification, is distinct
in that those strategic risk management frameworks tend to focus on hazard
identification (i.e. finding sources of potential harm), rather than the exploration of how
and why hazardous events may occur (i.e. examining underlying processes or pathways
– precursors – through which hazardous events may arise). This is an important
observation in that an inability to capture causal pathways to failure significantly
impedes the development of risk reduction measures targeted at their root causes.
Consider now our practice control evaluation. This involves the identification and
assessment of existing technical, physical and administrative controls which may either
reduce the likelihood of a hazardous event occurring, or serve to mitigate its severity of
consequences. Whilst not in itself novel (e.g. AS/NZS, 1999, 2004), our treatment of
the practice diverges in that we consider this assessment should address both the
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criticality of the controls (e.g. based on their inherent capacity to reduce risk, whether
they are proactive or reactive, etc.) and their adequacy of design, management and
operation. In doing so, we abstract principles relating to the control of drinking water
quality hazards from those frameworks for drinking water quality management which
adopt a risk-based approach (NZMOH, 2001; NHMRC, 2001, 2004; WHO, 2002,
2004).
Finally, our coding of risk analysis places consequence evaluation prior to
likelihood evaluation, as opposed to the majority of frameworks which consider the
order in which they are performed to be interchangeable, or at least make no explicit
reference to their ordering (e.g. COSO, 2004; AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; FERMA, 2003).
Our reasoning is simple: risk assessment (i.e. the combined steps of consequence and
likelihood evaluation) involves determining the likelihoods of a range of potential
outcomes, or the likelihood of one potential outcome. Thus, the outcome(s) should be
defined prior to any evaluation of its (their) likelihood of occurrence. If these steps are
performed in reverse, likelihood evaluation will inevitably be concerned with the
likelihood of a hazardous event occurring (e.g. the probability of asset failure), rather
than with the likelihood of an event occurring and leading to a defined outcome (e.g.
the probability of an asset failing and leading to a given environmental impact). The
former approach overestimates risk.
1.7.2.2 Novelty in coding of risk based decision making
We now turn to our coding of the risk based decision making process (Figure 1.3;
Table 1.4). It is notable that strategic risk management frameworks (e.g. COSO, 2004;
AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; FERMA, 2003) conventionally treat risk based decision making,
namely the identification, evaluation and selection of options to reduce risks, in a
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somewhat cursory manner. This perhaps reflects a prevailing view that values the
judgement, intuition, and inherent need for creativity of decision makers, over any
perceived moves towards prescription. However, decision making frameworks,
including ours, are intended to guide, not prescribe, decision making, with the objective
of ensuring a level of consistency, credibility, and confidence in achieving desirable
outcomes. This is supported by a wealth of empirical evidence suggesting that, in the
absence of a clear framework, people struggle to identify their full range of values and
concerns in a given decision context, and are ill-equipped to make those complex trade-
offs common to risk based decision making (Arvai et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 1977;
Payne et al., 1992; Slovic, 1995; Matheson and Matheson, 1998). This is manifested in
the selection of sub-optimal risk reduction options; sub-optimal, as they fail to address
the full range of stakeholder concerns and values (Bohneblust and Slovic, 1998).
And so the contribution and novelty of our coding is best illustrated not by its
comparison to existing risk management frameworks, but rather to the literature on
decision theory (particularly regarding decision analysis and the construction of
preferences) and its application to risk based decision making. Through this
comparison, novelty is found, particularly, in two aspects. Firstly, in our designation of
establish risk acceptance criteria as the initial practice, which refers to the development
of criteria for evaluating the acceptability of risk (e.g. life safety criteria, as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP) criteria, and the de minimis risk concept), as in the
absence of such criteria, on what basis are decisions taken whether to accept or reduce
risk? Secondly, novelty is seen in our separation of the evaluate options practice into
three elements: forecasting the impact of each option against the individual evaluation
criteria (e.g. engineering studies to evaluate the technical feasibility of an option),
determining the cumulative “goodness” of each option (e.g. via cost-benefit analysis,
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multi-attribute analysis); and determining risk acceptability (e.g. applying the results of
the cost-benefit analysis to the ALARP criteria). Determining risk acceptability is the
final of these elements as it is risk reduction options, not risks, which are unacceptable
or acceptable (Fischoff et al., 1981), i.e. the acceptability of risk cannot be determined
without considering the costs and benefits of maintaining vs. reducing current risk
levels.
Finally, we highlight our inclusion of the practice managerial review and option
selection, which is concerned with the application of managerial judgement in
reviewing the premises, assumptions, and limitations of analyses, prior to the final
decision (i.e. selection of risk reduction option). Whilst not novel (after Aven et al.,
2006), it is crucial as it highlights our view that decision analysis should compliment,
but not replace, the knowledge, intuitions and judgement of decision makers
(Mintzberg, 1994), and further, that risk based decisions should not reflect theoretically
or analytically derived perspectives that run counter to sound professional judgement
(Hrudey and Hrudey, 2003). More specifically, it emphasises that as risk is, at a
fundamental level, an expression of uncertainty, and that the analysis of risk and
decision alternatives is further subject to aleatory, epistemic and operational uncertainty
(Amendola, 2001), then the outputs of decision analysis must be treated diagnostically
rather than deterministically, i.e., they should provide decision support, not decisions.
This final point is critical, as there is an understandable tendency for decision making
frameworks to embrace determinism, given that, at a psychological level, the mind
prefers certainty to truth, and often mistakes the former for the latter. Whilst our model
seeks to explicitly avoid this, one can question whether the roles of judgement,
experience, bias, power structures, etc., would be best incorporated within each process
step (i.e. practice) of risk based decision making, rather than it being appended as the
43
last practice in the process. This is because all of these aspects inevitably influence
each preceding practice (e.g. bias influences the selection of evaluation criteria, etc.).
1.7.2.3 Novelty in coding of maturity hierarchy
We now turn to the novelty of our revised maturity levels, characterised with
reference to attributes, which describe the relative maturity of implementation of the
processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making (Table 1.5; Table 1.6). Here,
novelty is inherent as, to our knowledge, it is the first detailed application of CMM
principles to the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making (excluding
the RM-CMM). Thus, we focus on novelty in comparison to CMMs designed for other
disciplines (e.g. software engineering, construction management, reliability
engineering, etc.). In this regard, novelty is found in both the attributes selected and,
less importantly, in their manner of representation within the maturity hierarchy (i.e.
what distinguishes one level from another). We restrict our discussion to the former.
Many of the attributes can be traced back to the prior literature on capability maturity
modelling and quality management (specifically: procedures, roles and responsibilities,
resource management, input data management, output data management, verification,
and competence; see e.g. Crosby, 1979, 1996; Hoyle, 2001; ISO, 2000; Paulk et al.,
1993; SEI, 2002a/b; Sharp et al., 2002; Strutt et al., 2006; Sarshar et al., 2000),
however we have built upon this prior art through both refining and adapting our
descriptions of these attributes to fit the context of risk analysis and risk based decision
making, a task informed by our empirical observations and the broader literature (e.g.,
see Table 1.6, and Appendices H and J).
This extension of the prior art is shown in our treatment of competence, which, in
the case of its application to risk analysis, is defined as the ability of staff to
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demonstrate knowledge, skills, and experience in risk analysis to the level required, an
attribute included as the legitimacy of risk analyses depends largely on the capacity of
staff to critically evaluate available information and to supplement it with their own
knowledge and plausible assumptions (Rosness, 1998), i.e. on staff competencies. Key
issues here include the definition of required staff competencies in risk analysis; the
evaluation and implementation of appropriate education and training vehicles to
develop / maintain those competencies (e.g. classroom learning, external workshops);
providing “on the job” training under adequate supervision; and designing and
implementing methods for evaluating the efficacy of educating and training (e.g. for
measuring that the required competencies have been imparted).
We now turn to those attributes which are particularly distinctive in comparison
to the prior CMM literature. We illustrate these with reference to the risk analysis
process, although their application to risk based decision making is broadly similar.
One of these is initiation criteria, which refers to predefined stages or conditions which
initiate risk analysis, included to ensure that risk analysis is undertaken as required,
rather than being initiated on an ad hoc, over zealous, or reactive basis, or marginalised
as “make work.” Key issues here include identifying where risk analysis is necessary
vs. where adherence to codes and standards can be said to discharge the duty (Health
and Safety Laboratory, 2003; UKOOA, 1999), and making this explicit in cyclical and
event-based criteria. Another novel attribute is stakeholder engagement, which deals
with the engagement of stakeholders, both internal and external to the utility, for the
purpose of harnessing a broad range of perspectives, knowledge, skills and experience
within risk analysis, on the basis that risk is an intrinsically multi-faceted construct,
whose comprehensive understanding is often beyond the capabilities of individuals or
small groups.
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Consider also our treatment of validation as an attribute, which is concerned with
evaluating the fundamental correctness of the risk analysis process design (e.g. that the
correct techniques are being applied, that the correct initiation criteria are in place), and
included because the willingness and means to question the validity of current practices
is required to show due diligence and ensure that current practices are legitimate, and is
further a prerequisite to their continual improvement. Formalised approaches to
validation include: statistical or mathematical approaches to validating technical
methodologies, independent peer reviews, and benchmarking surveys; and informally
may draw upon: professional networks, trade and scientific literature, etc.
Finally consider our inclusion of organisational learning as an attribute, which
addresses the manner in which the organisation identifies, evaluates and implements
improvements to the design and execution of risk analysis, and is based on part upon
the concepts of single and double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). It is
included because mechanisms for verification and validation of risk analysis are mere
panaceas if their findings are not acted upon, i.e., if they are not used to rectify
deficiencies in the design and execution of risk analysis. Key issues here are that
associated reviews should be: undertaken at specified intervals and on an event driven-
basis; consider a broad range of internal and external feedback; focus on improving the
validity of the risk analysis process and the effectiveness of its execution, not on
ensuring it complies with a given standard; treat errors of omission or commission in
the execution of risk analysis not as isolated lapses requiring sanction to prevent their
re-occurrence, but as opportunities to identify and resolve root and common causes of
error; and be supported by a learning culture, wherein current methods and approaches
to risk analysis, and their underlying assumptions, are open to question and critical
evaluation.
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1.7.2.4 Utility of capability maturity model for benchmarking risk analysis and risk based
decision making practice
We now consider the contribution of the synthesis of our coding of risk analysis
and risk based decision making within a process maturity hierarchy in terms of the
utility of the revised model; specifically, who will use it and what will it enable them to
do that they were previously unable to? From an internal organisational perspective,
there are three principal uses of the model: for benchmarking purposes, enabling utility
functions to compare themselves against others in their sector and beyond; as a
reference model for developing plans to improve capabilities in risk analysis and risk
based decision making; or to drive improvements in the capabilities of key suppliers
and partners (e.g. by using maturity in risk analysis or risk based decision making as a
criteria in supplier selection). From an external perspective, the model is of potential
use to standards agencies within the water and related utility sectors. It satisfies a key
requirement of being both empirically and theoretically grounded, and is distinct from
existing standards in terms of: its proven generalisability to a range of utility functions;
its detailed treatment of risk based decision making, in particular the inclusion of the
principles of decision theory; and its placement of risk analysis and risk based decision
making within a maturity framework which allows distinctions to be made between
organisational capabilities based on their relative maturity of implementation.
Furthermore, the model has potential utility from a regulatory perspective, specifically
in facilitating a step-change in the approach to regulating risk management within the
water sector from its current synthesis of reactive, outcome based approaches (e.g.
water quality standards) and prescriptions (e.g. codes and regulations), towards a
proactive, capability based approach. Finally, the model has potential value to the
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research community, as a framework for conducting further descriptive research into
utility risk management practices and their methods of institutionalisation.
1.7.2.5 Novelty in empirical findings
Finally, we consider the contribution of our empirical findings. As noted, these
may be summarised as: juxtaposing empirical observations on the practices which
constitute risk analysis and risk based decision making across a range of water utility
functions; providing a comparative analysis of the strengths and limitations of said
practices with reference to the broader literature (e.g. the strengths and limitations of
checklist-based approaches to hazard identification in occupational health and safety);
empirical observations on the steps required for the mature implementation of those
practices across a range of functions (e.g. relating to how risk analysis may be initiated
within engineering, and quality control achieved within project risk analysis); and
evaluating the implications of the presence or absence of those maturity characteristics
with reference to the broader literature (e.g. discussing the implications of the lack of a
defined framework for risk based decision making).
As we have noted, the novelty of this is pronounced given the lack of descriptive
research of an analytical nature on risk management within water utilities. Indeed, this
novelty extends beyond the water sector, as academic treatments of risk analysis and
risk based decision making, particularly the former, tend to focus on their technical and
normative aspects (e.g. focusing on the technical aspects of applying risk or decision
analysis techniques), rather than their institutional, behavioural, or descriptive aspects
(e.g. how risk analysis and risk based decision making can be embedded within
organizations, or case study research exploring how they are applied in practice).
48
Furthermore, our function-specific approach counters the concept of “enterprise wide
risk management,” which, anecdotally, appears to have created a majority opinion
amongst practitioners where risk management is viewed as an over-arching, strategic
discipline (i.e. taking broadly similar forms in strategic planning, business planning and
project management), as opposed to the minority brief, to which the author subscribes,
which, whilst recognising that the underlying theoretical basis of risk analysis and risk
based decision making remain largely constant, views the variations and nuances of
their application to particular utility functions as critical (i.e. we consider that the form
of risk analysis and risk based decision making should be fit for purpose, rather than
being normalised across the organisation to fit a common format).
1.8 CONCLUSIONS
The research was based on the premise that the most fruitful approach to
improving water utility risk management practice on the ground would be to focus on
the implementation of risk management rather than the techniques employed per se, i.e.
to focus on the institutional capacities of utilities to employ risk analysis and
management techniques for more credible, optimal decision making. Here, the field of
capability maturity modelling showed great promise. Thus, the research began with the
development of a risk management capability maturity model (RM-CMM) for the water
utility sector. The model was a prescriptive codification of water sector risk
management practice, within a process-based hierarchy which distinguished the relative
maturity of implementation of risk management. The model was then applied to the
sector via case study and benchmarking survey. Given our subsequent revision of the
model, its contribution is best viewed as a precursor to the revised model, and as a
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vehicle for capturing empirical observations reflecting our prescriptive codification of
risk management processes and their methods for institutionalisation.
We revised the prescriptive RM-CMM model towards a descriptive capability
maturity model of risk analysis and risk based decision making practice. We illustrated
the application of this revised model to a cross-section of water and wastewater utility
functions. The contribution to knowledge of this stage of the research was three-fold,
we: synthesized empirical observations with behavioral and normative theories to
codify the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making; placed these
processes within a maturity framework which distinguishes their relative maturity of
implementation from ad hoc to adaptive; and provided a comparative analysis of the
risk analysis and risk based decision making practices, and their maturity of
implementation, across a range of water and wastewater utility functions.
This research is particularly timely, given that whilst the premise that institutional
capacities rather than technical aspects are a fundamental limiting factor in
implementing risk management has many proponents (e.g. Garrick, 1988; Luehrman,
1997; Strutt, 2006), there is a dearth of descriptive research on both the practical form
of risk management within the water and related utility sectors and how it may be
institutionalised, and those that exist tend towards the anecdotal rather than analytical
(e.g. Dalgleish and Cooper, 2005; Aabo et al., 2005). In summary, the research
provides utility managers, technical staff, project managers and chief finance officers
with a practical and systematic understanding of how to implement and improve risk
management, and offer preliminary guidance to regulators concerning how improved
water utility governance can be made real. This latter point is particularly pertinent,
given the revised model’s potential for facilitating a step-change in the approach to
regulating risk management within the water sector from its current synthesis of
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reactive, outcome based approaches (e.g. water quality standards) and prescriptions
(e.g. codes and regulations), towards a proactive, capability based approach.
1.9 FUTURE RESEARCH
Finally, we present suggestions for future research:
1: Apply the revised model to benchmark the risk analysis and risk based decision
making capabilities of a representative sample of the international water utility
sector. This would reveal the general strengths and weaknesses of the sector as
a whole, and so inform the targeting of regulatory, industrial and scholarly
resources to ameliorate the latter. The assessment methodology should depart
from that adopted in the thesis in two principal ways. The first concerns the
sampling design, which was devised to capture “best practice” utilities
throughout this thesis, rather than to reflect the sectors’ capabilities as a whole.
The second concerns the approach to determining process maturity. Although
we do not anticipate a deterministic assessment approach (i.e. there would
remain a role for expert judgement in interpreting the data), we feel that in order
to enhance the reliability and validity of the maturity profiles that would be
obtained, clear criteria should be established as to what constitutes valid
evidence for attaining each maturity level (e.g. what specific documentary,
observational or anecdotal evidence would correlate with the guideline
statement characterising stakeholder engagement at L3 maturity in risk
analysis).
2: Establish the correlation between maturity in risk analysis and risk based
decision making and utility performance in managing risk. This is crucial, as
there is a regrettable tendency within the social sciences to judge the value of
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tools and policies based on their intentions, rather than the consequences which
they generate. However, if industrial take up of the model is desired, empirical
evidence of the (presumed) benefits that derive from implementing the model
would be crucial (e.g. characterising the expected reduction in water quality
contamination events from an enhancement of maturity in risk analysis). This
work could proceed in concert with the above suggestion, with performance in
risk management perhaps measured by the framework presented in Appendix A,
and conventional statistical methods used to determine both the nature and
extent of the correlation.
3: Apply the model to related industry sectors considered at the cutting edge of
risk management (e.g. nuclear, offshore oil and gas, chemical process). This is
because we feel that there is considerable opportunity for cross-fertilisation of
knowledge from those sectors who have been experimenting longer with risk
management.
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ABSTRACT
Financial pressures, regulatory reform and sectoral restructuring are requiring
water utilities to move from technically inclined, risk-averse management approaches
toward more commercial, business-oriented practices. Risk analysis strategies and
techniques traditionally applied to public health protection are now seeing broader
application for asset management, assessing competition risks and potential threats to
the security of supplies. Water utility managers have to consider these risks alongside
one another and employ a range of techniques and devise business plans that prioritise
resources on the basis of risk. We present a comprehensive review of risk analysis and
management strategies for application in the water utility sector at the strategic,
programme, and operational levels of decision making.




Providing wholesome, affordable and safe drinking water that has the trust of
customers are the overarching goals of the water utility sector. The sector has publicly
stated (AWWA et al., 2001) that achieving this requires, at a minimum, that water is
safe in microbiological and chemical terms; that it is acceptable to consumers in terms
of taste, odour and appearance; and that the supply is reliable in terms of quality and
quantity. Delivering these objectives in the context of an increasingly demanding
consumer and regulatory environment, under constraints imposed by ageing
infrastructure and the trend towards financial self-sufficiency is challenging. Many
within the industry, spurred on by developments in international regulation and
guidance, are now promoting a business-wide approach to risk management as a means
to ease and exploit this transition (e.g. Lifton and Smeaton, 2003). In practice, water
quality managers and internal audit functions within the sector are working more
closely to address issues of business risk and many of the larger international water
companies now have “group risk managers” in place to manage business and consumer
risks within a single portfolio. Implementation of this business-wide approach to risk
management is not straightforward, however - it requires (Pollard et al., 2004):
(i) integrated frameworks for the management of internal risks (e.g. from
ageing infrastructure) and external risks (e.g. from “competitor” actions) to
the utility;
(ii) the support of Board level, executive management and operational staff as
well as that of external stakeholders; and
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(iii) the effective communication of risk and engagement within decision-
making processes both within companies and with external stakeholders.
Furthermore, as illustrated in this review, there are potential tensions between
managing the risks of a commercial water business and the overarching public health
goal of the water industry, stated above. Critically in this regard, the transition to an
explicit risk management philosophy within the water utility sector is now reflected in
recent revisions to the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Guidelines for Drinking
Water Quality (WHO, 2002, 2003; Fewtrell and Bartram, 2001). This is placing an
emphasis on the development and implementation of “water safety plans” for water
quality management and, within these, the application of risk frameworks and risk tools
such as the “hazard analysis and critical control points” (HACCP) (Dewettinck et al.,
2001; Hellier, 2000) approach as a basis for prioritising risk management measures
within the water supply chain from catchment to tap. The risk management approach is
becoming increasingly embedded within utilities and with it a maturing view of risk
analysis, shifting from that of a one-off technique to “placate” regulators towards that
of a practical methodology to facilitate process control, optimisation and corporate
decision-making within a cost-effective framework. Despite a growing consensus,
there remain significant barriers to the implementation of risk management within
utilities. These can be categorised as business-related, the challenge of integrating risk
management within organisational cultures and decision-making processes (e.g. Pollard
et al., 2004); and technical, relating to the selection and application of risk analysis
tools. One of the key difficulties all organisations face in implementing risk
management is managing the interfaces between high level corporate objectives,
business plans and operational reality. Here then, we critically review the risk analysis
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strategies and tools and techniques available for risk analysis within the sector, with
particular emphasis on decision-making at the corporate (strategic), business
(programme level) and operational levels in water utilities. Necessarily the discussion
requires excursions into the management and technical environmental literature.
However, we view the juxtaposition of these aspects of risk management as central to
providing a well-round examination of the prior art in the current context of its
application within the sector.
2.1.2 Risk analysis and decision-making
Before entering a discussion on risk analysis, we must be clear in our
terminology. In simple terms, risk is widely accepted to consist of a combination of
probabilities and consequences. However, further clarity is required. Adapting
Hrudey’s (2000) elaboration, we consider the notion of risk to be a prediction or
expectation that involves:
• an agent with the potential to cause either harm and/or benefit (e.g. a chemical
contaminant, or an investment opportunity);
• uncertainty of occurrence and outcomes (expressed by the probability or
likelihood of occurrence);
• consequences (the possible outcomes);
• a specified time frame.
The exploration of these facets provides us with an analysis of risk (note that the
authors consider the terms risk assessment and risk analysis to be interchangeable).
Risk is inextricably linked to uncertainty. Thus uncertainty analysis plays a prominent
role in many risk analysis strategies. Finally, and in a distinct business context, we
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consider risk management as the sum of the constituent sets of socio-technical
decisions and actions taken by staff to optimise their organisation’s exposure to risk.
Risk analysis plays a role alongside other decision tools for risk management
(Pollard et al., 2004). Detailed risk analysis is not a prerequisite for effective risk
management. In many industries there are accepted standards of performance and
codes of practice (e.g. engineering standards; accepted best practice; Figure 2.1) that, if
adhered to, provide high degrees of control. These are applied in familiar and well-
characterised situations where uncertainties and system vulnerabilities are well
understood.
Figure 2.1 Decision Framework for the Offshore Oil Industry (UK Oil Operators
Association, 1999, with permission)
However, complex, uncertain and novel systems, that deviate from routine
operation, may require risk analysis, so as to better understand what drives the risk
from or to the plant, process or operation, thereby allowing management measures for
the reduction of unacceptable risks to be targeted for greatest effect (Pollard et al.,
CODES &
Nothing new or unusual
Well understood risks
Established practice
No major stakeholder implications
Lifecycle implications
Some risk trade-offs / transfers
Some uncertainty or deviation from
standard best practice
Significant economic implications
Very novel or challenging
Strong stakeholder views
Significant risk trade-offs / transfers
Large uncertainties



























2004). This principle extends beyond the operation of technical systems to embrace all
aspects of managing a business. This said, risk analysis is, in many respects, a
practitioner-driven discipline. Its application within water utilities has its roots firmly
in the protection of public health from pathogens afforded by the multiple barrier
approach to raw water treatment. Whilst the extension of risk analysis to asset
management, water supply security and catchment (watershed) management is clearly
evident, these applications and the use of risk-based techniques for optimising
treatment plant performance, on-site energy use, maintenance programmes and
compliance monitoring regimes can inadvertently but easily detract from and confuse
the principal purpose of the water supply industry – to provide wholesome, affordable
and safe drinking water that has the trust of customers. In all these applications this
goal must remain paramount.
2.1.3 The risk hierarchy
The organisational hierarchy that exists even within “flat” organisations requires
that risks are actively managed at the strategic, programme and operational levels of an
organisation (Figure 2.2). Typically, there are split accountabilities for these risks such
that the chief financial officer / financial director and Board have overall responsibility,
supported by an internal audit or control function for the management of strategic risks;
executive and senior management address programme level risks (e.g. asset
management, maintenance planning); and operational (e.g. site) managers bear
responsibility for operational risks (e.g. treatment plant performance) (Pollard et al.,
2004).
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Figure 2.2 The risk hierarchy (adapted from Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2002)
A range of strategies exist for assessing and managing these risks in a business
context. The focus in this review is sector-specific, addressing “process” risk analysis
(i.e. risks at the operational and programme level), but in establishing a business-wide
context for this activity we also draw upon the experiences of organisations assessing
risk at the strategic level.
2.2 STRATEGIC RISK ANALYSIS
Within an overarching context of public health protection and the maintenance of
process reliability, utility managers are increasingly concerned with managing the risks
inherent to corporate level decision-making. Critical issues include decisions on
outsourcing asset maintenance, billing and monitoring, the management of change, staff
retention, the long-term viability of investment decisions, and the management of
external interfaces with regulators and “competing” utilities. Risk analysis tools are






















Table 2.1 Strategic level risk portfolio
Context Tool / Technique Application Reference
Ex-post modelling Interpreting / evaluating the relationship between stock risk and
regulatory events
Buckland and Fraser (2001), Morana and Sawkins (2000).Regulatory risk
Ex-ante modelling Modelling evolution of regulatory environment Larssen and Bunn (1999), Bunn et al. (1997).
Competition risks
1) Comparative Competitor analysis Reducing price review uncertainty (and conventional benefits) Drohan and O’ Connor (1998), Rothschild (1979).
Screening Tracking take-over risk2) Capital market
Investment analysis Evaluating take-over opportunity Thomas (1983).
3) For the market Investment analysis Evaluating joint venture Ranasinghe (1999), Grimsey and Lewis (2002).
Competitor identification /
analysis
Minimising competitive threats Rothschild (1979), Drohan and O’ Connor (1998).4) Product market
Investment analysis Evaluating de facto take-over
Scenario planning Exploring potential BPR outcomes Clemons (1995).
Quantitative ‘risk of failure’ Evaluating success likelihood of BPR efforts Crowe et al. (2002).
BPR risks
Risk matrix Appraising and comparing risks of BPR strategies Remeyi and Heafield (1996).
Risk matrix Appraising and comparing risks of new technology projects McGaughey et al. (1994).
Risk algorithm Characterising risk of new technology ‘problems’ Hartmann and Lakatos (1998).
Checklist Minimising risk of new technology introduction Hartmann and Lakatos (1998).
New technology
Profile Guiding strategic technology planning Wildemann (1986).
Outsourcing decision models Evaluating core competencies and appraising market
opportunities for outsourcing candidates
Quélin and Duhamel (2003), Lonsdale (1999).Outsourcing
Scenario planning Exploring ‘what-if’ scenarios Zsidisin et al. (2000).
OCP Evaluating ‘cultural fit’ of prospective employees Sheridan (1992), O’Reilly et al. (1991).
Early warning system Identification of ‘at-risk’ employee groups McNally (2001).
Gap analysis To assess employee development and benefit schemes
Employee retention
Checklist Informal assessment of retention risk Anon (2001).
Investment analysis
NPV / IRR Valuation of an ongoing business or some part of one Barriex et al. (2003), Mosca et al. (2001), ADB (2001), Burchett and
Tummala (1998), Luehrman (1997), Thomas (1983).
1) Assets-in-place
Strategic portfolio planning Creating a balanced utility investment portfolio Rothstein and Kiyosaki (2003).
2) Opportunities Option pricing theory Valuation of possible future operations Luehrman (1997), Black and Scholes (1973).
3) Joint Ventures NPV / IRR Valuation of prospective partnerships, strategic alliances Grimsey and Lewis (2002), Ranasinghe (1999), Luehrman (1997).
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2.2.1 Regulatory risk
Throughout the 20th Century, the central role of water quality to the protection
and preservation of public health encouraged governments to manage utilities within
the public sector (Seidenstat, 2000). Regulation was historically self-imposed and
limited in scope, and, by extension, posed relatively low risk to municipalities and
utilities (in terms of both the likelihood of non-compliance and the associated
penalties). In contrast, more recent (since the 1980s) regulatory pressures and drives to
impose market discipline on the sector, whether directly (privatisation) or by proxy
(e.g. corporatisation or required self-sufficiency), have externalised and broadened the
role of regulatory scrutiny and intervention. Here our discussion is largely restricted to
economic regulation.
A concept of regulatory risk is difficult to grasp. Parker (1998, 2003) contends
that it arises from the nature of the regulatory rules and practices, with rules
determining the extent to which interventions are discretionary, and practices relating to
the interpretation the regulators and others (particularly government) place on the rules.
Kilpatrick and Lapsley (1996) consider regulatory risk as the uncertain impact of
regulatory decisions on regulated companies. Regulatory risk may best be considered
as a combination of the above interpretations, encompassing both the uncertainty of the
decision-making process and of its impact on utilities.
The core issues of regulatory risk are: regulatory independence; regulatory
discretion; transparency and accountability. Independence is critical to minimising the
risk of political interference in a regulatory regime. For example, in England and
Wales, the economic regulator (the Office of Water Services; Ofwat), acting in the
public interest, is vested with a high degree of autonomy from central government,
ensuring that the regulatory process is not subject to direct political interference. In
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contrast, in South Australia (SA), the state government directly controls the tariff
setting process, and as the dividend from SA Water is a significant contributor to the
state budget, there is the danger that political considerations, as well as commercial
ones, might be perceived to influence regulatory pricing (ADB, 2001).
Regulatory discretion refers to the freedom afforded to regulators to interpret the
importance of set duties and objectives and to determine how best to accomplish them
(Kilpatrick and Lapsley, 1996; Parker, 2003). In the UK, Ofwat’s Director General is
free to identify and change the importance attached to set objectives within the
regulatory system, within broadly defined constraints (Parker, 2003). Arguably, the
greater the discretion afforded to the regulator, the greater the uncertainty related to
future regulatory decisions. Ofwat’s regulatory practices are characterised by high
levels of transparency and accountability. In practice, utilities are fully engaged in
regulatory decision-making, with avenues for consultation and appeal established
should companies wish to challenge the outcome. Similarly, the New Jersey Board of
Public Utilities, which regulates all investor-owned utilities in the State, publishes
reports on its activities and is transparent and accountable in its decisions and processes
(ADB, 2001). These arrangements compare to the German system. Water and
sewerage in Germany is the responsibility of the municipalities and the municipalities
regulate and manage the water supply based on European, national, state and municipal
legislation. Though many are satisfied with these relationships, there has been criticism
in a recent report (ADB, 2001), where regulatory decisions were viewed as being taken
in a closed fashion with little clear accountability.
The nature of a regulatory system (i.e. its objectives and the systems in place for
their achievement) represents a core strategic risk for water utilities. For example, in
many developing countries, regulatory scrutiny is largely confined to ensuring a safe,
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secure water supply (ADB, 2001), which, whilst introducing inherent operational risks,
does not invoke strategic uncertainty. In contrast, a main goal of Ofwat is to facilitate
competition within the sector, an objective that introduces utilities to a range of hitherto
unknown risks.
Quantitative treatments of regulatory risk within the literature are restricted to ex-
post analyses of the relationship between utility share price volatility and the regulatory
process. Buckland and Fraser (2001) modelled variations in the systemic (market) risk,
using a variable β (which measures the variability in returns of a stock relative to the
variability of the broader market), of UK water utilities over time, examining the extent
to which observed variations were associated with the regulatory process. A key
finding was the surge in the market’s assessment of the systemic risk to the industry
accompanying the “surprise” result of the 1992 general election. The authors’ analysis
illustrates the influence of politics in even the most independent of regulatory systems.
Similarly, Morana and Sawkins (2000) modelled the London stock market’s response
to the 1994 “periodic review” of water price setting in the England and Wales utility
sector, finding a significant reduction in share price volatility, which they postulated to
be a reflection of shareholder confidence in the credibility and sustainability of the
settlement.
Ideally, for the active management of regulatory risk, analyses should extend to
ex-ante treatments of risk. This is of particular relevance to the modern water utility
sector, where widespread structural reforms are requiring utilities to operate under
rapidly evolving regulatory systems – creating unprecedented uncertainty. In such a
market, there has been no historical evolution and the participants, including the
regulatory institutions, have a limited understanding of how it will operate in the short
term and evolve in the future (Larsen and Bunn, 1999). In such situations, analytical
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models may offer value in alerting utilities to unintended consequences of their actions
that may trigger the regulator into reaction (Larsen and Bunn, 1999). Larsen and Bunn
(1999) argue that system dynamics, which incorporates systems thinking into
simulation modelling, is conducive to the dynamic, uncertain and subjective nature of
assumptions inherent to strategic analysis. To illustrate, Bunn et al. (1997) developed a
system dynamics model to simulate regulatory problems in the restructured UK gas and
electricity markets. Following problem definition and hypothesis formulation, the
authors constructed a simulation model describing the main feedbacks involved in the
exercise of “latent” market power. Their analysis explored the relationship between
corporate strategies designed to exercise this power and the risk of regulatory scrutiny.
The authors concluded that market mechanisms were open to exploitation. Such
analysis, and assessments of system sensitivity, could provide utility managers with a
priori insights into opportunities for exploiting market “imperfections,” thus aiding the
development of corporate strategies.
2.2.2 Competition risks
2.2.2.1 Comparative competition
On account of the water industry’s inherent monopolistic nature, many
governments and their regulators have sought to expand the role of sectoral
competition. None more prominently perhaps than in the UK, where the concept of
comparative competition underpins the regulatory regime (Sawkins, 1995; Saal and
Parker, 2001). The theory of comparative, or “yardstick competition” may be traced to
the work of Shleifer (1985), who proposed a regime in which the price (or financial
rewards) received by a regulated firm depends not on its costs (as in traditional “cost-
of-service” or “rate-of-return” regulation), but rather on the costs of “identical” firms
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operating within the same sector. Shleifer reasoned that by breaking the dependence
between the price a firm received and its own costs, and ensuring that the rewards for a
given firm depended on its standing vis-à-vis a “shadow firm” (a weighted average of
other firms operating within the sector – an idealised benchmark), each firm would be
forced to “compete” with its shadow, providing incentives for cost efficiency (widely
perceived as lacking from rate of return regulation). In practice, the inherent risks of
this “competition by proxy” pale in comparison to those found in fully liberalised
markets because market share is not directly threatened.
Techniques for evaluating the “explicit” risks posed by competitors have been
well developed in the business and economic literature. A notable example is
competitor analysis, with its potential to reduce the uncertainty of the price review
process (as price setting is linked to competitor performance). Its application is helped
by the tendency for regulatory bodies to disclose company performance data in the
interests of transparency. In addition to reducing uncertainty, competitor analysis
represents a strategic tool which assists managers in: evaluating competitors’ strengths
and weaknesses; identifying sources of competitive advantage; and assessing the
implications of competitors’ strategies on both the sector and their own utility
(Rothschild, 1979; Drohan and O’Connor, 1998).
2.2.2.2 Capital market competition
As Cowan (1997) contends, competition in the capital market can be thought of
as a private-sector version of yardstick regulation, in that it derives from the ability of
investors to make comparisons between different companies in the same sector.
Littlechild (1986), in his report to the UK Department of the Environment on the
prospects for water privatisation, emphasised that this would be an important incentive
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mechanism for utilities, as inefficient firms would be reflected in their share price and
be vulnerable to take-over, in addition to facing higher costs of capital. Although
Ofwat’s restrictions on mergers within the UK water sector, in the interests of
maintaining sufficient comparators, act as a constraint on capital market competition
(Cowan, 1997), the growing internationalisation of the industry increases the risk of
“external” mergers, whilst firms looking to diversify remain a threat to existing utilities.
Furthermore, the quality and quantity of comparative information available under
the “yardstick” system assists predators in identifying and assessing potential take-over
targets (Sawkins, 2001). Singh and Harianto (1989), in reviewing the acquisition
literature, surmised that profitability, size, leverage, and dividends were negatively
correlated with the risk of being acquired. In contrast, profitability and liquidity were
positively correlated with the probability of a firm acquiring, with leverage and
dividends negatively so. In light of this information, the dynamic risk of take-over can
be tracked both in real-time (e.g. with respect to the transfer of, for example, more than
5% of firm stocks to a potential acquirer and, in the US, the filing of 13D statements
indicating investor intent) and pro-actively (by “screening” the external environment
for trends and potential hostile bodies). Of further interest to corporate strategists,
recent research by Dickerson et al. (2003) suggests that acquisition can be used as a
strategy to reduce the risk of take-over. The researchers concluded this strategy allows
firms to grow quickly, thus protecting them from subsequent take-over. For utilities
considering expansion or diversification strategies, take-over represents not just a threat
but also an opportunity.
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2.2.2.3 Competition for the market
Another means of fostering competition is to encourage the private sector
(perhaps along with the incumbent public utility) to bid competitively for a concession,
lease, tender, or management contract (Cowan, 1997). The two key vehicles for doing
so are franchising and, more conservatively, contracting out (not involving the transfer
of assets). Numerous variants of these processes are adopted internationally, including:
build, operate and transfer (BOT) arrangements; finance, operate and own (concession);
and operate and provide working capital (affermage). The inherent complexity of many
of these arrangements, the generally low equity in the project vehicle (Grimsey and
Lewis, 2002), and the often significant investment obligations required of the sponsor,
create a pressing need for comprehensive risk assessment.
The project and financial risks associated with public-private partnerships have
been reviewed by Grimsey and Lewis (2002). Using the financing of Stirling Water, a
Scottish design-build-operate contractor as an illustrative example, they discuss the
complexity of the contractual arrangements within such partnerships and use a
quantitative analysis of returns on investment to characterise the robustness of cash
flows from each of the senior lenders to this joint public-private venture. From the
procurer’s perspective, project risks (e.g. delays and claims) are valued and
incorporated within the NPV calculation, whilst the impact of financial risks (inflation
and interest rate changes) are evaluated through sensitivity analysis. From the
sponsor’s perspective, risk analysis centres on simulating the effect of the underlying
variables (e.g. operating performance) upon the equity return. Ranasinghe (1999) uses
water supply projects in Sri Lanka to outline a methodology based on financial risk
analysis that a government or public utility can use to assess the viability of private
sector participation in new infrastructure projects. The author links a commercially
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available simulation package to the financial model to analyse the uncertainty
associated with the underlying variables (e.g. escalation in cost).
2.2.2.4 Product market competition
The traditional approach to introducing direct product market competition into
utility services has been to separate the monopolistic component of the industry and
regulate it, and to encourage competition in all other areas, e.g. the UK model of
separating the gas, electricity and railway networks (monopolistic) from the supply of
services over the network (Cowan, 1997). This so-called “vertical disaggregation,”
although promoted by the World Bank (1997), has not been widely adopted in the water
sector, the implicit assumption being that the industry is naturally monopolistic
(Seidenstat, 2000; Cowan, 1997). The UK has led the way in adopting alternative
approaches to facilitate product market competition. This can be traced back to the
1991 Water Industry Act, which introduced the concept of “Inset” appointments,
whereby a utility can apply for an appointment to provide water to a “large” customer
located within the statutory area of an existing company, usually by seeking a bulk
supply from the incumbent (Hern, 2001). Sawkins (2001) reports that the first Inset
appointment was granted in May 1997, when Anglian replaced Essex and Suffolk
Water (ESW) as the supplier to Buxted Chickens Ltd. Company licences were altered
and a new pipe constructed linking the site with an Anglian water main.
In practice, various restrictions, recently eased, have meant that this form of
competition has been slow to develop (Sawkins, 2001). Similarly, although the 1992
Competition and Service Act allows for cross-border competition, the costs are
prohibitive in the majority of cases. Perhaps the most significant recent development
has been the introduction of the 1998 Competition Act, which created the possibility for
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common carriage agreements, or network sharing, in the water industry. Here, the
shared use of an incumbent’s infrastructure by a third party enables the latter to provide
services within the incumbent’s area. To aid this, Ofwat now requires that all water
utilities publish “Access Codes” that set out their terms and conditions for common
carriage, and has published guidance on this procedure (Ofwat, 2002). Hern (2001)
reports that under the Act, utilities risk infringement if they refuse access to any parts of
their infrastructure deemed “essential” without objective justification, or if their access
terms are considered unreasonable. Although no successful applications for common
carriage have resulted to date, the threat alone acts as a catalyst for performance
improvements.
The authors were unable to uncover literature quantitatively addressing the risks
of product market competition within the water utility sector, a reflection of its nascent
development and descriptive nature. It seems appropriate here, however, to introduce
an oft-neglected truism: quantitative risk analysis is not a prerequisite of effective risk
management. This is apt in addressing the threats introduced by product-market
competition, where competitor identification and analysis, in concert with a critical
appraisal of self-performance and room for improvement, often provide an appropriate
foundation for minimising competitive threats. In contrast, harnessing the opportunities
presented by product-market competition requires more detailed analysis, and in the
absence of a relevant body of literature, the authors suggest treating what are
effectively, at least in the UK model, potential acquisitions of company operations in
the manner of strategic investment decisions.
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2.2.3 Business process re-engineering risks
Our discussion thus far has focused on the strategic approaches to risk
management within the sector. The pressures described are having important impacts
on the performance of the water sector. Structural changes to utility markets, an
increasingly demanding political and consumer environment, and more stringent
regulation are requiring utilities to improve financial and operational efficiencies. As
Westerhoff (2003) notes, water utilities are responding by rethinking their operations,
finding new ways to address problems, and revamping traditional business models – in
other words, re-engineering. According to Clemons (1995), major business process re-
engineering (BPR) initiatives – which range from the redesign of existing processes for
efficiency improvements, to the development of novel processes in support of a new
corporate vision – require the commitment of substantial resources and often constitute
a lasting legacy. If we define the risk of a project as the deviation in results from the
established goals, then there is substantial empirical evidence marking BPR as a high
risk endeavour. Many, if not most re-engineering efforts ultimately “fail” (see Crowe
et al., 2002; Remenyi and Heafield, 1996). Of particular relevance is the work of Dean
et al. (1999), whose analysis of change programmes undertaken in the UK water
industry suggests that re-engineering efforts, whilst often effective, produce highly
variable outcomes. On account of this, project risk analysis should be an integral part
of any re-engineering effort.
Clemons (1995) considers the core determinants of the risk profiles associated
with large scale BPR efforts to be: (a) functionality risk – the risk of making inadequate
or incorrect changes to systems or processes; and (b) political risk – the risk that the
organisation will not complete the project, either because of significant internal
resistance to the proposed changes or due to a more gradual loss of will. Clemons
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promotes scenario planning – a strategic planning tool that embraces uncertainty – as a
means for assessing and subsequently managing the risks associated with re-
engineering efforts. Rather than determining a single “correct” view of the future with
its implicit single response, scenario planning acknowledges the key sources of
uncertainty and incorporates these in developing a range of future scenarios and
strategic responses for exploration. Clemons argues that its use is suited to the context
of re-engineering efforts as it encourages the critical examination of potential futures
and strategies, reduces functionality risk and helps ensure the need for change is
internally addressed and accepted, thus reducing political risk. Scenario planning has
been embraced by the majority of UK water utilities (Phelps et al., 2001). A 2001
study (Phelps et al., 2001) explicitly linked the tool’s use with improved financial
performance on the part of utilities, although notably the authors suggest that scenario
planning may implicitly encourage firms to focus on financial returns at the expense of
customer service levels.
Recent work by Crowe et al. (2002) has led to the development of a semi-
quantitative tool for estimating the “risk of failure” of companies about to undertake re-
engineering efforts. The tool, developed through a survey of BRP-experienced
organisations, is based on measures of the core success (e.g. egalitarian leadership;
collaborative working environment; top management commitment; and change
management systems) and failure (middle management fear of losing authority; fear of
job loss; scepticism; discomfort of new working environment) factors of implementing
change. Raw data is extracted by questionnaire (e.g. ‘‘do managers usually share
vision and information with their subordinates’’ is used to mine information on the
general leadership style), and refined via fuzzy mathematics. Crowe et al.’s model is
intended to provide companies with an estimate of the likelihood of success or failure
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of proposed efforts prior to committing resources and to improve management’s a
priori insights into the potential outcomes of re-engineering. Similarly, Remenyi and
Heafield (1996) outline a methodology for evaluating the key risk issues relating to re-
engineering efforts. The methodology centres on a risk matrix (Table 2.2) that groups a
variety of potential BPR risks under the categories of business risk, financial risk,
corporate structure, corporate culture, technology and human. Organisations identify,
weight and rank what they consider to be the ten factors most pertinent to their
proposed re-engineering efforts. The framework represents a succinct method for
appraising and comparing the risks associated with BPR strategies. A perceived failure
of much of the BPR literature is the limited emphasis placed on the risks introduced by
adopting new technologies, an aspect critical to many re-engineering efforts.
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Table 2.2 BPR risk matrix (after Remenyi and Heafield, 1996 )
2.2.4 Technological risk
Clark et al. (2000) report that technology adoption is increasingly becoming a
concern of strategic planners and policy makers within the water industry. The
introduction of novel technology poses risks due to the inherent difficulty of preparing
Indicate the 10 most relevant factors
FACTORS FACTORS
BUSINESS RISKS CORPORATE CULTURE
Change to business scope (e.g. from diversifying) Staff attitude to technology
Change to market structures Staff attitude to changes
Change of regulatory relationship Staff attitude to senior managers
Change of supplier relationship Managerial style
Impact on (potential) ‘competitors’ Positive shared vision
FINANCIAL RISKS TECHNOLOGY
Funded from current cash flow Size of project
Funded from new equity Structuredness of project
Funded from long term debt Complexity of technology
Funded from short term debt Complexity of application
Novelty of technology
CORPORATE STRUCTURE Novelty of application
Bureaucratic structure Impact on technical infrastructure
Outsourcing utilisation
Flexibility of job positions HUMAN
Skills base
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accurate estimates of the costs, performance and system-wide effects of new
components and processes; and the long development cycles required for changes in
regulations and consumer demands (Colmer et al., 1999). This has led many
researchers to advocate the incorporation of risk management techniques for the
effective implementation of new technologies (e.g. Colmer et al., 1999; Fitzpatrick,
1995). This is highly relevant to the water sector, where, as Maxwell (2001) notes, the
advance of modern technology is illustrated by such trends as the replacement of
traditional methods of water treatment with advanced oxidation and other novel
physical and mechanical technologies; the broad use of membrane systems to desalinise
seawater for human consumption; and the increasingly widespread use of recycling
systems and technologies.
McGaughey et al. (1994) describe a framework for viewing and comparing the
risks inherent in the adoption of new technologies, specifically relating to IT. Initially,
proposed projects are assessed, through value chain analysis, in terms of their potential
positive and negative outcomes – these are then mapped onto a “speculative” risk
matrix to provide management with an initial screening of alternatives. In later stages
of planning, specific threats and opportunities associated with the project are identified
and ranked, by likelihood and consequence, for prioritisation purposes. Hartmann and
Lakatos (1998) drew on case studies monitoring the pace and quality of technology
delivery within two product development programmes and generated an algorithm
characterising the risk of each technology problem (Figure 2.3). The authors suggest
that its use can aid in the refinement of technology development and implementation
plans following risk identification. Hartmann and Lakatos define technology problems
as those arising:
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 from the application of a new process, material or subsystem before fully
understanding parameters that control cost, latitudes and failure modes;
 when a previously commercialised technology is extended outside the
known domains of the pertinent design rules; and
 from unexpected interactions arising from a new or unique combination of
known subsystems of components.
Of further interest, the authors (Hartmann and Lakatos, 1998) developed a
checklist to help technology and product developers audit technology progress, which
we have adapted to serve as a tool for minimising the risk associated with introducing
new technologies (i.e. beyond the development stage):
 Implementation goals confirmed
- validate business assumptions and technology specifications for cost,
performance and reliability
 Technology mastery demonstrated
- critical parameters identified
- failure modes identified
- set risk tolerances relating to the critical parameters so as to avoid failure
modes and deliver the required performance
- performance demonstrated using a combination of hardware and
mathematical simulation
- manufacturing feasibility established
 System specifications re-established
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- system and subsystem financial and operational performance targets are
re-established and re-assessed based on technology specifications
 Additional assessments completed
- supporting assessments completed, such as safety and environmental
impact study
 Contingency planning
- develop contingency plans should critical risks materialise in spite of
control procedures in place
Wildemann (1986) describes a framework for guiding technology planning. Risk
profiles are constructed displaying the relative importance of identified threats and
opportunities, and thus the inherent “attractiveness” of the technology, complemented
by a strengths-weaknesses analysis that estimates the ability of the firm to successfully
implement the technology. The author’s aim was to provide an analytical basis upon
which strategies may be developed for the introduction of new technologies.
84
Technology risk
















































Our discussion of risk analysis strategies moves to one of the key features of the
international water business – outsourcing. A significant feature of water utility
management in recent years has been the growth in outsourcing, defined as the transfer
of previously in house activities to a third party. Outsourcing allows utilities to focus
on critical functions (core business), access economies of scale, minimise investment,
increase quality of service, transfer risk, and reduce administrative burdens including
regulatory compliance (Parmelee, 2002; Elias, 2001; Downey, 1995). Common
candidates for outsourcing include information technology, maintenance, distribution,
manufacturing, and customer care and billing (Parmelee, 2002). A widely held view is
that the potential for outsourcing is far from exhausted. A holistic approach to risk
being promoted in this review requires that in addition to the traditional review of legal
and regulatory responsibilities following contractual agreement, the process of
outsourcing should fall within the remit of corporate risk management. That is,
outsourcing alters the boundaries of the firm, and the scope of risk analysis and risk
management programmes should be extended to reflect this.
Risks are inherent in the process of outsourcing, from the decision to outsource,
to the management of agreed contracts. Received wisdom has been that companies
should focus on “core competencies” and outsource the remaining parts of the business
(although the validity of this distinction has been questioned of late, notably by
Heikkilä and Cordon, 2002). The core risks discussed in the literature relating to
decisions over what to outsource and who to outsource to include: the loss of key
capabilities, developing dependence on the vendor, and risks linked to the service
provider’s deficient capabilities. Each decision to outsource must be carefully assessed
from a risks and benefits perspective (Downey, 1995). Decision-making frameworks
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are available for this purpose. Lonsdale’s (1999) decision tree for outsourcing provides
a framework for evaluating what constitutes an organisation’s core competencies, and
analysing market opportunities for outsourcing the remaining parts of the business. The
framework seeks to ensure managers retain those resources responsible for competitive
advantage, avoid monopolistic or oligopolistic supply markets, and effectively manage
the risk of post-contractual dependency. A similar model, although focussed at the
policy level, is provided by Quélin and Duhamel (2003). Of course, successful
outsourcing further depends on managing supply risks, defined as the transpiration of
failures with in-bound goods and services (Zsidisin et al., 2000). Core categories of
supply risk discussed in the literature include: the financial stability of the supplier; cost
fluctuations; capacity constraints of the market and specific suppliers; variations in
quality; the ability of the supplier to adapt to required changes in design or technology;
and natural disasters. Two diametrically opposed approaches to managing supply risk
are the active management of risk interfaces with the intention of reducing vendor
failures (Zsidisin et al., 2000), and the construction of barriers (e.g. safety stock,
multiple sources) to buffer the effects of inherent uncertainties (Fisher, 1997; Newman
et al., 1993). Tools in support of the former approach include qualitative assessments
of the financial stability of potential suppliers; formal models for the demonstration of
supplier capacity performance; “what-if” scenario planning; and statistical process
control to detect deviations from desired quality (Zsidisin et al., 2000).
2.2.6 Employee retention
Retaining valued employees has long been an implicit component of good utility
management. The recent emphasis on people as the resource, along with the external
realities of an increasingly dynamic and pressurised labour market, have led to the
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sector embracing employee retention as a critical risk issue – particularly in the
technically specialised areas of the water business. This focus is exemplified in recent
sectoral research initiatives (e.g. American Water Works Association Research
Foundation (AWWARF) project #2850 “Succession planning for a vital workforce in
the information age”), and a recent (2001) policy statement from AWWA calling on
utilities to establish formal employee retention plans.
Maintaining employee retention, thus managing the risk of losing organisation
capacity, begins at the recruitment stage (e.g. Barney, 2002; McNally, 2001; Denton,
1992). Empirical evidence suggests that ensuring a “cultural match” between
employees and the organisation plays a critical role in reducing staff turnover
(Sheridan, 1992). The tool applied by Sheridan (1992) to “measure” culture (beliefs
and values) was the Organisational Culture Profile (OCP) instrument developed by
O’Reilly et al. (1991). The OCP assesses candidates by encouraging them to sort value
statements on: norms regarding the completion of work tasks; norms regarding
interpersonal relationships; and norms regarding individual actions. Utilising the OCP
as a part of the recruitment process could provide utilities with a proactive tool for
minimising staff turnover, by filtering those most likely to leave the organisation early
from the selection process. Additionally, it enables the risk-based targeting of retention
efforts, for example by focusing efforts on employees hired regardless of “cultural
misfit.”
This philosophy is mirrored in the work of McNally (2001), who promotes the
use of more traditional tools such as personality assessments at the recruitment stage to
ensure “good fits” of personality and work ethic. As Denton (1992) notes, whilst
‘‘good recruitment is certainly important, it is what happens to recruits after joining an
organisation that determines whether a company will retain them.’’ In relation to this,
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McNally (2001) encourages organisations to develop “early warning systems” to
identify employees at risk of leaving. Such a system requires the collection and
analysis of retention data by subgroup (e.g. ethnicity, gender, function, organisational
level, etc.) to facilitate identification of “at-risk” groups. Following identification, tools
such as employee surveys, employee reviews, mentor or manager feedback, local
economic trends, head-hunter activity, and, crucially, the exit interview may be used to
determine factors driving high rates of defection (McNally, 2001). Adherence to such a
system would provide utilities with comprehensive data on who is leaving and why,
providing the foundation for developing effective, tailored retention strategies. A
recurrent theme of the retention literature is that incentives (e.g. salaries and benefits)
alone are not enough for achieving high levels of retention, the contention being that
retention is related more closely to employee development and intrinsic benefits such as
working relationships, job satisfaction and a sense of empowerment (e.g. Hagevik,
2001; McNally, 2001; Thompson, 2000; Denton, 1992). Accordingly, utilities may
consider undertaking a gap analysis of their employee development schemes
(interestingly, Brueck (2002) reports that water utilities spend as little as 1% or less of
their labour budget on nonmandatory employee training) and benefit programmes
before remedying deficiencies in order to minimise turnover rates. An alternative
approach to identifying the level of retention risk is to undertake an informal risk
assessment (Anon, 2001) which is essentially a checklist addressing the core issues
influencing turnover (e.g. employee-manager relationships, communication, job
satisfaction, etc.).
The negative consequences of employee turnover are clearly emphasised
throughout the literature, leading to the implicit assumption that organisations should
“pull out all the stops” to minimise defection rates. However, as Sigler (1999) and
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Mowday (1984) contend, the costs of reducing retention may, in some cases, exceed the
benefits to be derived. It is thus incumbent on organisations to critically analyse the
costs and benefits of implementing retention strategies; the cost-benefit analysis
approach offers a promising framework for this purpose.
2.2.7 Assessing investment risks
Behind each strategic investment an organisation considers lies some calculation
of the move’s worth (Luehrman, 1997). Following Rothstein and Kiyosaki (2003), we
define strategic investments as those resource allocations that will yield substantial
advances toward the achievement of a utility’s strategic goals. Whether considering a
joint venture, acquisition, or a major extension of an existing facility, how the utility
estimates value is a critical determinant of how it allocates its resources, which is in
turn a key driver of its overall performance (Luehrman, 1997). Valuation
methodologies range from the formal (comprising an appraisal model and a supporting
theory) to the informal (based on heuristics) (Luehrman, 1997). However, since the
1970s there has been a trend towards applying valuation methods that are more formal,
explicit, and institutionalised (Luehrman, 1997). The most widely adopted framework
is the Net Present Value (NPV) model, which estimates value by capitalising
(discounting) future streams of cash flow that the investor expects to receive from an
asset. The capitalisation rate is the minimum expected rate of return needed to induce
an investor to acquire. Capitalisation is comprised of two components, the risk-free
rate of return (accounting for the time value of money) and the risk premium (the
additional compensation demanded by investors for assuming risk). Although issues
have been raised regarding the applicability of conventional appraisal methodologies to
the water industry, specifically relating to the long lifespans of many capital projects
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and the fact that they often do not generate revenues in the traditional sense (e.g.
Tebbutt et al., 2001), they remain favoured by academics and industrialists. Our
subsequent discussion focuses on three distinct investment problems: valuation of
assets-in-place; valuation of “opportunities;” and the valuation of joint ventures.
2.2.7.1 Assets-in-place
The most basic valuation problem is valuing assets-in-place, i.e. the valuation of
an ongoing business or some part of one, for the purposes of informing decisions
ranging from a change in suppliers to an acquisition (Luehrman, 1997). It is for such
situations that Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) techniques (methodologies for
determining the capitalisation rate) are suited (Luehrman, 1997). In brief, the
established DCF methodologies include the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC;
Modigliani and Miller, 1958), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; Sharpe, 1964)
and the adjusted present value (APV; Myers, 1974). The WACC, which establishes the
risk premium on the basis of the “cost of capital” financing the investment, remains the
most commonly practised approach (Luehrman, 1997), though is increasingly criticised
in academic circles (e.g. Luehrman, 1997; Gregory, 1990). The fundamental idea
behind CAPM is to use β, a measure of systemic (market) risk, to adjust cash flows. In
contrast, APV seeks to unbundle the various components of value (i.e. cash flows),
analyse them separately, and then add up the present values. For a fuller discussion of
these and other DCF techniques see e.g. Modigliani and Miller (1958), Sharpe (1964),
Myers (1974), Berry et al. (1988), Gregory (1990), Luehrman (1997), and Ye and
Tiong (2000).
Regardless of the individual strengths and limitations of the above models, a
common deficiency is that there is no indication of the confidence level on the
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determined capitalisation rates (Ye and Tiong, 2000). Following on from Hertz (1964),
who highlighted the misleading nature of single-point estimates in investment analysis,
most researchers advocate the appraisal of investments within a non-deterministic
framework; the principle being that investment forecasts are, by definition, uncertain.
Reflecting this uncertainty in model outputs lends some assurance to the decision-
makers that the available information has been used with maximum efficiency (Hertz,
1964). This is reflected in Guidelines published by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB, 1999) on the application of financial evaluation methodologies to water supply
projects. Risk analysis, in the form of sensitivity analysis and stochastic simulation, is
promoted as a means to examine the influence of changes in key underlying variables
on forecast cash flows, and the probability that project NPV will fall below zero.
Incorporating these principles, Barriex et al. (2003) describe the application of the NPV
framework to the proposed restructuring, privatisation and optimisation of water utility
operations in Panama. The focus of their study is on the proposed rehabilitation of
systems supplying water to Arraijan, Chorrera, Colon and Panama City, a “holistic”
programme entailing the upgrading of commercial, technical and operational aspects.
Through stochastic simulation and sensitivity analysis of forecast financial returns, the
authors confirmed the project’s robustness from a financial standpoint, determining a
“zero” probability of negative NPV.
Thomas (1983) uses an illustrative example to examine the role of CAPM in
adjusting for the risk inherent to acquisition / diversification appraisals (using internal
rate of return (IRR), an appraisal framework similar to NPV). Accounting for the
unique nature of acquisition / diversification appraisals, the author provides a
methodology for integrating expected financial and operational synergies (e.g. derived
from financial and operating economies, or the pooling of functional areas) within the
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analysis. However, through applying a risk premium to projected cash flows (which by
definition accounts for the increased returns investors demand for variable cash flows)
and undertaking simulation of the variables influencing future cash flows (thus
explicitly modelling the variability of returns), Thomas (1983) is effectively “double
counting” for risk, introducing a bias against investment decisions. This criticism is
supported in the work of Burchett and Tummala (1998), who apply Monte Carlo
simulation to an NPV based appraisal of an infrastructure capital investment decision.
These researchers argue that applying specific probability distributions to the relevant
variables captures all potential risks relating to the investment, thus negating the
requirement for incorporating a risk premium as part of the capitalisation rate.
Although it is widely accepted that a probabilistic approach to investment risk
analysis is desirable, problems exist. As Songer et al. (1997) assert, the failure to
identify all significant risks (i.e. to apply appropriate probability distributions to all
relevant underlying variables) quickly undermines model validity and output. A further
pitfall is identified by Mosca et al. (2001), who in applying simulation methodologies
to a proposed plant investment, found that the choice of frequency distribution chosen
(often arbitrarily) for the independent variables can have a marked effect on the process
outcome. These are important observations in that they highlight the biases inherent to
all risk models, reminding of us of the need to use risk analysis output diagnostically
rather than to over-invest belief in quantitative risk estimates.
In financial circles, recent times have seen an increasing adoption of tools that
can perform economic evaluation and modelling on the combined entity of investments
(portfolio) as well as for each individual project. This trend extends beyond the
financial sphere, as is illustrated in the work of Rothstein and Kiyosaki (2003), who
describe the application of portfolio management theory to water utility investment
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planning. The philosophy of their approach is to create a portfolio representing a
balanced array of investments that mitigate uncertainties and that are likely to realise
potential returns. Of particular interest is their use of multi-attribute analysis, which
allows the risk-based prioritisation of monetary and non-monetary investment decisions
within a single analytical framework.
2.2.7.2 Opportunities
It is relevant here to further discuss the work of Luehrman (1997), who
categorises a second type of valuation problem – the valuation of opportunities (i.e.
possible future operations) – as distinct from the valuation of operations (assets-in-
place). The distinction is that with the former, the decision to invest may be deferred.
In opportunity valuation, risk matters in two ways: the risk of the investment, and the
risk that circumstances will change before a decision has to be made – such
contingencies are not well handled by the traditional DCF approach (Luehrman, 1997).
Luehrman (1997) states that a common approach in the valuation of opportunities is
simply not to value them formally until they mature to the point where a decision can
no longer be deferred, where they can then be valued, in effect, as assets-in-place.
Critics have decried this practice, on the premise that it leads companies to undervalue
the future and hence underinvest (Luehrman, 1997). In response, Luehrman (1997)
discusses the potential of “option-pricing theory” (Black and Scholes, 1973) - an
analytical strategy that allows managers to handle the contingencies created by the
time-dependant nature of opportunity valuation - as a supplement, not a replacement,
for the valuation method for in place assets.
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2.2.7.3 Joint-ventures
A further category of investment decisions is found where firms participate in
joint ventures, partnerships, or strategic alliances. This takes on particular resonance in
the water industry, where recent years have seen a proliferation in public / private
partnerships. In such cases, where ownership is shared with other parties, managers
need to understand both the value of the venture as a whole and the value of their
company’s interest in it (Luehrman, 1997).
The investment risks associated with public-private partnerships have been
reviewed by Grimsey and Lewis (2002). Using the financing of Stirling Water, a
Scottish design-build-operate contractor as an illustrative example, they apply
quantitative analysis of returns on investment from the perspective of the private
(sponsor) and public (procurer) sector entities.
A common observation of the risk management literature is an all too obvious
gap between theory and practice. Much of the highly theorized investment literature
does not reflect standard industry practice, particularly that relating to the application of
complex methodologies such as simulation and scenario analysis. The discrepancy is
explained, in part, in that such techniques do not fit naturally into most companies’ skill
sets or capital-budgeting systems (Luehrman, 1997). Despite this, there is a dearth of
literature focussing on the practicalities of integrating such tools deep within company
structures. To address this issue and as part of the research that has informed this
review, the authors will be undertaking a benchmarking of risk management
capabilities within the international water utility sector.
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2.3 PROGRAMME RISK ANALYSIS
We turn to a more familiar discussion of the application of risk analysis to the
water utility sector. The revised WHO guidelines (WHO, 2003) are promoting the
implementation of water safety plans for water quality management from catchment
management, through process control, distribution and on to the tap (UKWIR, 2003).
Application of risk analysis to these aspects of the water “supply chain” extends to
programmes of work as well as individual plant operations. A discussion of the latter,
operational risk analysis follows, but here we are concerned with the analysis of risks
associated with programmes of activity that are “rolled-out” across organisations, such
as asset management and maintenance planning. Here, managers are responsible for
the implementation of strategies across company functions, multiple sites and
geographic regions. They are concerned with: evaluating the risks posed by a similar
hazard at a variety of locations (e.g. mains bursts, network intrusion – in asset
management, for example); the risk-based appraisal of operational strategies and long-
term planning in relation to the water supply-demand equilibrium; and the wide variety
of risks existing within a catchment or watershed. Table 2.3 summarises the portfolio
of analysis techniques available at the programme level.
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Table 2.3 Program level risk portfolio
Context Tool / Technique Application Reference
Risk ranking Prioritisation of remedial work on infrastructure
assets
Kent et al. (2003), Radovanovic and
Marlin (2003), Foster et al. (2000).
FMECA ‘Source to tap’ risk identification and
prioritisation
Lifton and Smeaton (2003).
Logic models Evaluating structural failure modes Gray and Powell (1988), Parr and Cullen
(1988).
GIS risk tracking Infrastructure risk-tracking, visualisation and
communication
Kaufman and Wurtz (1998).
GIS spatial analysis Risk-mapping of infrastructure Doyle and Grabinski (2003), Ta (2001).
Asset
management
GIS risk simulation Evaluating degradation risk Lindley and Buchberger (2002), Besner et
al. (2001).
Risk ranking Prioritisation of monitoring strategies Dabrowski et al. (2002), Verro et al.
(2002), Boak and Packman (2001), Feijtel
et al. (1998).
GIS risk mapping Mapping areas of catchment critical to water
quality
Lytton et al. (2003), Sivertun and Prange
(2003), Wickham and Wade (2002), Foster
and McDonald (2000), Osowski et al.




Projecting degradation patterns / assessing risk
of water quality violation
Anderson and Destouni (2001), Gündüz et
al. (1998), Halfacree (1998), Liou and Yeh
(1997), Cole et al. (1988)
Kriging Projecting degradation patterns with limited
sample data (e.g. groundwater)
Passarella et al. (2001), Wingle et al.
(1999), Rautman and Istok (1996).
Catchment
management
GIS risk simulation Quantified risk mapping over space and time Dabrowski et al. (2002), Verro et al.





a) Assess susceptibility to supply-demand
scenarios; b) aid development of supply
strategies and policies; c) assist design of
distribution networks; and d) inform the need
for capital expenditure.
Stevens and Lloyd (2004),Lifton and
Smeaton, (2003), Wang et al. (2003),
Merabtene et al. (2002), Ostfeld (2001),
Stahl and Elliot (1999), Zongxue et al.
(1998), Andreu et al. (1996), Jinno et al.
(1995).
RAM-W To assess system vulnerabilities and develop





As above NRWA (2002).
2.3.1 Asset management
In line with Booth and Rogers (2001), we consider asset management as
‘‘managing infrastructure capital assets to optimise the total cost of owning and
operating them while delivering the service levels customers desire.’’ Managing risk in
the face of limited resources has long been an implicit component of asset management.
Within the UK, pressure from the economic regulator has ensured that the explicit
incorporation of risk analysis into asset management programmes has taken on added
momentum. Water utilities are expected to:
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‘‘demonstrate how the flow of services to customers can be maintained at least
cost in terms of both capital maintenance and operating expenditure, recognising the
trade off between cost and risk, whilst ensuring compliance with statutory duties’’
(Ofwat letter MD 161, April, 2000).
In addition to regulatory pressures, the global trend towards requiring financial
self-sufficiency on the part of public and private utilities has created a climate in which
management can no longer seek to “over-engineer” facilities with the presumption of
screening out technical risk. A recent (2004) report (USGAO, 2004) to the US Senate
cites ‘‘mounting evidence suggest[ing] that the integrity of the nation’s [water]
infrastructure is at risk without a concerted effort to improve the management of key
assets…and a significant investment in maintaining, rehabilitating and replacing these
assets.’’ The report goes on to explicitly endorse the role of risk analysis in asset
management. More than ever, utilities must now seek to balance spending with risk
minimisation. A risk-based approach to asset management requires an integrated,
systematic process drawing upon a broad range of methodologies for the identification,
analysis and prioritisation of assets-at-risk, from the process to the component level
(e.g. Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Booth and Rogers, 2001).
On a national scale, the US Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC, 2003)
recently (2003) reported on the risk to drinking water quality from ageing pipes and
process plant across the US with individual city “rankings” being informed by water
quality data, USEPA compliance records and water utility annual reports. Many water
companies have in place risk-ranking procedures to evaluate and rank potential risks
across a variety of categories, and thus help inform and prioritise risk management
procedures (Pollard et al., 2004). For example, Radovanovic and Marlin (2003)
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describe the risk-based approach to water mains asset management in place at Sydney
Water (Australia). Budgetary requirements are estimated through the application of
KANEW, a statistically based survival model which aids the calculation of pipe
rehabilitation and replacement needs for distribution networks. The identification of
specific pipes requiring work is external to the model, with separate approaches for
trunk and reticulation mains (the latter generally being run to failure). Critical trunk
mains are identified by means of a checklist-aided screening approach, wherein
preliminary assessments of failure likelihood and consequence are combined to create
an overall risk score. This combined risk score is used to identify critical water mains
deemed to require more detailed analysis (e.g. condition-based assessments). This
methodology allows Sydney Water to identify and prioritise water mains in need of
rehabilitation / renewal, and to proactively assess budgetary requirements.
Louisville Water Company (Kentucky) apply their Pipe Evaluation Model, which
integrates data such as pipe age and maintenance history, as a tool for prioritising pipe
and water mains for rehabilitation and replacement (USGAO, 2004). Utility managers
report that this model, in combination with wider asset management practices, has
helped reduce the frequency of water mains breaks from 26 to 22.7 per hundred miles
and the frequency of joint leaks from 8.2 to 5.6 per hundred miles (USGAO, 2004).
Seattle Public Utilities adopt a risk-based approach to asset management, considering
likelihood and impact of pipe rupture with reference to such factors as age, material,
location and historical cost of repair (USGAO, 2004). Drawing upon this analysis,
utility officials were able to delineate their pipe network into areas of critical and non-
critical risk, and allocate maintenance and rehabilitation resources accordingly.
Through adopting this approach, officials believe that they are using staff resources
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more efficiently and that, over time, the programme will lead to a reduction in
maintenance costs (USGAO, 2004).
Kent et al. (2003) describe how risk analysis informs the prioritisation of
investment strategies for trunk main maintenance at Dwr Cymru Welsh Water. The
methodology is based on the available records of asset performance, condition and
serviceability, which are stored on the company’s WAM (Water Asset Management)
database. STRUMAP, a software-based mapping system, allows clustered failures to
be considered separately from “random” bursts, a task performed as the former are
considered likely to be representative of underlying susceptibilities. For each location
where a cluster is identified, specific failure rates are derived. For random bursts,
failure data is separated according to pipe material and diameter, with failure likelihood
determined by group. STRUMAP further enables consideration of failure
consequences, in terms of the number of properties potentially affected by an event,
taking into account service reservoir storage. Failure likelihood and consequence are
then combined to derive an overall severity score, which in turn informs the derivation
of investment requirements. The National Research Council of Canada are currently
developing a prototype Water Mains Renewal Planner (WARP; Rajani and Kleiner,
2001), which is aimed at integrating the most promising breakage analysis models into
one discrete decision support tool. At present, WARP consists of three modules: a)
analysis of water main breakage patterns; b) short-term operational forecasting; and c)
long-term renewal planning. A fourth module is to be added to enable prioritisation of
individual water mains for renewal.
Foster et al. (2000) detail a risk-ranking approach for estimating the relative
likelihood of failure of embankment dams by piping. Failure likelihood is assessed by
weighting the historical frequency of piping failure with respect to dam zoning, filters,
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dam age, core soil types, compaction, foundation geology, dam performance, and
monitoring and surveillance. The methodology allows the prioritisation of dams-at-risk
for more detailed analysis, and is further offered as a check on traditional event-tree
methods (see also Seker et al., 2003).
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), developed by the US military, is an
engineering technique that tabulates failure modes of equipment and their effects on a
system (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992) (Table 2.4). The failure mode
describes how equipment fails (open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc.). The failure effect is
determined by the system’s response to the equipment failure.
Table 2.4 Component FMEA for chlorine cylinder and outlet valve (Egerton, 2004, with
permission)




Methods of Detection Comments








detect loss of supply
System failure would
require combination of
loss of flow and failure
of changeover





















QA checks on delivery.
Low chlorine residual
readings and alarm
When FMEA is extended by a criticality analysis, it is known as failure modes,
effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Lifton and Smeaton (2003) detail how
Scottish Water apply source-to-tap FMECA studies across their water supply systems
as part of their “asset management toolkit.” This allows priority risks to be identified
and subsequently compared across the utility portfolio (e.g. various mains, raw and
treated reservoirs, treatment works etc.) in order to focus attention on the most serious
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threats to system performance. Infrastructure investment strategies are further informed
by the HYSIM-AQUATOR supply-demand model. Of particular interest is their
description of the asset risk and criticality scoring system implemented at Scottish
Water. The system is designed to assess the relative “total business impact” of asset
failures across the company by reference to a “common currency of risk” (one point
equates to £1000 of business impact), facilitating a consistent approach to risk scoring
across Scottish Water. Additionally, this scoring system guides the prioritisation of
reliability studies at the operational level, which further informs asset management
strategy.
Given the complexity inherent in describing modes of structural failure and
assessing their likelihoods (Gray and Powell, 1988), logic models (visual risk
schematics, e.g. reliability block diagrams, fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree
analysis (ETA), see Figures 2.4 and 2.5) have found application in support of asset
management. Parr and Cullen (1988), through examining the applicability of logic
modelling techniques to dam failure analysis, illustrate how such an approach can
inform the prioritisation of expenditure on monitoring, maintenance and remedial
works. Similarly, Gray and Powell (1988) promote the use of logic diagrams in aiding
the development of risk-based strategies for maintaining asset security. The authors
model the interactions leading to failure for each class of aqueduct structure. To this,
historic data, or where data is deficient, engineering judgement, are applied in order to
derive failure probabilities. A cautionary note is sounded by Latiffe (1993), who
contends that risk analysis, specifically logic modelling, is not yet effective in
modelling dam failure. The author cites insufficient statistical data on the deficiencies
of structural components as the core drawback.
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Tr = resource turbidity
The probability of the top-event may be calculated if the probabilities of the sub-events are known or
estimable.




















a) Series diagram – here, the system / process is working if A1 and A2 are
working
b) Parallel diagram – here, the system / process is working if A1 or A2 are
working
c) Redundancy diagram – here, the system / process is working if at least r
elements among n are working












2.3.1.1 Spatial context of risk
Geographic Information System (GIS) technologies now play a critical role in
asset management. At its most basic level, GIS allow utilities to convert data ordinarily
displayed on paper maps into one single, easily accessible digital format, representing
an excellent method for storing and collating data for future use (Foster and McDonald,
2000). The level of detail (i.e. the layers of spatial data) contained within such systems
varies widely. Kaufman and Wurtz (1998) describe the evolution of a GIS for a small
utility (Beecher Water District, Michigan). An extensive inventory of asset condition
records and failure and maintenance data is collated within the system, supporting the
risk-based planning of capital improvement and maintenance works. Pertinently, the
system took only three months and less than $3,000 to develop. Similarly, Booth and
Rogers (2001) illustrate how the implementation of GIS technologies within an asset
management decision support system can allow for the visual tracking of infrastructure
assets and their associated risk factors.
Although applications of GIS technologies in support of asset management have
proven to be powerful risk-tracking, visualisation and communication tools (Booth and
Rogers, 2001), they rarely utilise the capabilities of GIS to spatially analyse data in the
classical sense (Foster and McDonald, 2000). Doyle and Grabinski (2003) illustrate
these capabilities through quantitatively relating Toronto’s infrastructure deterioration
to spatially variable corrosion risk factors, providing a basis for the identification of
network areas most at risk from external corrosion. Such an approach may allow utility
managers to better focus rehabilitation efforts through having a more complete
understanding of the causative factors behind water main deterioration. Of further
interest is the work of Ta (2001), who describes the application of a probability model
for burst risk studies of water mains. Contributing factors (e.g. pipe number density,
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pipe age, material and diameter, soil corrosivity, etc.) are represented as GIS data layers
and correlated with past failure data in order to deduce burst probability scores for each
water main. The tool, developed for Thames Water Utilities Ltd. (UK), is not intended
to predict the likelihood of pipe bursts, rather to aid utilities in sourcing the origin of an
area burst (i.e. following a pipe burst in the area, the value of probability evaluated for a
particular pipe section would indicate the likelihood that the burst actually occurred at
that section).
While GIS represent powerful tools for spatial data analysis, their inherent
capabilities for complex and dynamic analysis are limited (Sweeney, 1999; Fedra,
1998). In contrast, traditional simulation models are powerful tools for complex and
dynamic situations, but often lack the intuitive visualisation and spatial-analysis
functions that GIS offers (Sweeney, 1999; Fedra, 1998). Consequently, researchers
have sought to couple these systems. Lindley and Buchberger (2002) describe the
integration of hydraulic modelling within a GIS for the purpose of assessing intrusion
susceptibility in distribution systems. The holistic methodology enables the synthesis
of multiple risk factors describing the three key (geographically variable) susceptibility
conditions of adverse pressure gradient, intrusion pathway, and contaminant source,
thus identifying areas susceptible to intrusion (accidental or intended). Susceptible
locations are then prioritised for attention by considering how they are hydraulically
connected to local sensitive populations. In addition to informing asset management
programmes, this framework may also be applied in a reliability context at the design
stage. Similarly, Besner et al. (2001) illustrate via case study how the coupling of a
GIS containing structural, operational and water quality parameters with simulation
model EPANET facilitates the identification of key factors responsible for water
degradation in the distribution network. Through identifying network areas presenting
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the greatest risk, this technique can inform the prioritisation of risk management
strategies.
2.3.2 Catchment management
The concept of catchment (or watershed) management has gained widespread
international support, representing a shift from the sole reliance on end-of-pipe
treatment technologies for point sources towards the watershed-specific prioritisation of
water quality problems and their integrated solution (Foran et al., 2000). An outcome
of this is that the assessment of hazards to the quality of water resources within a
catchment is increasingly subject to formal risk assessment and can be expected as part
of routine water safety plans (UKWIR, 2003; Umweltbundesamt, 2003; WHO, 2003).
In Europe, the DPSIR approach to identifying key hazards within a watershed, by
reference to the driving forces (e.g population growth), pressures (sewer discharge),
state (increased nutrient load), impacts (anthropogenic eutrophication) and policy
response (discharge control) is being adopted under the European Water Framework
Directive (IMPRESS Management, 2002). Here, risk assessments of activities posing a
an actual or potential threat to the quality of water bodies in “river basin districts” are
intended to inform and help prioritise a programme of multi-agency action plans
targeted at raising the overall ecological status of the watershed within statutory
timescales. Given the plethora of potential catchment management issues in any
improvement programme, there is a need to prioritise risk management efforts within
the watershed by concentrating on those measures that reduce the significant likelihood
of severe impacts being realised. Southern Water (UK) adopt a semi-quantitative
ranking scheme in screening their groundwater sources for Cryptosporidium
contamination risk, as described by Boak and Packman (2001). The methodology
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consists of ranking source waters across ten risk categories (e.g. land use) using pre-
determined scoring hierarchies (e.g. occasional livestock grazing: 2), before combining
these category rankings into an overall weighted risk score. Through this approach the
utility identifies those sources deemed to be at significant risk of oocyst contamination,
and which therefore require continuous monitoring (in line with regulations).
Given the improved capabilities and functionality of modern GIS and their
inherent ability to map and analyse data that is spatially variable in nature, many
catchment-level ranking methodologies have sought to incorporate their benefits.
Various authors (Lytton et al., 2003; Sivertun and Prange, 2003; Wickham and Wade,
2002; Foster and McDonald, 2000; Osowski et al., 1999; Fuest et al., 1998) describe
the use of map overlay techniques (which essentially combine the attributes of two or
more data layers across geographic space) in the identification and mapping of areas
critical to catchment water quality. These risk-mapping (essentially spatial risk-
ranking) methodologies centre on the analysis of those spatial attributes considered to
play a significant role in pollutant transport (e.g. geology, rainfall, soil type, agricultural
activities etc.) according to pre-defined formulae (e.g. a weighted runoff-potential
index). Their focus may be generic or targeted towards specific hazards (e.g. animal
feeding operations) or pollutants (e.g. through incorporating measures of their leaching
potential).
Risk-ranking methods are applied to help target more detailed analysis towards
critical risks and to inform the prioritisation of catchment management activities,
specifically monitoring programmes. Of course, the potential exists that as the costs of
planned monitoring decrease on the one hand, the risks may increase on the other.
When designed well, piloted and implemented with feedback, risk-based resourcing
strategies (Figure 2.6) can provide a sound basis for distinguishing greater risks from
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lesser ones, and for investing resources in risk management that are proportional to the
risks posed (Pollard et al., 2002).
Figure 2.6 Risk-based workforce planning (after Pollard et al., 2002)
Most critically, however, these risk-based optimisation tools, whether intended to
drive monitoring regimes, maintenance schedules or workforce planning, may
themselves incur significant risk unless the consequences of resource trade-offs are
themselves assessed. Consider the actions of the Saskatchewan Department of
Environment and Resource Management (SERM) prior to the North Battleford
cryptosporidiosis outbreak in April 2001 (Pollard et al., 2004). SERM held legislative
responsibility for the Saskatchewan drinking water programme and, partly in response
to budget cuts in the mid 1990s, drastically reduced the already limited field inspection
and enforcement of municipal utilities. This culminated in SERM proposing to
eliminate its drinking water programme altogether, a motion tentatively approved by
the Treasury Board in 2000/01 and justified as being “risk-based.” The subsequent
109
North Battleford outbreak, infecting between 5800 to 7100 persons in the immediate
community plus a large number of visitors from three other provinces, led to a public
inquiry into the outbreak and the provincial drinking water regulatory system. Justice
Laing (2002) concluded in his Inquiry report: “that the current risk-based model
employed by SERM since 1996 is arrived at on the basis of economics, and has nothing
to do with how best to safeguard the health of the population, all of whom consume
water.” The example aptly illustrates the inappropriate use of risk analysis as a
justification for the removal of processes critical to public health protection. Tensions
that arise between those seeking economic efficiencies and preservation of the principal
goal of providing safe drinking water are often played out in the conflicting
expectations and presumed purposes of risk analysis made by different professionals.
The real consequences of stripping away levels of safety, precaution and protection
using “risk analysis” as a justification can be to render the system as a whole less safe,
more precarious and more susceptible to catastrophic failure and so optimisation
programmes, maintenance schedules and risk-based monitoring require special scrutiny
as to the balance between risk and the full cost of implementing these programmes.
Where more detailed analysis is deemed necessary, a common recourse is to
model-based approaches. Water quality and flow / transport models represent core
tools for this purpose, due to their combined ability to model the dispersal of pollutants
and predict the resultant deterioration of water quality. Aside from the inherent value
of fostering an increased understanding of catchment water quality issues, the core
benefits of model-based analysis stems from their ability to test management scenarios
(through e.g. sensitivity and scenario analysis), thus enabling informed decisions on
how best to manage the resource. A range of models are available that apply to
110
catchment risk analysis, from micro to landscape scales, from deterministic to
stochastic approaches (Table 2.3).
Common practices of hydrological and water quality modelling have been based
mostly on deterministic analysis, producing single point estimates that neglect
prediction uncertainty (Andersson and Destouni, 2001). Determinism has been
embraced by many risk analysts, for example, Gündüz et al. (1998) describe the use of
the combined hydrodynamic and water quality model CE-QUAL-W2 in projecting
potential water quality degradation patterns under different pollution loads. The tool is
intended to aid management in the development of appropriate strategies for the
management of water quality. Similarly deterministic approaches to catchment analysis
are described by various other researchers (e.g. Cole et al., 1988). The limitations of
determinism in risk analysis, discussed earlier, are particularly relevant in the context of
hydrological and water quality modelling, considering the often scarce or incomplete
data available (Mailhot and Villeneuve, 2003). This uncertainty takes on particular
importance from the utility standpoint, as their assessments of catchment water quality
are performed with regard to set regulatory standards. To illustrate this point, the
uncertainties inherent in flow and contaminant transport modelling (from e.g. spatial
variability, data scarcity, model imperfections) imply that there will always be a risk of
exceeding a given standard at some point over space or time following a pollution
event, regardless of the estimated single-point (mean) contaminant levels (Andersson
and Destouni, 2001).
An argument can thus be forwarded for the explicit consideration of prediction
uncertainties in catchment level risk modelling. There exist two dominant approaches
towards this task: stochastic modelling; and deterministic modelling allied with
uncertainty analysis of the output. Adopting the former approach, Andersson and
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Destouni (2001) outline the application of stochastic transport modelling to quantify the
risk of exceeding regulatory standards for groundwater at any point on the compliance
boundary. This quantification is coupled with an analysis of the abatement costs
required to attain an “acceptable” risk level. Halfacree (1998), for example, describes
the use of PRAIRIE, an aquatic dispersion modelling tool for assessing chemical
pollution risks to water bodies. The main elements are an aquatic dispersion model;
hydrological, substance and standards databases; and a tabular / graphical output
facility. The model has a deterministic mode used to “screen out” low risk sites, and a
probabilistic mode for more detailed analysis of high risk sites. The output results (e.g.
frequency versus concentration curves) are compared with pre-determined criteria to
inform regulatory actions on risk management from hazardous activities within a
sensitive catchment. An advantage of the stochastic approach is that uncertainty is
interwoven within the model (Zoppou, 2001). However, the solution of stochastic
equations is often impractical for complex problems (Li and McLaughlin, 1991). This
explains, in part, the preference for deterministic approaches to water quality /
hydrological modelling, creating the subsequent need for external consideration of
output uncertainty.
In this context, uncertainty analysis is performed to estimate the probability of
obtaining a given output value when uncertainties on input variables and parameters are
known (Mailhot and Villeneuve, 2003). Liou and Yeh (1997) outline the use of a
groundwater transport model in deriving the risk of contaminant concentration
exceeding a maximum acceptable upper limit (e.g. regulatory standard). The analytical
uncertainty of the predicted contaminant concentration is derived by first-order mean-
centred uncertainty analysis, prior to the application of Monte Carlo simulation in order
to compute the mean risk and associated confidence interval of exceeding standards.
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For detailed discussions of the forms of uncertainty in water quality modelling and the
techniques for their analysis, see Mailhot and Villeneuve (2003); Portielje et al. (2000);
and Beck (1997).
In the event of pollution leading to a violation of water quality standards,
remediation may be required. Researchers have developed methodologies for
optimising remediation strategies (e.g. Rogers et al., 1995). However, as Latinopoulos
et al. (1997) contend, if the inability to meet the constraints of a groundwater quality
programme is considered a significant risk, then quantifying the risk of remediation
failure in terms of failure to comply with regulatory standards is a primary task. In
relation to this, Latinopoulos et al. (1997), through coupling stochastic flow and
transport simulations with a risk-cost-benefit objective function, have developed a
methodology facilitating the risk-based evaluation of remediation strategies (costing the
risk of failure in terms of regulatory fines and the need to import / develop alternative
supplies).
An alternative approach to characterising the extent and severity of source
contamination is that of geostatistical inference (e.g. Passarella et al., 2001; Wingle et
al., 1999; Rautman and Istok, 1996). These kriging methods – essentially a form of
least squares linear regression – focus on providing an estimate of a spatially distributed
variable (e.g. contaminant concentration) at unsampled locations as a function of a
limited set of sample values taken from surrounding locations (Rautman and Istok,
1996). As such, they are ideally suited to groundwater quality issues, where data
collection is limited by expense and access. Of particular relevance to risk analysis is
the discipline of geostatistical simulation, where multiple, unique estimates of site
conditions that mimic the random variability of the parameter(s) of concern are
produced (Wingle et al., 1999). Various authors (Passarella et al., 2001; Wingle et al.,
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1999; Rautman and Istok, 1996) have illustrated how such an approach may answer the
following questions: what is the probability that contaminant levels exceed regulatory
standards; where are the compliance boundaries (and what is the associated level of
confidence); and how much contaminant is present (and hence, how much must be
removed)? Although the principles of geostatistical simulation are well established, the
technique has yet to be widely applied to problems of groundwater contamination
(Rautman and Istok, 1996).
Applications of GIS to catchment risk analysis were discussed earlier in the
context of risk-mapping. Although representing efficient risk screening tools, their
ability to quantify risk over space and time is limited. To counter this, researchers have
sought to integrate these systems with simulation models. Feijtel et al. (1998) illustrate
that the embedding of chemical fate prediction models within a GIS allows for
calculation of the distribution of predicted environmental concentrations, both in space
and time, of “down-the-drain” chemicals in catchment surface waters. Similar
approaches are adopted by Dabrowski et al. (2002) and Verro et al. (2002) to assess
surface water pesticide loading.
2.3.3 Network analysis
A water distribution system may be viewed as an interconnected collection of
sources, pipes, and hydraulic control elements (e.g. pumps, valves, regulators, tanks)
delivering water to consumers in prescribed quantities and at desired pressures (Ostfeld
et al., 2002). System behaviour, which is governed by hydraulics, supply, demand, and
system layout, may be described mathematically (Ostfeld et al., 2002). This
description forms the basis of water supply and distribution modelling (network
analysis), a discipline practised in the water industry for many years, particularly to
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inform the development of operational strategies (Tanyimboh, 2004; Brammer and
Schulte, 1993). Water utilities routinely apply network analysis in order to assess their
“security of supply,” defined as the probability of being able to meet consumer
demands (i.e. network reliability). “Best practice” utilities extend their analysis beyond
routine operating conditions to examine network performance under various supply-
demand scenarios, thus reflecting the inherent uncertainty of the supply-demand
balance. The standard Scottish Water methodology of yield assessment uses the
software tool HYSIM-AQUATOR (Lifton and Smeaton, 2003). HYSIM, a
hydrological rainfall-runoff simulation model, is used to derive historic inflow series,
based on historic rainfall, potential evapotranspiration, and if necessary any artificial
influences (e.g. abstractions). AQUATOR, a water resource system model, uses the
output from HYSIM to simulate reservoir storage based on system demands and
compensation flows. The model assists Scottish Water in understanding the level of
supply availability risk in the current system and in determining the impact of
prospective investment strategies to mitigate this risk.
Stevens and Lloyd (2004) describe the application of the resource modelling
package WRAPsim, with reference to the Yorkshire Water (UK) Grid. The model
contains over 1200 components including all river and reservoir sources, boreholes,
water treatment works, pipelines and demand centres. Through simulation of the
conjunctive use of Yorkshire Water’s sources over a given time period, model output
provides the decision-maker with an accurate assessment of the behaviour of each
source, its ability to meet demand, and the frequency of restrictions that would need to
be imposed. Further insights are gleaned through the application of scenario analysis,
wherein the supply-demand balance for each zone under variable scenarios (e.g.
average year, dry year, peak week, etc.) allows an assessment of security of supply over
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a range of timescales and operating conditions. The authors report that WRAPsim’s
ability to predict future supply conditions, to optimise allocation of water resources,
and to rebalance stocks, has significantly increased the yield and reliability of
Yorkshire Water’s supply system (Stevens and Lloyd, 2004).
Stahl and Elliott (1999) discuss Essex and Suffolk Water (ESW)’s use of the risk-
based resource planning and operational support model DROP (Drought Reliable
Output Programme), an adaptation of WRAPsim designed to accommodate the utility’s
specific technical requirements. The model has been applied in a variety of areas,
particularly in support of investment planning and the determination of operational
strategies. The authors state that DROP has enabled ESW to improve their
understanding of system performance, identify new schemes or short term options to
improve reliability of supply, and to more accurately determine future operating costs
associated with new developments. Such methodologies, although able to examine
system reliability under a range of operating conditions, do not adequately address
whether the system is sufficiently reliable, as this requires the definition and
quantification of appropriate and meaningful reliability measures, a computationally
difficult task (Ostfeld, 2001). Harnessing developments in computer processing power
and operability, Ostfeld (2001) has developed a methodology for the explicit reliability
analysis of water distribution networks, with reliability defined, quantified and
measured as the probability of zero annual shortfalls. The methodology, whose
development was funded with the intention of practical application by the Israeli Water
Commission, is comprised of two interconnected stages: (i) analysis of the storage-
conveyance properties of the system; and (ii) implementation of stochastic simulation
through use of RAPTOR (Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational
Readiness) software.
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However, researchers in the field of network analysis are increasingly aware of
the need to take account of both the frequency and severity of modelled failures, and as
a result analyses are often suggested to extend beyond measures of reliability to
incorporate resiliency (e.g. the capacity of a system to recover to a satisfactory state
from a state of failure) and vulnerability (e.g. a measure of failure significance) (Wang
et al., 2003; Jinno et al., 1995). Adopting this paradigm, Zongxue et al. (1998) describe
the coupling of a risk model (comprising measures of reliability, resiliency and
vulnerability), which incorporates predictions of water demand, with a traditional
network simulation model. The approach aids the identification of operational
strategies of minimum risk under given supply and demand scenarios, and is illustrated
by application to Fukuoka Water Supply System, Japan (see also Jinno et al., 1995).
Similar methodologies are described by Wang et al. (2003); Merabtene et al. (2002);
and Andreu et al. (1996) – though supplemented with formal optimisation procedures
to assist derivation of the most appropriate operational policies of minimum risk.
To summarise, network analysis can: (a) allow utilities to assess their
susceptibility to various supply-demand scenarios (e.g. drought or increases in
demand); (b) aid decision-makers in determining “optimal” supply strategies and
policies; (c) assist in the design phase of distribution networks; and (d) inform the need
for capital expenditure.
2.3.4 Vulnerability assessments
Operational disruptions are the inevitable result of large-scale disasters (e.g.
flooding, drought, earthquakes, terrorism). To minimise the risks posed by such
“uncontrollable” events, utilities must seek to eliminate or reduce their potential
consequences – this is best achieved through contingency and emergency planning
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(Shimoda, 1994). The role of formal risk analysis in emergency planning, long
restricted to drought management, is now being widely adopted to address security
risks. This is largely in response to the events of September 11th, 2001. In relation to
this, a methodology for vulnerability assessments has been developed by Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL) – known as Risk Assessment Methodology for Water
Utilities (RAM-W). The methodology allows utilities to conduct a detailed assessment
of their system vulnerabilities and to develop measures to reduce the risks and mitigate
the consequences of terrorist or other criminal attacks (SNL, 2001). The assessment
comprises three steps (SNL, 2001):
1) determine how well the system detects a problem, which involves surveying
all security and monitoring features (e.g. how quickly could it detect an
undesired chemical being introduced to the supply);
2) measure delay capabilities in order to determine how well a system can stop
undesired events (e.g. security in place, length of storage time); and
3) measure the capacity of private guard forces and local, state and federal
authorities to respond to an event.
Perhaps a more pragmatic approach, particularly for smaller utilities, is found in
the questionnaire-based self-assessment developed by the National Rural Water
Association (NRWA, 2002).
2.4 OPERATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS
Our review now progresses to the analysis of individual plant. Operational risk
managers are responsible for the risks associated with specific operations at plant level
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– for example, the risk of failure of a device or process component, or the risk of
exceeding a particular water quality standard and they are increasingly responsible for
the health and safety of plant operatives. Analysis at this level is largely concerned
with the “classic” risk analysis methodologies developed and established within other
process industries, most notably the oil and chemical sectors (Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Operational level risk portfolio
Context Tool / Technique Application Reference
Risk ranking Prioritisation of plant contamination risks Egerton (2004).
QMRA Assessing public health risk from microbial
source contamination
Medema et al. (2003), Masago et
al. (2000), Teunis et al. (1997).
End-of-pipe compliance
models
Assessing risk of exceeding water quality
standards
Demotier et al., (2002), Haas and
Trussell (1998).
Compliance risk
GIS simulation Assessing risk of distribution system water
quality degradation
Lindley and Buchberger (2002),
Besner et al. (2001).
HACCP Identifying ‘critical control points’ Mullenger et al. (2002),
Dewettinck et al. (2001), Hellier
(2000).
HAZOP Evaluating deviations from design intent US Department of Energy (1993),
Khan and Abassi (2000).
FMECA Evaluating component failures Lifton and Smeaton (2003), Cyna
(1997).




Multiple barrier approach Assessing the reliability of multiple barrier
treatment processes
Demotier et al. (2002), Eisenberg
et al. (2001), Haas and Trussell
(1998).
2.4.1 Public health and compliance risk
Here, we are primarily concerned with the risk posed by specific contaminants at
the plant and distribution system level, particularly relating to the hazards posed to
human health and the related risk of exceeding regulatory standards. The multiple
barrier approach to water treatment has been the central tenet of modern water
treatment systems and relies upon the use of “in-series” water treatment processes to
remove hazardous agents from the public water supply. Failure or inadequacy of the
treatment and distribution process can result in an interruption of supply and / or
derogation in water quality (microbiological or chemical) with potential impacts on
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public health. The underlying causes may include source contamination, human error,
mechanical failure or network intrusion. The consequences of process failure can be
immediate, there is very little time if any to reduce exposure because of the lag in
securing monitoring data and the impacts can affect a large number of people
simultaneously (Pollard et al., 2004). Beyond the paramount impacts on public health
through the direct ingestion of contaminated drinking water, financial and consumer
confidence impacts invariably ensue. The financial costs to the community of the fatal
Walkerton outbreak for example, were in excess of Cdn$65 million, with one time costs
to Ontario estimated at more than Cdn$100 million (O’Connor, 2002). Compounding
this, the loss of consumer confidence following disease outbreaks is often enormous
(Hrudey and Leiss, 2003). Even when there is no legislation covering certain aspects
there can be claims of negligence against operating companies. Litigation for civil
damages have been prominent features following both the Walkerton outbreak (settled
out of court) and the Sydney Water crisis (largely dismissed, costs still incurred)
(Pollard et al., 2004).
Conventionally, the public health impacts of drinking water consumption have
been assessed retrospectively using epidemiological studies (Hunter et al., 2002).
Recognition of the need for a preventative approach to managing risk and providing
safe drinking water, however, has driven international interest in the application of risk
assessment methodologies within the sector, for both chemical and microbiological
hazards (Ashbolt, 2004; Haas et al., 1999). The generic approach is based on the risk
assessment framework developed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS,
1983),103 which consists of four key steps (Haas et al., 1999):
 problem formulation and hazard identification – to describe the human health
effects derived from any particular hazard (e.g. infection, carcinogenicity, etc.);
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 exposure assessment – to determine the size and characteristics of the
population exposed and the route, amount, and duration of exposure;
 dose-response assessment – to characterize the relationship between the dose
exposure and the incidence of the health effects;
 risk characterization – to integrate the information from exposure, dose-
response, and health interventions in order to estimate the magnitude of the
public health problem and to evaluate variability and uncertainty.
Several substantive differences exist between assessment of risk of microbial
agents and assessment of risk of chemicals (Haas, 2002). Accordingly, the NAS
approach has been adapted to account for the dynamic and epidemiologic
characteristics of infectious disease processes (Fewtrell and Bartram, 2001), to form
what is known as quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA). The application of
these models has long been the basis for the derivation of water quality guidelines for
drinking water (WHO, 2002). The substance-specific health risk assessments that have
historically informed the guidelines may, however, be somewhat distanced from the
immediate operational context of individual utilities (Pollard et al., 2004). However,
recent work has extended the application of these models to the operational (plant-
specific) context. For example, Medema et al. (2003), Masago et al. (2002), and
Teunis et al. (1997) describe the application of QMRA in determining the public health
risks posed by the presence of microbial contaminants in treated water. The first step in
the process is to define the relationship between measured pathogen source levels and
the consumed dose (incorporating analytical detection levels, treatment removal
efficiencies, drinking water consumption), followed by the construction of a
deterministic model mathematically describing this relationship. Monte Carlo
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simulation (a method of uncertainty analysis) is then applied to the output of the
deterministic model to determine the distribution of the daily consumed dose, to which
the relevant dose response relationship is applied in order to determine the cumulative
distribution of the probability of infection. From this, the mean annual individual risk
of infection may be determined. Such approaches are of particular relevance in areas,
such as the Netherlands, where water supply legislation expresses acceptable health
risks in terms of infections per year (Medema et al., 2003). Of course, core microbial
standards generally refer to a maximum level of organisms in the treated water, and so
consideration of consumption levels and the dose-response relationship is superfluous
to compliance risk assessment. The approach perhaps has most utility in “what-if”
mode to answer questions such as: “what are the public health implications of a failure
of part of the treatment process or of a re-designing of the treatment process” (Gale,
2001).
Tools are available to assess the risk of exceeding water quality standards relating
to physical or chemical parameters. For example, Demotier et al. (2002) describe an
integrated FTA / FMEA approach to determining the risk of producing non-compliant
drinking water across a range of parameters, taking into account the quality parameters
of raw water and the removal efficiencies and reliability of the full set of treatment
processes. Similar methodologies are described by Eisenberg et al. (2001) and Haas
and Trussell (1998) in assessing the reliability of multiple, independent barriers in
water treatment. These three pieces of research explicitly consider the performance
variability of individual processes along the treatment line, an approach rarely
described in operational QMRA. Not only does this offer a more realistic appraisal of
compliance risk, it is in line with recent proposals from regulatory bodies (e.g. National
Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC, 2001)) calling on utilities to formally
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adopt the multiple barrier approach to risk management to ensure multiple levels of
protection are afforded against specific contamination threats (see Rizak et al., 2003).
Of course, limitations in resources (human and financial) and in the data to
underpin such sophisticated analyses often restrict the practical application of these
more advanced methodologies within the sector. A more pragmatic analysis of the
risks of process failure is commonly undertaken using a semi-quantitative risk-ranking
of hazards according to their likelihood and consequence. Egerton (2004) describes the
application of ranking techniques for the prioritisation of contamination risks at a water
treatment plant. Risks are scored according to the frequency with which they may
occur, the ability to take action to contain the event, and the consequence of subsequent
contamination. The methodology is intended to aid the targeting and prioritisation of
remedial actions. Such approaches rely heavily on the experience and judgement of the
assessment team, and depending on the level of guidance provided for scoring within
these criteria, remain open to bias especially from unforeseen circumstances that often
fall beyond the process boundary, e.g. deliberate or accidental human error.
Finished water can undergo a variety of physical, chemical, and biological
changes during transportation through a distribution system (Besner et al., 2001).
Understanding the nature and likelihood of these risks has become a priority for water
producers (Besner et al., 2001), in part due to research linking such degradation to the
incidence of gastrointestinal illnesses (e.g. Payment et al., 1991). Application of the
methodologies developed by Lindley and Buchberger (2002) and Besner et al. (2001),
described earlier (see Asset management), would provide utilities with a means to
distinguish areas of the distribution system at greatest risk of degradation, providing a
framework for prioritising risk management activities.
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2.4.2 Reliability analysis
It is implicit in the planning, design and operation of water utilities that risk
analysis is a qualitative component of the intellectual process of the experienced
engineer / operator. Reliability analysis seeks to formalise, systemise, and, where
necessary, quantify this process. Assessments of operational reliability range from
component (e.g. risk of valve failure), process (e.g. risk of failure of treatment step) to
network (e.g. network reliability under drought conditions, see Network analysis) level
analysis. Regardless of focus, the aim is to identify the potential failures that may
occur in a system, their effects and their likelihood, thus aiding the identification of
critical components and processes where design and operational changes are required to
meet safety and / or production targets (Strutt, 2004). Analysis may be summarised as
follows (Strutt, 2004):
 system definition – defining the level of analysis;
 failure identification – identifying potential hazards (e.g. HACCP, hazard and
operability studies, FMEA / FMECA);
 reliability modelling – to describe failure behaviour of system as a whole
(e.g. FTA, ETA, reliability block diagrams); and
 sensitivity analysis.
The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), the body
responsible for issuing drinking water guidelines to Australian water utilities, in their
“Framework for Management of Drinking Water Quality” (Rizak et al., 2003;
NHMRC, 2001) advocated the application of a HACCP (hazard analysis critical control
points) methodology, namely the determination of “critical control points” whereupon
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risks can be monitored and reduced (Codex Alimentarius, 1993). Hellier (2000)
describes the implementation of this approach within Melbourne Water (Australia).
The process begins with the division of the water system into four discrete subsystems:
catchment, treatment, distribution and customer premises. Across each subsystem (e.g.
catchment) the sources of risk to water quality (e.g. native animals) and the associated
hazards (e.g. bacteria, viruses) are identified and plotted on a simple risk matrix; those
risks deemed to be significant are evaluated further for their critical control points.
Assessors then identify the critical limits, monitoring systems and corrective actions for
each CCP. The application of HACCP to South East Water Ltd.’s (Australia)
distribution and reticulation systems is described in Mullenger et al. (2002). Through
implementing their HACCP plan, the company has developed a greater understanding
of water quality issues, refined and optimised operating procedures, and observed a net
decrease in customer complaints. These benefits stem from an increased knowledge
and understanding of the water supply system and an improved ability to identify
potential risks to water supply / quality (Mullenger et al., 2002). Beyond managing
existing process control, HACCP may also be used to assess and manage the risks from
proposed operational changes, such as the integration of treated domestic wastewater to
an existing potable production process (e.g. Dewettinck et al., 2001).
HAZOP (hazard and operability study), a technique developed by Imperial
Chemical Industries Ltd., systematically evaluates the process and engineering
intentions of new or existing facilities in order to identify the hazards that may arise due
to deviations from design specifications (American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
1992). Typically, a carefully selected team examines a process (e.g. disinfection)
subdivided into “nodes,” at each node, the team applies guidewords (e.g. low) to
process parameters (e.g. ozone levels) to identify ways in which the process may
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deviate from its design intention, before evaluating the causes and consequences of the
deviation. A technical document published by the US Department of Energy (1993)
describes the undertaking of a HAZOP study on the partially installed chlorination
process of a water treatment facility. The analysis, conducted in response to regulatory
requirements, identified the key areas of uncertainty (e.g. chlorine cylinder received
overfilled). “Action items” and recommendations were formulated to clarify these
uncertainties and to verify process conditions (e.g. check pressure potential from the
chlorine cylinder and the system response).
The practical implementation of many of these techniques is often constrained by
the institutional capacity of organisations and the skill sets available at the operational
level. Risk analysis remains an expert discipline and many organisations are more
comfortable with the historic and proven implicit approach to risk management.
Nevertheless, we are witnessing a growing number of utilities making their analysis
more explicit and using these tools for better decision-making, identifying risk issues
early rather than later, when their ability to respond may be compromised. At Scottish
Water, for example, FMECA-based studies are performed at the operational level.
Targeted by a risk criticality scoring system, the analysis systematically considers
various components of the water supply system and their respective failure modes
(Lifton and Smeaton, 2003). As the scoring system is “pseudo-economic,” decision-
makers are empowered to assess the costs and benefits in terms of risk reduction per
pound of mitigation efforts through undertaking simple scenario modelling (Lifton and
Smeaton, 2003). Where identified failure modes are traced to specific mechanical or
electrical equipment, the equipment is subject to reliability centred maintenance – the
risk-based prioritisation of maintenance activities. In recognition of the dangers of ill-
informed risk-based resourcing, select critical-risk assets undergo formal optimisation
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of maintenance task cost-risk-performance using a suite of asset performance tools
(APT).
These methodologies represent an informed and structured, if time-consuming,
framework for pinpointing weaknesses in utility design and operation. Applied
effectively using personnel with appropriate skills, experience and resources, they
provide operational management with a basis for improving process reliability and
identifying issues early. Ineffectively applied, they become little more than acronyms
for complacency. As discussed, reliability analysis may require a quantitative treatment
of the effect of identified risks at the system level. The importance and complexity of
this task has increased in recent years, due in part to the increased range of available
technologies and the tighter operational margins imposed by regulators (Eisenberg et
al., 2001).
For unreliable or heavily used equipment, an analysis of historic data may be
sufficient for this purpose. In the absence of such data, there is a requirement for the
formal modelling of risk consequences. There exist a range of techniques for this task,
including logic modelling (e.g. Demotier et al., 2002; Cyna, 1997), “quantitative”
FMECA (e.g. Cyna, 1997), and multiple barrier approaches to treatment reliability (e.g.
Demotier et al., 2002; Eisenberg et al., 2001; Haas and Trussell, 1998). An illustration
of an integrated approach to evaluating plant reliability is provided by Cyna (1997),
who describes the methodology developed and applied by the Compagnie Generale des
Eaux (France) (Figure 2.7). Following system definition and modelling (via reliability
block diagrams), risks are identified and classified using HAZOP. Risk consequences
are subsequently quantified via FMECA, allowing the computation of system
availability (the probability of the system to be found operative at a given time). Cyna
(1997) describes how the methodology was applied to a proposed post-chlorination
127
system in Neuilly-sur-Marne plant, arguing that its employment helped conceive a
reliable system and verified the adequacy of plant availability. The author concludes
that reliability analysis is an essential tool at “conception,” which allows the adjustment
of project design, and thus cost, to the level of reliability required, and, when associated
with maintenance procedures, can provide insurance of design quality.
Figure 2.7 Methodology for reliability analysis of a water treatment plant (after Cyna,
1997)
2.5 CONCLUSION
Risk management for water utilities is fast becoming an explicitly-stated
paradigm, recognising the implicit approach performed over the last 150 years. With
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increasing globalisation, outsourcing and increased regulation of the industry, tools that
allow system vulnerabilities to be identified before failures occur are essential. In
many ways, however, the industry is discovering risk analysis afresh and there is a
learning curve to climb in terms of the capabilities and limitations of these tools and
techniques. The international water sector has helpfully restated its overarching goal
reminding us that even in the face of rationalisation and economic pressure, public
health protection is the principal business of the water industry. Risk analysis has a
part to play in focussing effort in the right places, but should not be treated as a panacea
or substitute for managing risk and neither allowed to dictate the outcome of decisions
without recourse to the fundamental goal of the business. Flexibility of approach is key
to the successful application of these tools, as is their appropriate selection within the
organisational context and legal framework. For large multi-utilities, one can expect
high developed business risk capabilities, whereas for smaller and single utilities, an
approach based on accepted codes and standards may be more suitable. Our analysis
provide a comprehensive inventory of the current state-of-the-art as a reference for
developing a risk analysis strategy that is fit for purpose.
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ABSTRACT
Risk management in the water utility sector is becoming increasingly explicit.
However, due to the novelty and complexity of the discipline, utilities are encountering
difficulties in institutionalising risk management. In response, the authors have
developed a sector specific capability maturity methodology for benchmarking and
improving risk management. The research, conducted in consultation with water utility
practitioners, has distilled risk management into a coherent, process-based maturity
framework. We identified eleven risk management processes, and eight attributes with
characterise the extent to which these processes are repeatable, defined, controlled and
optimising. Implementation of the model should enable utilities to more effectively
employ their portfolio of risk management techniques for optimal, credible and
defensible decision making.
KEYWORDS: maturity model, risk, analysis, management, water, sector
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Financial restrictions, regulatory pressures and sectoral restructuring are
encouraging water utilities to move from technically inclined, risk-averse management
approaches towards more commercial, business-oriented practices (MacGillivray et al.,
2006a). Many within the industry, spurred on by developments in international
regulation and guidance, are promoting a business-wide approach to risk management
as a means to ease and exploit this transition (e.g. Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Miller,
2005; Lloyd and Abell, 2005). Whilst the sector has made good progress towards
setting its stated goal (AWWA et al., 2001) of providing wholesome, safe drinking
water that has the trust of customers within a risk-based context (Pollard et al., 2004),
there remain barriers to the implementation of risk management. These can be
categorised as business-related, the challenge of embedding risk management within
organisational cultures and decision-making processes (e.g. Pollard et al., 2004;
Howard and Lourens, 2005); and technical, relating to the selection and application of
risk analysis tools (e.g. MacGillivray et al., 2006a). Our research addresses the former;
the premise being that the tools and techniques for risk analysis are sufficiently
developed, yet lacking is the organisational capacity to employ these methodologies for
more optimal, credible, and defensible decision-making.
The authors propose that the dominant cause of this capacity deficiency is the
difficulty inherent in institutionalising mature risk management processes. This is
perhaps because the sector’s approach to implementation has centred on adherence to
risk management frameworks. These are essentially standards describing the
fundamentals of the prior art and the interrelationships between its core elements (e.g.
Hamilton et al., 2006). Here, we are not concerned with frameworks for drinking water
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quality management (e.g. NHMRC, 2001; WHO, 2002), widely accepted and applied
within the sector as a means of placing public health protection within a risk-based
context, but with those corporate-level frameworks intended to foster an integrated
approach to risk management (e.g. COSO, 2004; Canadian Standards Association,
1997; Council of Standards of Australia, 1999). These latter frameworks have been
instrumental in transforming the discipline from the preserve of engineering and
finance functions towards a business-wide paradigm. However, a number of criticisms
may be offered. Critically, although they typically embrace the concept that risk
management is comprised of processes, their treatment of the discipline focuses on
organisational structures and procedures. They often fail to address how the core tasks
and activities of risk management may be defined and controlled as processes.
Furthermore, although they have evolved beyond prescribing static requirements
towards embracing the concept of continuous improvement, too often this is addressed
as an afterthought rather than as an explicit component of these frameworks. As such,
the water sector has lacked methodologies on which to base risk management
improvement initiatives, suggesting that enhancements may often be isolated and that
their associated benefits can neither be replicated nor extended throughout
organisations. Finally, whilst typically generic in nature, these frameworks are often
representative of the large, financially-oriented firms where their application
predominates.
To address these shortcomings, the authors have developed a sector-specific risk
management capability maturity model (RM-CMM), a vehicle for benchmarking,
implementing and improving the processes that comprise risk management. In this
paper we review the field of capability maturity modelling. We then describe the
research methodology adopted in the design of our model, before discussing its
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development, structure and practical definition. A companion manuscript
(MacGillivray et al., 2006b) describes the model’s application in a benchmarking of
eight utilities within the international water sector.
3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE WATER SECTOR
The water industry is undergoing a significant shift in its approach to risk
management to one that is increasingly explicit and better integrated with other
business processes. Risk management strategies and techniques traditionally applied to
occupational health and safety and public health protection are now seeing broader
application for asset management (Booth and Rogers, 2001; Lifton and Smeaton,
2003), watershed protection (IMPRESS Management, 2002; NHMRC, 2001; WHO,
2003) and network operation (Stahl and Elliott, 1999; Stevens and Lloyd, 2004).
Beyond this operational context, utility managers are increasingly concerned with
managing the risks inherent to corporate level decision making. Critical issues include
decisions on outsourcing asset maintenance; billing and monitoring; the management of
change; staff retention; the long-term viability of investment decisions; and the
management of external interfaces with regulators and “competing” utilities
(MacGillivray et al., 2006a). Pollard et al. (2004) report that the organisational
hierarchy that exists even within “flat” utilities requires that these risks are actively
managed at strategic, programme and operational levels (Figure 3.1). Typically, there
are split accountabilities for these risks such that the chief financial officer / financial
director and Board have overall responsibility, supported by an internal audit or control
function for the management of strategic risks; executive and senior management
address programme level risks (e.g. asset management, maintenance planning); and
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operational (e.g. site) managers bear responsibility for operational risks (e.g. treatment
plant performance).
Figure 3.1 The risk hierarchy (adapted from Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2002)
Water utilities must employ a range of techniques to evaluate and consider these
aspects alongside one another, devising business and operating strategies that prioritise
resources on the basis of risk. Here tensions may arise from the explicit risk trade-offs
inherent to running a commercial water utility, such that the industry’s overarching goal
of public health protection is placed in conflict with narrower financial interests.
Critically in this regard, the transition to an explicit risk management philosophy within
the sector is reflected in recent revisions to the World Health Organisation’s (WHO,
2003) Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality. It is this overall context that drives the









 Water resource planning
 Microbial risk assessment programme
 Catchment protection programme
 Security risks/emergency planning
Strategic
 Individual compliance/consent risks
 Project risk assessment
 Site health and safety
 Maintenance planning
 Process design reliability
 Strategic investments





3.3 OVERVIEW OF CAPABILITY MATURITY MODELLING
A capability maturity model (CMM) is a simplified representation of an
organisational discipline (e.g. software engineering, risk management) that distils
industry practices into a coherent, process-based framework. These models are
constructed according to maturity levels, from learner to best practice, which are
characterised by the extent to which the processes are repeatable, defined, controlled
and optimising (although the terminology varies). The field’s origins can be traced to
the “quality revolution” of the 1970s (e.g. Crosby, 1979) and to the field of
management performance measurement. The CMM methodology was first articulated
by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), whose seminal model (Paulk et al., 1993)
explored the design capability of software development organisations. The capability
maturity modelling concept is finding increasing acceptance in academia and industry.
Notable applications include software and systems engineering (Paulk et al., 1993;
Software Engineering Institute, 2002a), workforce development and management
(Software Engineering Institute, 2002b), offshore design safety (Sharp et al., 2002),
reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003), and construction (Sarshar et al., 2000). Capability
models enable organisations to establish their current level of process maturity and
identify the steps necessary to progress to a higher level, building on their strengths and
improving on their weaknesses. They may be used for benchmarking purposes,
enabling organisations to compare themselves against other companies in their sector
and beyond. This may be done at the corporate, functional or business unit level.
Similarly, they may be used to assess the capabilities of key suppliers and partners.
Recently, a selection of risk management capability maturity models (e.g.
IACCM, 2003; RMRDP, 2002) have been developed. We believe that these models
insufficiently reflect the basic principles of capability maturity modelling. The most
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critical point is that they are not explicitly process-centred. Furthermore, they do not
closely reflect the clear distinctions between maturity levels as set out by the SEI and
developed further by subsequent researchers, instead characterising risk management
maturity on a graded scale of good-to-bad practice. Of course, the CMM approach is
not the sole means for improving risk management, and these critiqued models have
found support within industry. Thus, we do not imply that the IACCM and RMRDP
models are without value, indeed their simplicity and modest time demands may prove
attractive to many organisations. However, our development of the RM-CMM is not an
extension of these models, but rather a novel application of capability maturity
modelling to risk management in the water utility sector.
3.4 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The tailoring of existing maturity models to a new discipline and sector is not a
simple mapping exercise (Sarshar et al., 2000). Here, the core principles of maturity
modelling were abstracted and recreated in a form specific to risk management within
the water utility sector. Design of the research methodology (Figure 3.2) was informed
by the authors’ previous experience in maturity modelling within similar utility sectors
and drew upon the CMM literature, particularly Sarshar et al. (2000). The
methodology is designated “testing-out research” (Starke, 1995). Here, the aim is to
explore the limits of previously proposed generalisations and to specify, modify or
clarify their content (Starke, 1995). This form of research must be conducted under
real world conditions, where the kind of control present in laboratory conditions is
neither feasible nor justifiable. The lead author, in concert with a steering group of four
expert practitioners, designed the model in collaboration with partner water utilities.
Key development inputs included literature reviews of risk management and capability
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maturity modelling, structured scoping interviews with eleven water utility
professionals from five countries, prior knowledge of maturity modelling in similar
utility sectors, and past experience within the water sector.
Figure 3.2 Research methodology for design of RM-CMM
Given the qualitative nature of the research, verification and validation
mechanisms were adopted. The purpose of the expert steering group was to verify that
the model accurately codified risk management in line with the principles of maturity
modelling. Furthermore, feedback was sought from three water utilities to ensure that
the model reflected the practical realities of managing risk in the sector. This took the
form of one workshop and two interviews conducted after sharing the pilot model. This
piloting sought to validate the model’s architecture (e.g. are the right processes
included, are they adequately characterised, are the attributes relevant, etc.) and to
clarify its terminology. The model remains under research. The authors have recently
tested the model through a benchmarking exercise and two industrial case studies.
These applications will provide data of intrinsic value to both the industrial and
academic communities, and will serve as a means for evolving the model towards a
state compatible with industrial ownership.
Review of water sector risk
management practice
Review of CMM methodology
Scoping interviews with water
sector practitioners




3.5 RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL
3.5.1 Model overview
The RM-CMM is designed to measure and improve risk management processes.
Hence it is process-based rather than focussing on specific outcomes or deliverables. It
is increasingly accepted that continuous process improvement is based on a series of
small, evolutionary steps, rather than revolutionary measures (Paulk et al., 1993). The
RM-CMM organises these steps within evolutionary plateaus, or maturity levels, which
lay successive foundations for continual process improvement. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the model architecture.
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Figure 3.3 Overview of the RM-CMM (after Strutt et al., 2005)
3.5.2 Risk management maturity levels
Setting sensible goals for process improvement requires an understanding of the
difference between mature and immature organisations (Paulk et al., 1993). We have
developed descriptions of five maturity levels that characterise organisational
behaviours in both risk management overall and for each constituent process. These
levels were derived by abstraction from existing CMMs describing different disciplines
(Paulk et al., 1993, Software Engineering Institute, 2002a / 2002b; Sharp et al., 2002;






















Supply chain risk management
(SCRM)
Supporting
Change risk management (CRM)














(MacGillivray et al., 2006a, Pollard et al., 2004; Hamilton et al., 2006) and scoping
interviews. It is important to understand what these levels represent in practice, as they
are central to assessing the maturity of an organisation. Below we describe the
overarching maturity hierarchy. Note that at a given level of maturity, the positive
characteristics from preceding levels remain.
Level 1 – Initial
L1 organisations practice a largely ad hoc approach to risk management,
possessing no formal risk management processes and often exhibiting limited
knowledge of relevant standards or regulatory guidelines. Thus, they are largely reliant
upon individual heroics for the active management of risk. L1 organisations are likely
to be small water providers based in isolated rural areas where resource constraints
prevent the staffing of utilities with dedicated water professionals.
Level 2 – The repeatable organisation
L2 organisations understand that they have risks that require formal management,
and have established basic risk management processes for this purpose. However,
these processes are ill-defined and poorly institutionalised, limiting their capacity to
influence organisational actions. Furthermore, the scope of risk management is narrow,
generally restricted to addressing mission-critical risks and areas required by regulation
(e.g. occupational health and safety, water quality). Hence, at L2 the active
management of risk tends to be influenced less by explicit risk management processes
than by the repetition of activities and practices that have worked for the organisation
before. In a technical context, this places a premium on accepted standards of
performance and codes of practice (e.g. engineering standards; accepted best practice)
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which, if adhered to, provide high degrees of control. This is a pragmatic approach in
familiar and well-characterised situations where uncertainties and system
vulnerabilities are well understood.
However, this mind set is vulnerable; when mistakes are made they do not learn –
failures are repeated as well as success. Whilst L2 organisations often have a
reputation for achieving reliable, cost-effective water supply, they are very vulnerable
to change, whether organisational, technical or commercial. This, allied with deficient
organisational learning, is a common theme across many recent water quality related
outbreaks in affluent nations (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004).
Level 3 – The defined organisation
The key characteristic of the L3 organisation is the definition and implementation
of risk management processes across core business areas. This is achieved through
establishing process “enablers”. Enablers include the policies, procedures and
frameworks that guide risk management activities (i.e. who does what and when), and
the provision of adequate training, funding and tools in support of these activities.
Several scoping interviewees described their recent definition of risk management
processes. Drivers for this included: a desire to balance the roles of “brainstorming”
and “judgement” in risk management with more methodological, standardised and
objective approaches; the need to “institutionalise” risk management; and obligations
to exhibit good corporate governance to shareholders and regulators. In essence,
definition seeks to formalise existing implicit approaches to risk management. This is
most notably illustrated in the sector’s increasing adoption of the “water safety plan”
approach, which codifies good practice in the identification, assessment and control of
hazards to water quality.
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Definition creates an environment in which risks are methodically identified,
analysed, responded to and monitored. In a technical context, L3 maturity is required
where systems are characterised by greater levels of uncertainty and the potential to
deviate from routine operation. This is increasingly common, as the trend towards
utility self-sufficiency means that management can no longer seek to “over-engineer”
facilities with the presumption of screening out technical risk (MacGillivray et al.,
2006a). Here, optimisation of plant, network and process design and operation requires
a capacity to assess, understand and respond to what is driving the risk from or to the
plant, process or network. However, at L3 the efficiency and quality of risk
management processes are variable, stemming from limitations in their verification,
validation and feedback mechanisms (the “evaluators”). These limitations restrict
organisations’ ability to track and therefore control their risk management processes,
which are thus characterised as “open loop.”
Level 4 – The controlled organisation
The key characteristic of the L4 organisation is a structure which not only enables
their risk management processes but also evaluates and ensures their effective
execution (closing the open loop of L3). The scope of these processes reach throughout
the organisational hierarchy and across all functional boundaries. Evaluating refers to
the implementation of verification and validation mechanisms to provide feedback on
the status, quality, efficiency and expediency of risk management (e.g. ensuring
procedural compliance, quality assurance, benchmarking etc.). The value of systematic
verification was emphasised by one scoping interviewee, who noted that previously,
free access to the corporate risk register was combined with an absence of peer review
of risk assessments. This had allowed staff to “over-estimate their own pet concerns”
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and to assign risk reduction actions via the register to other staff “unbeknownst to
them.” These deficiencies were remedied through the introduction of formal
procedures governing access and use of the register and the establishment of challenge
procedures to provide quality assurance of risk assessments.
However, the L4 organisation tends to be hardwired and lacking in internal
flexibility. This is reflected in that although a learning ethos exists, the manner in
which L4 organisations learn is defined as single-loop (Argyris and Schön, 1978). This
refers to learning where the emphasis is on improving techniques for executing
processes, within the constraints of established process strategies. In other words,
learning is directed towards making existing process strategies more effective. Single-
loop learning tends to be present in organisations where goals, values, frameworks and
strategies are taken for granted. This lack of capacity for deeper learning hampers their
ability to make informed risk management decisions in rapidly changing and uncertain
contexts. Additionally, L4 organisations are often unable to grasp the soft issues
associated with human and organisational behaviour. This is a core weakness.
Level 5 – The optimised organisation
The key characteristics of the L5 organisation are its adaptability, flexibility and
attention to human and organisational behaviour. The L5 mindset is one of deeper
understanding, of an adaptive, learning organisation aiming to be best in class and
always improving in the long term. Central to this is their capacity for both double
(Argyris and Schön, 1978) and triple-loop learning. Double-loop learning involves
questioning the norms, values and assumptions underlying the design of risk
management processes, and is typically found in organisations where risk information
is continually developed through a broad range of channels (e.g. experience, R+D,
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benchmarking, analysis, simulation, etc.). This information is openly shared,
communicated and used to publicly test assumptions and beliefs. We define triple-loop
learning as questioning and revising broader organisational structures and practices to
optimise the capability of risk management processes (e.g. changing incentive
structures to encourage knowledge sharing and collaboration between traditionally
competing departments, etc.). The core enablers of triple-loop learning are an
understanding of how human and organisational behaviour influence process capability,
and organisational flexibility. L5 organisations are also actively engaged in the
innovation, development and piloting of new ideas and technologies to optimise risk
management throughout the organisation. From these efforts, best practices are
identified and transferred throughout the organisation. L5 processes are extremely
efficient and there is a strong risk management culture, because of the long term
investments made in developing processes and in training staff to participate in them.
3.5.3 Risk management processes
Our research identified 11 risk management processes (Figure 3.3). Strategic risk
planning centres on developing the corporate framework for risk management.
Hamilton et al. (2006) describe how these frameworks can introduce greater rigour,
consistency and standardisation to the discipline. The researchers further note their
potential for adaptation to suit user needs. This final point is crucial, as our scoping
interviews suggested that risk management frameworks were not simply shoehorned
within utilities. Establishing risk acceptance criteria is perhaps the least understood
aspect of risk management. Whilst our scoping interviews implied that internally
developed criteria for evaluating the significance of risks were commonplace (risk
ranking techniques), prior experience in similar sectors suggests that tolerability criteria
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are less prevalent and often externally imposed (e.g. ALARP criteria for dam safety).
We address both of these aspects in the context of an internal process, as we propose
that both are required to develop responses to risks in a consistent, objective and
defensible manner. Risk analysis involves the identification and assessment of risk.
We have previously reviewed (MacGillivray et al., 2006a) its application in the sector
at operational, programme and strategic levels. Here, our focus is not on the
methodologies per se, but on their application. Supported by initiation criteria and
formal procedures, using personnel with appropriate skills, experience, and resources,
risk analysis techniques can provide utilities with benefits ranging from an improved
understanding of treatment reliability to an explicit appreciation of project financial
risks. Applied inappropriately, whether due to ill-defined procedures or deficient
institutional capacities, risk analysis is not a subset of risk management but its panacea.
Our inclusion of risk based decision making examines how organisations identify
and evaluate solutions to manage individual risks. Clearly, risk analysis is of little use
if the outputs are intended to placate regulators rather than inform decision making.
Furthermore, one interviewee noted that an absence of criteria to evaluate decisions
restricts objectivity (i.e. opinions dominate in decision making), and we further propose
that it prevents the ex ante validation of decisions taken. Risk response is the
implementation of risk based decisions. Although an argument may be forwarded that
this lies outside the scope of our model as implementation processes are unlikely to be
unique to risk based decisions (i.e. there will exist models for implementing capital or
operational solutions, not models for implementing risk based decisions per se), it is
included as decisions left unimplemented are hollow gestures. The model’s treatment
of these latter two processes is particularly relevant as risk management frameworks
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have historically focussed on the identification and assessment of risk, effectively
marginalising guidance on their practical management.
Risk monitoring involves tracking the evolution of identified risks, and is
included in recognition of their dynamic nature. Integration is the current focus of the
risk management community. From the literature and our scoping interviews, two
aspects were identified: embedding risk management within organisations; and
enterprise risk management, where risks are managed with reference to the organisation
as a whole, rather than in isolation or in functional silos. Illustrating the latter aspect,
Lam (2003) contends that the traditional, fragmented approach, where companies
manage risk in organisational “silos,” is ineffective because risks are highly
interdependent and cannot be segmented and managed by entirely independent units.
As one scoping interviewee stated, “one of the challenges is…when [staff] are all
using discrete [risk] tools which may have different terminologies, scoring systems and
ways of presenting the outputs, my role is [to ensure] is a shared understanding and an
ability to interpret the results of tools in a business-wide context.” We introduce a
third element of integration by abstraction from the systems engineering CMM
(Software Engineering Institute, 2002a): integration of the risk management process
interfaces (e.g. between risk analysis and risk based decision making).
Supply chain risk management addresses two components: the sourcing of
components required to develop a product (e.g. chemicals) and the management of
services provided by organisations throughout the supply chain. The latter element is
of particular significance to the sector owing to the increasing utilisation of
outsourcing. However, one pilot interviewee challenged the inclusion of product risk,
arguing it is effectively managed through adhering to quality accredited suppliers.
However, it was maintained as the authors’ prior research in the oil and gas industry
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indicates that many organisational failures can be traced back to minor and apparently
insignificant services and components sourced from suppliers. Change risk
management is abstracted from the reliability engineering CMM (Strutt, 2003), and
involves identifying and managing the risk implications of organisational (e.g. business
process re-engineering) and technical change. We justify its inclusion as a range of
factors (e.g. globalisation, regulatory and market restructuring, novel technologies) are
serving to fundamentally alter the context in which water utilities operate.
Education and training – the development and maintenance of the competencies
required to manage risk – is included as our scoping interviews suggested that risk
management simply does not fit well into traditional company skill sets. Risk
knowledge management may be considered as the collection, storage and access of the
data underpinning and accumulated from the broader risk management processes, i.e.
the input and output data. The latter aspect is drawn from our scoping interviews,
which discussed various risk communication and reporting protocols and the use of
databases for storing risk assessment outputs. We include the former aspect on the
premise that in the absence of pre-defined data requirements, risk data collection is
likely to be ad hoc and largely restricted to the needs of business as usual.
There was some discussion amongst the authors as to whether research and
development in risk management merited inclusion as a process. However, the pilot
interviewees were resistant to this, with one considering it ‘‘not directly relevant,’’
another stating that the tools and techniques of the discipline are sufficiently developed,
rendering it a secondary issue. Although their experience within the sector confers
validity to their arguments, they may nonetheless be considered somewhat short-
sighted. A compromise was found through considering research and development not
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as a distinct process but as a defining characteristic of mature risk analysis, risk
monitoring and risk knowledge management.
3.5.4 Attributes
We have identified eight attributes (Figure 3.3) which characterise process
maturity. Scope is included as we propose maturity to be correlated with the scope of
implementation (i.e. a well defined process restricted to engineering does not constitute
high organisational maturity). Here, integration refers to the existence of initiation
criteria and procedures for process execution. Although its treatment as both process
and attribute constitutes double-coverage, this was felt appropriate given its prominence
in the practitioner and academic literature. Verification mechanisms address procedural
compliance and quality assurance of process execution, whilst validation determines
whether the process itself is correct. Together, these mechanisms create process
control, and provide the primary feedback inputs for organisational learning. The
inclusion of organisational learning builds on prior research conducted by the authors in
offshore design and safety (Sharp et al., 2002) and reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003),
although the underlying principle is drawn from ideas from the theory of action and the
concept of single and double loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). It is best
illustrated by paraphrasing Dalrymple (2006), who notes that experience rarely
provides lessons directly, but instead requires interpretation through the filter of
preconceived theories, values and prejudices. Where these are impregnable, facts are
weak things. The capacity to use experience to question and revise these preconceived
notions constitutes double loop learning.
We include stakeholder engagement in deference to its prominent representation
within risk management frameworks. However, our scoping interviews revealed a
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disconnect between academic and industrial perceptions of the appropriate role of
external stakeholders within risk management, with the latter generally more resistant
to their involvement. Explanations to support this stance included the need to preserve
commercial confidentiality, concerns over possible conflicting objectives between
stakeholders and organisations, and fears that stakeholder representatives may lack
specialist knowledge and hence “slow down” risk management. One interviewee
described that whilst they developed emergency response plans for water quality
incidents in conjunction with the public health regulator, they were resistant to brining
concerns about drinking water safety to the public domain owing to fears of press
sensationalism. Another noted that they “don’t so much consult stakeholders as expose
the [risk] governance process to them [e.g. regulators or shareholder representatives]
– they form an opinion of [its] adequacy or otherwise.” That said, there was agreement
on the importance of engaging internal stakeholders, on the premise that through
engaging other departments, functions, and business units, organisations may avoid the
silo mentality which has historically pervaded risk management, thus creating synergies
through shared knowledge and expertise, the co-ordination of related work, etc. For
example, one interviewee described the value of using “networks of participants” to
provide input to capital investment decisions. Here, stakeholders have the opportunity
to critique proposed options (e.g. for constructing a new treatment plant, staff involved
in the design, operation and maintenance, costing, etc.). The inclusion of competence
as an attribute recognises that risk management processes will prove ineffective if their
execution lies outwith technical or managerial skill sets. Indeed, many of our
interviewees discussed their desire to maintain in-house competencies to manage risk in
preference to relying on consultants. Resourcing encompasses the use of monetary,
human and technical (e.g. analysis methodologies) resources. As one interviewee
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noted, “funding, manpower, and specialists” are particular constraints to effective risk
management in smaller utilities. Process documentation and reporting is the final
attribute. Notably, Deloach (2000) reflects that there is often a lack of organisational
consistency in reporting formats for risk management, which he perceives as a barrier
to “enterprise wide” risk management. More practically, one interviewee argued that in
what remains a conservative industry, if risk information is not properly documented
and accessible then staff will use this ‘‘as an excuse to ignore risk management.’’
Consideration was afforded to the inclusion of culture as an attribute, given its
extensive discussion in the literature and our scoping interviews. However, this was
rejected for two reasons. Firstly, culture is a notoriously difficult concept to define, let
alone measure. Secondly, overt attempts to change culture, which in this context may
be thought of as the values and beliefs held by employees that guide their actions in
managing risk, are not only Orwellian, but likely to be ineffectual. Ineffectual, as the
authors consider that employee values and beliefs are not intrinsic properties, but rather
are conditioned by the environment within which they manage risk (i.e. the risk
management processes). Thus, culture change is a consequence of process
improvement, not a prerequisite.
3.5.5 Internal structure of process assessment framework
At the framework’s core are a series of guideline statements which describe how
each process is conducted at each level of maturity with reference to the attributes. In
support of this are process descriptions which also outline the practices required to
satisfy the process goals. As the guideline statements are largely devolved from the
principles contained in the overarching maturity hierarchy, we do not dwell on their
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detail. However, by way of illustration, Table 3.1 depicts the assessment framework at
levels 3 and 4 for risk analysis.
3.5.6 Internal structure of process improvement framework
This framework outlines the operational steps that utilities may take in order to
implement their process improvement priorities as identified from application of the
assessment framework. It was developed after receiving feedback that the assessment
framework was at a layer of abstraction which restricted its ability to inform the
development of improvement plans. The steps are grouped by process and maturity
level, and are categorised according to actions to: perform the practices that satisfy the
process goals (i.e. do the process); establish and define the process (i.e. structure the
process); and enable and evaluate the process. Table 3.2 depicts the process
improvement framework relating to progression from L3 to L4 in risk analysis.
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Table 3.1 L3 and L4 process maturity in risk analysis
.
Attribute Attribute at level 3: Risk analysis Attribute at level 4: Risk analysis
Scope A defined, documented process is in place containing criteria, methods
and guidelines for the identification, assessment and evaluation (with
respect to acceptance criteria) of a broad range of risks across core
business areas, guided by a risk register. The organisation is conversant
with and goes beyond the regulatory requirements for risk analysis.
A controlled process is in place containing detailed criteria, methods and
guidelines to manage the identification, assessment, evaluation (with respect to
acceptance criteria), establishment of causality and linking (common cause and
dependent) of risks at all levels of the company and across all functional
boundaries of the business, guided by a company-specific risk register.
Integration Procedures are in place to initiate risk analysis processes. Risk analysis is initiated automatically as part of core business processes (e.g.
periodic business risk assessments).
Verification and
Validation
Basic mechanisms are in place to verify that risk analysis is performed as
required, largely reliant on lagging indicators. The expertise for
validation is generally lacking.
Verification and validation systems are in place to verify the efficiency of risk
analysis activities and to validate their expediency (e.g. the organisation tracks
that tools and techniques are being used correctly and that the correct tools and




The risk analysis tool suite is reviewed and modified on an event-driven
basis.
Feedback is actively used to improve the execution of risk analysis (e.g. gaps
identified and risk analysis tools and techniques improved in response).
Stakeholder
Engagement
Risk analysis processes generally reside within the responsible unit, with
limited cross-functional or external consultation.
Risk analysis processes generally reside within affected disciplines, and
stakeholders work together to define and implement an integrated approach to
risk analysis, capitalising on synergies and collective knowledge.
Competence Detailed knowledge of risk analysis resides only within the responsible
unit.
Most involved staff exhibit a good level of competence in the selection and
application of risk analysis tools and techniques, and have access to support
from internal or external expert risk practitioners.
Resources Adequate resources are provided in support of risk analysis, with both
qualitative and quantitative tools and techniques available.
Sufficient resources are provided in support of risk analysis, a portion of which
is made available for R + D for risk assessment. A broad range of qualitative
and quantitative tools and techniques are available and applied, including
methodologies for aggregating and comparing risks.
Documentation and
Reporting
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and disseminated in a format that
supports decision making.
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and disseminated in a clear, concise and
actionable format that supports real-time decision making, and their reporting is
co-ordinated with other risk reporting mechanisms (e.g. risk status updates).
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 Identify and allocate sufficient resources in support of risk analysis, updating them as
necessary to reflect changing needs.
 Identify key internal and external stakeholders (e.g. representatives of different functions or
divisions of the business) and define their potential contributions (e.g. synergies from
collective knowledge and advice, etc.) and requirements (e.g. involvement in assessing
cross business impacts).




 Establish formal mechanisms (e.g. periodic reviews, audits, status reports, milestones, etc.)
to verify that risk analysis adheres to its formal description, policies, and procedures, and
is being performed efficiently.
 Designate ‘ownership’ of verification to a responsible individual(s). The individual(s) is
responsible for ensuring verification is performed, reviewing the findings, and
recommending corrective action where necessary. Stakeholders should be involved as
appropriate (e.g. staff not conforming to established procedures).
 Define and collect measures to support verification of adherence and efficiency (e.g. task
and activity checklists, cost of analyses, timeliness of analyses, etc.).
 Establish formal mechanisms (e.g. periodic reviews, external advice, status reports, etc.) to
validate the process of risk analysis. Candidates for validation include the methods and
procedures for risk analysis (e.g. the tools and techniques applied) and the risk analysis
outputs (e.g. do the analysis outputs inform decision making).
 Designate ‘ownership’ of validation to a responsible individual(s). The individual(s) is
responsible for ensuring validation is performed, reviewing the findings, and
recommending corrective action where necessary. Stakeholders should be involved as
appropriate (e.g. where changes to the tool suite or procedures are recommended, the
process ‘owners’ would be involved).
 Define and collect measures to support validation of risk analysis (e.g. internal assessments
by decision makers of the value of risk analysis outputs, formal validation of risk analysis
methodologies, etc.).
 Establish mechanisms to compare in-house risk analysis with industry practice, making
changes where appropriate (e.g. benchmarking initiatives, strategic information exchange,
etc.).
3.6 ILLUSTRATING THE RM-CMM
We have discussed the overarching maturity hierarchy, and introduced the risk
management processes and those attributes which define their maturity. Here, we build
on these foundations by illustrating what the model practically means within various
organisational functions. Consider first risk analysis. The distinction between the
initial and the repeatable level is that in the latter, the application of basic techniques by
experienced staff creates a degree of stability. In process engineering, this may entail
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the execution of hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) to identify and assess the
potential for designs to deviate from specifications, whilst at L1 this potential would be
addressed implicitly if at all. At L3, initiation points for analyses are defined (e.g. at
the concept design stage), and formalised procedures detail the tasks, activities, roles
and responsibilities for execution, creating a basic infrastructure that maintains the
process beyond the tenure of experienced staff (who are depended upon at L2). At L4,
verification extends beyond ensuring procedural compliance (L3) to address quality
assurance of analyses, for example through technical peer reviews. Questions
addressed may include: did the analysts work their way through the HAZOP study
systematically, or did they overlook important scenarios, components and process
flows; were all stages and operating modes of the process considered (e.g. startup,
shutdown and transitioning to partial operation); and was adequate time spent on the
analysis.
We now consider risk based decision making in the context of occupational
health and safety. Here, the initiating point is the receipt of risk analysis outputs (e.g.
job safety risk analyses, plant hazard evaluations, etc.). These outputs, together perhaps
with a predefined hierarchy of health and safety risk controls (e.g. engineering;
administrative; and protective personal equipment) serve as the framework for
identifying solutions to manage individual risks. Once identified, these solutions may
be evaluated with reference to criteria including: cost, feasibility and risk reduction
achieved. In contrast, at L2 maturity, decisions to manage risks are taken in isolation of
a clearly defined framework and perhaps even in the absence of risk analysis outputs,
and are hence focussed upon replicating historic good practice. Thus, health and safety
is under pressure when circumstances change, whether through the introduction of new
technical processes or modifications to work practices.
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Finally, consider education and training in risk management. Here, a repeatable
process may focus on workshops, where the concepts of risk management are
introduced to staff on an as required basis, supported by on the job training. Further,
there is an absence of clear criteria dictating when and to whom training should be
delivered. An additional weakness is the inability to define the required competencies
for effective risk management. Without these, on what basis are training programmes
designed, how are the appropriate means of delivery selected (e.g. classroom training,
workshop, on the job, etc.), and how can the efficacy of training be evaluated? These
weaknesses are remedied at the defined state.
3.7 MODELAPPLICATION
The RM-CMM has a range of potential applications, including:
 Self-assessment or external evaluation (voluntary or audit) of risk management
maturity at the corporate, business unit, functional and project level;
 Use by management and technical staff as a reference model for designing and
implementing a risk management improvement initiative;
 Evaluation of potential suppliers’ / contractors’ / partners’ risk management
maturity prior to selection.
The model can be implemented either as a self-assessment procedure or by
external audit using independent verification authorities. It is felt that the latter, in most
cases, gives greater credence to the results of an assessment. However, internal
assessments are often more useful when using the model as an improvement tool rather
than as a measurement tool. The companion paper (MacGillivray et al., 2006b)
describes in detail the self-assessment methodology.
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3.8 CONCLUSIONS
We have described a risk management capability maturity model, a vehicle for
benchmarking and improving risk management within the water sector. We have
addressed the model’s theoretical and empirical foundations, overviewed its
architecture, and illustrated its practical definition. Implementation of the model should
assist utilities to more effectively employ their portfolio of risk analysis and
management techniques for optimal, credible, defensible decision making. A
companion paper describes its application to benchmark eight utilities within the
international water sector.
Acknowledgements
This work has been funded by the American Water Works Association Research
Foundation (AWWARF project RFP2939) and a consortium of international water
utility companies. The comments and views herein are the authors’ alone. BM is co-
funded on a UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)
Doctoral training account.
3.9 REFERENCES
Argyris, C. and Schön, D., Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective,
Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1978.
AWWA, EUREAU, WSAA and DVGW, Bonn Workshop 2001 – Key principles in
establishing a framework for assuring the quality of drinking water: a summary,
AWWA, Denver, CO., 2001.
174
Booth, R. and Rogers, J., Using GIS technology to manage infrastructure capital assets,
J. AWWA, 93(11): 62, 2001.
Canadian Standards Association, Risk management: guidelines for decision makers.
CAN/CSA-Q850-97, 1997.
COSO, Enterprise risk management framework - Executive Summary, 2004 (website:
www.otpp.com).
Council of Standards of Australia, Australian/New Zealand risk management standard
No.4360: 1999, 1999.
Crosby, P. B., Quality is Free, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Dalrymple, T., Less liberté means less egalité, City Journal, Winter 2006.
Deloach, J.W., Enterprise-wide risk management - strategies for linking risk and
opportunity, Pearson Education Limited, London, 2000.
Hamilton, P.D., Pollard, S.J.T., Hrudey, S.E. and MacGillivray, B.H, Risk management
frameworks for the water sector – a review, at review, 2006.
Howard, J. and Lourens, A., Engaging operational staff in risk management, Proc. of
Risk analysis strategies for better and more credible decision making, 6-8th April,
2005, Banff, Canada.
Hrudey, S.E. and Hrudey E.J., Safe drinking water: Lessons from recent outbreaks in
affluent nations, IWA Publishing, 2004.
IACCM, Organisational maturity in risk management: The IACCM business risk
management maturity model (BRM3), 2003 (website: http://www.risk-
doctor.com/pdf-files/brm1202.pdf.).
IMPRESS Management, Guidance for the analysis of pressures and impacts in
accordance with the water framework directive, Draft 5.2, European Commission,
Brussels, 2002.
175
Lam, J., Enterprise risk management: from incentives to controls, John Wiley & Sons,
Hoboken, New Jersey, 2003.
Lifton, G. and Smeaton, P., Asset risk management in Scottish Water, Proc. of the
ICE/CIWEM Conference: Risk and reward in asset management delivery – who is
best prepared for the challenges ahead?, 14th November, 2003, London, UK.
Lloyd, R. and Abell, P., Capital maintenance in Yorkshire Water’s water business unit,
Proc. of Risk analysis strategies for better and more credible decision making, 6-8th
April, 2005, Banff, Canada.
MacGillivray, B.H, Hamilton, P.D., Strutt, J.E., Pollard, S.J.T., Risk analysis strategies
in the water utility sector: an inventory of applications for better and more credible
decision-making, Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and Technology, 36:
85, 2006a.
MacGillivray, B.H., Sharp, J.V., Strutt, J.V.,, Hamilton, P.D. and Pollard, S.J.T.,
Benchmarking risk management within the international water utility sector. Part II:
A survey of eight water utilities, J. Risk Research, in press, 2006b.
Miller, G.A., Risk governance in a water utility, Proc. of Risk analysis strategies for
better and more credible decision making, 6-8th April, 2005, Banff, Canada.
NHMRC, Framework for management of drinking water quality, NHMRC, New
Zealand, 2001.
Paulk, M.C., Curtis, B., Chrissis, M.B. and Weber, C.V., Capability maturity model,
version 1.1, IEEE Software, 10(4): 18, 1993.
Pollard, S.J.T., Strutt, J.E., MacGillivray, B.H., Hamilton, P.D. and Hrudey, S.E., Risk
analysis and management in the water utility sector – a review of drivers, tools and
techniques, Trans. IChemE, Part B: Proc. Safety Environ., 82(B6): 1, 2004.
176
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Risk: improving Government’s capability to handle risk
and uncertainty, The Strategy Unit, London, 2002. (website: http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/SU/RISK/risk/home.html.).
RMRDP, Risk management maturity level development, 2002. (website:
http://www.risksig.com/Articles/rm%20report%20final%20version%2012.doc.).
Sarshar, M., Haigh, R., Finnemore, M., Aouad, G., Barrett, P., Baldry, D. and Sexton,
M., SPICE: a business process diagnostics tool for construction projects,
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 7(3): 241, 2000.
Sharp, J.V., Strutt, J.E., Busby, J. and Terry, E., Measurement of organizational
maturity in designing safe offshore installations, Proceedings of the International
Conference on Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, 2: 383, 2002.
Software Engineering Institute, CMMI for systems engineering / software engineering /
integrated product development / supplier sourcing, version 1.1, 2002a. (website:
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/).
Software Engineering Institute, People capability maturity model, version 2.0., 2002b.
(website: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/).
Stahl, G.R. and Elliott, J.C., ‘New generation’ computer models for risk-based planning
and management, Water Supply (Australia), 17(3/4): 289, 1999.
Starke, R.E., The art of case study research, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA and London,
1995.
Stevens, I.M. and Lloyd, R.I., Water resources: Sustainable optimisation and security
of supply, a proven example, A paper presented to the 2004 Water sources
conference and exposition, Jan 11-14th, 2004, Austin, Texas.
Strutt, J.E., Reliability capability maturity briefing document, Report No. R-03/2/1,
Cranfield University, 2003.
177
WHO, Guidelines for drinking water quality, 3rd Edition (draft), WHO, 2003 (website:
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/guidelines3rd/en/).
WHO, Water safety plans (revised draft), Report publication WHO/SDE/WSH/02.09,
World Health Organisation, 2002/
178
Chapter 4
Implementing risk management: a study of improving
performance within a water utility
Submitted to Journal of Water Supply: Research and Technology – Aqua
179
4. Implementing risk management: a study of improving
performance within a water utility
B.H. MacGillivray and S.J. T. Pollard
Centre for Water Science, Sustainable Systems Department, School of Applied
Sciences, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL, UK.
ABSTRACT
We describe application of a model to benchmark utility risk management
capability and discuss observed risk management practices and their maturity of
implementation within an international water utility. We highlight practices ranging
from the application of classical risk assessment methodologies such as hazard and
operability studies, to the use of scenario planning in guiding organisational
restructuring programmes. We draw general conclusions regarding the presence or
absence of attributes which determine the maturity of implementation of these
practices, such as governance by procedure and criteria for initiating the application of
risk analysis techniques. The findings provide additional insight into what risk
management means in practice and how organisational capabilities may be improved.




Formalised risk management is becoming a central feature within the strategic
governance of water and wastewater services because it provides opportunities to
identify and prevent potential failures before they occur (AWWA et al., 2001; The
Expert Panel on Water and Wastewater Strategy, 2005; Pollard et al., 2005). Its
application now extends beyond the preserves of occupational health and safety and
public health protection to embrace corporate level decision making, asset
management, watershed protection and network reliability analysis (as reviewed in
MacGillivray et al., 2006a). Risk management is of little value, however, without
implementation (Mosse, 2006). So utilities committed to a more strategic approach to
their business have concerned themselves with how to improve their organisational
capabilities in managing risk. In support, the American Water Works Association
(AWWA) Research Foundation have funded research on risk management maturity and
we have published a capability maturity model for benchmarking and improving the
processes that comprise utility risk management (MacGillivray et al., 2006b). Here, we
discuss its application within a water and wastewater utility.
4.2 METHODS
Our risk management capability maturity model (RM-CMM) (MacGillivray et al.
2006b; Figure 4.1) presents eleven risk management processes at five maturity levels
(1-5) characterised with reference to attributes. These maturity levels reflect the extent
to which each process is repeatable, defined, controlled and optimising (Table 4.1).
Once a process is enshrined in procedures, with staff trained in their application, roles
and responsibilities assigned, the necessary resources secured, and mechanisms in place
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to prevent deviations from requirements and to learn from the feedback obtained,
implementation of risk management should be of consistent high quality. In this way,
the demonstrable maturity of risk management becomes the benchmark of an
organisation’s capability to manage risk, rather than the presence or absence of
frameworks and procedures in isolation, the latter frequently being mistaken for the
former.
The utility investigated in this paper is responsible for the management and
operation of water and wastewater networks. Our analysis has been informed by
questionnaire, interviews and document analysis. The questionnaire, completed by the
risk manager, comprised a series of statements characterising the implementation of
each risk management process at each maturity level. These were responded to on a
four point Likert-type scale (fully agree, generally agree, partially agree, disagree).
Process maturity was determined according to the “highest degree of fit,” a measure of
the level of agreement with the guideline statements at each maturity level for each
process. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the risk manager, eight
senior managers charged with the oversight of the discipline within their business
functions (e.g. asset management, finance, human resources) and one manager
responsible for recent organisational restructuring. These interviews, eight conducted
in situ and two by ’phone, were transcribed verbatim. Finally, a range of supporting
company documentation (e.g. policies, procedures, methodologies, process flow
diagrams) was obtained and reviewed. We preserved the utility’s anonymity, so
removing potential conflicts (e.g. the utility’s potential desire that the findings reflected
positively upon themselves). Further, the use of multiple data sources allowed
triangulation, wherein the documents, questionnaire responses and interview transcripts
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were cross-checked for inconsistencies. Finally, two members of the utility’s risk
management group reviewed and approved our conclusions.






The process is a continual, explicit component of organisational activities, forming part of the ‘culture.’
Feedback is actively used to improve both the philosophy and execution of the process, and the adaptation of
organisational structures and practices to optimise its ability to undertake the process (double loop learning).
Management continually establishes measurable targets for process improvement, with systems in place to
verify their achievement and to validate the means through which they are pursued. Active innovation,
development and piloting of new ideas and technologies to optimise the process.
Controlled
(L4)
Verification mechanisms extend to provide quality assurance, and are supplemented by the capacity for
process validation. Feedback is actively used to improve process execution, albeit within the constraints of
existing process strategies (single loop learning). Broadly spread competencies enable the process to reside
within affected disciplines, although stakeholders work together to achieve an integrated approach, capitalising
on synergies and collective knowledge. Sufficient resources are available, with limited internal R&D.
Defined
(L3)
Process scope exceeds regulatory requirements, extending across core business areas. Documentation details
procedures, criteria, methods and guidelines for process undertaking, whilst basic audit mechanisms verify
compliance. Feedback limitations restrict process evolution to learning from ‘events’ (open loop learning).




Basic process in place, focused on meeting regulatory requirements and addressing ‘mission-critical’ risks.
Initiated reactively, often in response to an event or situation. Limited capacity to evolve based on experience.
Initial (L1) No formal process; ad-hoc approach. Reliance on individual heroics. Limited awareness of regulatory
requirements or relevant standards.
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4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 4.2 displays the utility’s maturity profile by self-assessment. With the
exception of supply chain risk management and risk knowledge management (L2), each
process was self-assessed at L3, representing process definition. In contrast, L2
processes are generally limited in scope, ill-defined and poorly institutionalised with
limited capacity to influence organisational behaviours. Table 4.2 presents the
processes included within the RM-CMM, and the related utility practices observed.
Figure 4.2 The case study utility’s risk management maturity profile by self-assessment
We discuss four processes: (i) risk knowledge management; (ii) change risk
management; (iii) education and training in risk management; and (iv) risk analysis.
Note that as process maturity is assessed according to the highest degree of fit with a
given level, there is scope for discrepancies between, for example, a process evaluated

















Table 4.2 Description of the RM-CMM processes and of the relevant practices observed within the utility
Process Description Observed practices
SRP The process by which the Board, the executive and senior
management set out their overarching framework for corporate
risk management.
Risk management policy and framework derived in part from external standards, informed by consultations between the risk management
group, senior and executive management and the Board.
ERAC The process by which the utility establishes criteria for
evaluating the significance and acceptability of risk.
Risk ranking technique in place, derived from external standards, which set out criteria for evaluating the consequence, likelihood, strength of
existing controls and, combined, the overall significance of strategic risks. However, evaluations as to their acceptability were judgement-
based. The acceptable level of operational risk was implicit in asset design and operating standards, at times these were derived with respect
to clear criteria (e.g. ALARP in dam safety, H&S regulations, etc.), although more often were based on experience, judgement and historic
practice.
RA The identification and assessment of risk. Two distinct categories of risk analysis: a generic strategic technique applied in business planning and project management; and a series of
discrete methods applied operationally. In the former, experience, judgement and the outputs of SWOT and STEEP analyses informed the
identification to risks to achieving business plan objectives, which were then assessed via the risk ranking technique. A similar approach was
adopted in project management. Operationally, a portfolio of industry standard and best practice risk analysis techniques were applied (e.g.
hazard and operability studies; hazards in construction studies; failure mode, effect and criticality analyses; cryptosporidium risk analysis
techniques, Monte Carlo simulation; and dam portfolio analysis).
RBDM The identification and evaluation of options to manage risks. No inference possible.
RR Implementing the selected risk management option(s). Tasks, responsibilities and accountabilities for implementing risk management options were assigned and logged within the corporate risk
register. The nature of the implementation process varied according to the nature of the option (e.g. operational vs. capital).
RM Reviewing and updating risk analyses. Strategic risks (business planning and project management) were informally monitored on an ongoing basis by those assigned responsibility,
and formally re-evaluated at periodic intervals.
IRM The integration of risk management process interfaces; the
cross-functional integration of risk management; integration of
risk management with broader business operations.
No inference possible.
SCRM Two aspects: (i) product supply risk management: addressing
the way utilities obtain the raw components required to
develop a product; (ii) service supply risk management:
managing services provided by other organisations throughout
the supply chain – e.g. outsourcing agreements.
Broad range of pre-qualification standards / criteria were applied as appropriate (e.g. all high risk suppliers were evaluated in terms including
previous work carried out for the utility; strategic potential; technical competence and experience; financial capacity and stability; health and
safety record; quality system; environmental policy). Long term supplier partnerships were established, where appropriate, to optimise value
for money and ensure quality and reliability of supply.
CRM Managing the risk implications of business (e.g. re-
engineering) and technical (e.g. changes in design or
technology) change.
The planning of a recent organisational restructuring was informed by process mapping and scenario planning, which operationalised the
broad guidelines for restructuring set at the executive level (e.g. guidance against processes, organisational structures, commercial approach,
etc.).
E&T Development of the skills and knowledge that enable staff to
perform their risk management roles.
Comprised of a combination of ad hoc attendance of external courses and conferences for key risk management staff; internally delivered
training modules wherein the discipline received primary or secondary focus (e.g. in project management); and “on the job” training, where
knowledge transfer occurred through direct participation in the risk management processes (e.g. risk analysis workshops).
RKM The collection, storage and access of input and output risk
data.
The use of a risk register (IT database) for the collection, storage and access of risk analysis outputs. Pre-defined strategies for collecting the
data required to inform risk management appeared restricted to select risks whose management was underpinned by analytical methodologies
(e.g. in reliability modelling, dam safety management).
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Consider risk knowledge management. We observed use of a risk register (IT
database) for the storage and access of risk analysis and monitoring outputs (catalogued
according to level of risk, date of addition, and ownership, etc.) from business planning
and project management. Formal procedures governed its use, which was overseen by
a network of risk co-ordinators and the risk management team, supported by bi-weekly
compliance reports on the adequacy of its maintenance. However, a core shortcoming
was that a clear understanding of the data required to inform risk management (i.e. the
input data) proved restricted to select risks whose management was underpinned by
analytical methodologies (e.g. in reliability modelling, dam safety assessment). This is
an important observation because in the absence of predefined requirements, risk data
collection is likely to be ad hoc and restricted to the familiar requirements of business
as usual, leading to an over-reliance on expert judgement in managing risk.
Consider now change risk management, a particularly significant process given
the range of factors (e.g. globalisation, regulatory and market restructuring, novel
technologies; Means et al., 2005) serving to fundamentally alter the context in which
the sector operates. Of note was the utility’s recent restructuring programme, aimed at
improving efficiency, customer service and internal accountability. At the planning
stage, process mapping and scenario planning were undertaken to operationalise the
restructuring guidelines set by the executive (e.g. on processes, organisational
structures, commercial approach). Scenario planning acknowledges the key sources of
uncertainty and incorporates them into a range of future strategic responses for
exploration (Clemons, 1995). As one manger noted “we got experienced people from
within the business to map out [their] processes and, it was in doing that, that we tested
the scenarios…the organisational design followed…that was important as there was a
great temptation just to jump into [the] re-organisation…but we resisted that, and what
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it allowed us to do was not only do the scenarios, but also when you come up with the
[final plan], it’s not as contestable or emotionally charged.” This supports Clemons’
(1995) argument that scenario planning reduces the risk of making inadequate changes
to organisational structures or processes and, through ensuring the need for change is
internally addressed and accepted, reduces the risk that implementation will fail.
However, whilst evaluated as closest to L3 maturity, the case study utility’s change risk
management process cannot be considered fully defined. As one manager offered: “we
don’t have a rulebook on organisational change that we pull off the shelf. I think [the
process] was [shaped] by a culmination of things…experience, the nature of the team,
the leadership, the style of the new managing director… we did run a workshop on
lessons learnt before we disbanded [the [restructuring team], but I’m unsure how that
finds its way into the corporate rulebook.” This is significant as substantial evidence
exists to mark organisational re-engineering a high risk-endeavour, in that whilst often
effective, such programmes produce highly variable outcomes (e.g. Remenyi and
Heafield, 1996; Crowe et al., 2002; Dean et al., 1999).
Consider now the utility’s education and training in risk management process,
comprised of a combination of ad hoc attendance of external courses and conferences
for risk management practitioners; internally delivered training modules (e.g. in project
management); and informal “on the job” training. However, once again, as one
manager stated, it was “not yet a formally documented process;” nor had the required
staff competencies been defined. This latter point is key, as without defined
competency requirements and methods for determining whether competencies exist or
have been imparted (e.g. assessment matrices), the value of training can not be
quantified.
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In light of this, a pressing question for utility managers is: what practical steps are
required to secure fully defined (L3; Table 4.1) risk management processes? To
discuss this, we turn to our observations of risk analysis. Within the utility, we
observed two categories of risk analysis: a generic strategic technique; and a series of
discrete techniques applied in specific operational contexts. The former involved risk
ranking to assess and prioritise a broad spectrum of strategic risks (e.g. financial,
environmental, regulatory, etc.) to the delivery of business plans and project objectives.
The latter involved a portfolio of industry standard and best practice techniques (e.g.
hazard and operability studies (HAZOP); hazards in construction studies; failure mode,
effect and criticality analyses; cryptosporidium risk analysis techniques, Monte Carlo
simulation; and dam portfolio analysis). Observed L3 characteristics included
procedures and criteria governing the conduct and initiation of these risk analyses. For
example, strategic risk analysis was initiated at points in the business planning and
project management cycles, whilst HAZOP studies were undertaken at set points in the
design stage (e.g. during the production of detailed design data). However, even at L3,
process execution is variable because of limitations in verification, validation and
feedback. For example, whilst the utility had basic mechanisms in place to verify
compliance with risk analysis procedures (e.g. sign offs, internal audits), it lacked
formal, systematic mechanisms to ensure the quality of completed analyses (e.g.
technical peer reviews, challenge procedures). Nor was a systematic approach to
validating the design of the risk analysis process evident (e.g. are the risk analysis
techniques fit-for-purpose, do the procedures maintain an appropriate balance between
standardisation and flexibility, etc.). This said, progression to L4, in which these
limitations are resolved, is difficult, in part because the measures required are resource
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intensive, technically challenging, and may be viewed as introducing unnecessary
internal bureaucracy.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
Implementing risk management is not straightforward. It requires moving
beyond the establishment of frameworks, risk champions and risk management
committees and influencing practice on the ground. We therefore anticipate our
empirical observations regarding risk management practices and their methods for
institutionalisation will be of interest to utility risk managers, asset managers and
operational water utility staff, as well as regulators considering how improved water
utility governance can be made real.
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ABSTRACT
Risk management in the water utility sector is fast becoming explicit. Here, we
describe application of a capability model to benchmark the risk management maturity
of eight water utilities from the UK, Australia and the USA. Our analysis codifies risk
management practice and offers practical guidance as to how utilities may more
effectively employ their portfolio of risk management techniques for optimal, credible,
and defensible decision making. For risk analysis, observed good practices include the
use of initiation criteria for applying risk analysis techniques; the adoption of
formalised procedures to guide their application; and auditing and peer reviews to
ensure procedural compliance and provide quality assurance. Additionally, we have
identified common weaknesses likely to be representative of the sector as a whole, in
particular a need for improved risk knowledge management and education and training
in the discipline.
KEYWORDS: maturity model, risk analysis, risk management, water sector
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.1.1 Risk Management in the Water Utility Sector
The water sector is witnessing a significant shift in the approach to managing risk
to one that is increasingly explicit and broad in scope. Risk management strategies and
techniques traditionally applied to occupational health and safety and public health
protection are seeing application to corporate level decision making, asset management
(Booth and Rogers, 2001; Lifton and Smeaton, 2003), watershed protection (IMPRESS
Management, 2002; Lloyd and Abell, 2005; WHO, 2003) and network reliability
(Stevens and Lloyd, 2004; Stahl and Elliott, 1999). This is in large part a response to
the corporate governance, asset management, public health and environmental
protection agendas, and represents a growing recognition that the provision of safe
drinking water deserves to be treated as a “high reliability” societal service, subject to
the sectoral and organisational rigours and controls inherent to the nuclear, offshore and
aerospace industries (Pollard et al., 2005). However, it is not the presence of risk
management per se that governs the value derived, but its relative maturity of
implementation within a utility. We have developed a capability maturity model for
benchmarking and improving the processes that comprise risk management
(MacGillivray et al., 2006a). Here, we report its application to benchmark within the
international water utility sector, the purpose of which was to identify good risk
management practices and explore how their mature institutionalisation can be
achieved.
195
5.1.2 Risk Management Capability Maturity Model (RM-CMM)
Our companion paper (MacGillivray et al., 2006a) describes the development of a
RM-CMM for the water utility sector. The model is a prescriptive codification of water
sector risk management practice, within a process-based maturity hierarchy. The model
was developed by abstracting the principles of capability maturity modelling observed
in other disciplines, including software and systems engineering (Paulk et al., 1993;
Software Engineering Institute, 2002a), workforce development and management
(Software Engineering Institute, 2002b), offshore design safety (Sharp et al., 2002),
reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003), and construction (Sarshar et al., 2000). This was
achieved through literature reviews (MacGillivray et al., 2006b; Pollard et al., 2004;
Hamilton et al., 2006), structured interviews with water utility managers, and prior
knowledge of maturity modelling in similar utility sectors. We identified eleven risk
management processes (Figure 5.1). These processes are separated into five maturity
levels, from learner to best practice. These maturity levels, characterised by reference
to attributes (Figure 5.1), reflect the extent to which each process is repeatable, defined,
controlled and optimising. It is important to understand what these levels represent in
practice as this is crucial to assessing the maturity of an organisation. Whilst the
precise definition of the maturity hierarchy is process specific, a generalised description
is provided in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 Generalised representation of the process maturity hierarchy
Maturity level Process Characteristics
Level 5 – Optimising The process is a continual, explicit component of organisational activities, forming part of the ‘culture’. Feedback is actively used to
improve both the philosophy and execution of the process, and the adaptation of organisational structures and practices to optimise its
ability to undertake the process (double loop learning). Management continually establishes measurable targets for process
improvement, with systems in place to verify their achievement and to validate the means through which they are pursued. Active
innovation, development and piloting of new ideas and technologies to optimise the process.
Level 4 – Controlled Verification mechanisms extend to provide quality assurance, and are supplemented by the capacity for process validation. Feedback is
actively used to improve process execution, albeit within the constraints of existing process strategies (single loop learning). Broadly
spread competencies enable the process to reside within affected disciplines, although stakeholders work together to achieve an
integrated approach, capitalising on synergies and collective knowledge. Sufficient resources are available, with limited internal R&D.
Level 3 – Defined Process scope exceeds regulatory requirements, extending across core business areas. Documentation details procedures, criteria,
methods and guidelines for process undertaking, whilst basic audit mechanisms verify compliance. Feedback limitations restrict process
evolution to learning from ‘events’ (open loop learning). Processes reside within the responsible unit, with limited cross-functional or
external consultation. Adequate resources in place.
Level2 – Repeatable Basic process in place, focused on meeting regulatory requirements and addressing ‘mission-critical’ risks. Initiated reactively, often in
response to an event or situation. Limited capacity to evolve based on experience.




Eight water utilities from the UK, Australia and the USA participated in this
study. This was supplemented by the participation of an electricity utility regarded as
best practice in risk management. However, an incomplete questionnaire return
prevented its maturity assessment, and we restrict its discussion to key observations.
The sample is intended to reflect good risk management practice, hence we do not
suggest that our analysis is representative of the sector as a whole. The scope of
analysis varies by utility, and includes organisational, business unit, and functional
perspectives (Table 5.2). Sample selection drew upon existing industrial contacts and
was further informed by prior reviews (MacGillivray et al., 2006b; Pollard et al., 2004;
Hamilton et al., 2006) of the academic, practitioner and grey literature.
Table 5.2 Sample characteristics.
Descriptor Respondent* Unit of study Scope of analysis
Utility A Corporate risk manager Corporate Water supply, sewerage services
and electricity distribution
Utility B Water quality manager Corporate Water supply and sewerage
services
Utility C Water quality manager Corporate Water supply and sewerage
services
Utility D Corporate risk manager Corporate Water supply
Utility E Asset manager Corporate Water supply and sewerage
services
Utility F Corporate risk manager Corporate Water supply and sewerage
services
Utility G Asset manager Business unit Water supply
Utility H Water quality manager Function Drinking water quality
management
Utility I** Corporate risk manager Corporate Electricity transmission and
distribution
* Respondent denotes the interviewee; in most cases, the questionnaire was undertaken in consultation with
other staff. ** Data limitations prevented the maturity evaluation of Utility I.
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A survey-type research design was adopted, whilst the research methods included
questionnaire, interview and textual analysis. The questionnaire was comprised of a
series of statements characterising the undertaking of each risk management process at
each maturity level. These were responded to on a four point scale (fully agree;
generally agree; partially agree; and disagree), with space provided for supporting
comments. Process maturity was determined according to the highest “degree of fit”; a
measure of the average level of agreement with the guideline statements at each
maturity level for each process. The interview and textual analysis was concerned with
identifying the specific risk management practices undertaken within the sample and
correlating these with our model coding (e.g. what form does risk analysis take in
practice, and how may it be institutionalised as a process). Semi-structured interviews
were undertaken with each assessor following receipt of the questionnaire. The
interview methodology was developed, tested and refined within a separate industrial
case study. Interviews were conducted by ’phone, recorded, and subsequently
converted into transcripts. These transcripts were returned to each interviewee,
providing them an opportunity to comment. Finally, a range of pertinent supporting
company documentation was requested from each participant. Those made available
included risk management policies and frameworks, risk analysis procedures and
techniques, and water safety plans.
Given the qualitative nature of the research, mechanisms to validate our findings
were adopted. This was achieved through sample anonymity and triangulation.
Anonymity removed the potential for conflicts with the fundamental goal of adding to
the body of knowledge (as opposed, e.g., to the participants’ desire that the findings
reflected positively upon their organisation). Triangulation sought to balance the lead
author’s principal analysis of the questionnaires, texts and interview transcripts with a
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blind scoping analysis conducted by a co-author. Additionally, each respondent was
offered the opportunity to comment on all statements within the paper referring
specifically to their utility. Diverging perspectives were resolved through consensus.
5.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the sample process maturity profiles. Detailed
discussion of these levels may be found in our companion paper. Here, we do not
dwell on the maturity profiles as our scoring methodology is arbitrarily rather than
scientifically derived and the sample is not intended to reflect the sector as a whole.
We restrict ourselves to the following observations. The sample profiles are relatively
mature for the core and supporting processes of risk management, in contrast to the
long-term processes of education and training in risk management and risk knowledge
management. Two explanations are offered. Firstly, the attention and resources
dedicated to the design and execution of processes is correlated with their perceived
criticality. Secondly, the long-term processes receive limited treatment within the
academic and practitioner literature, leaving utilities bereft of guidance. The maturity
of the supporting processes – supply chain risk management and change risk
management – is particularly high. The strength in the former is likely a function of the
increasing level of outsourcing within the sector. Similarly, we propose that mature
change risk management is driven by evolving regulatory and governance structures
and the commonality of internal restructuring.
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* Red indicates uncertainty arising from incomplete questionnaire data.
Figure 5.3 Spider diagrams of organisational maturity by self-assessment
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We now discuss the observed risk management practices and their methods for
institutionalisation on a process-specific basis.
5.3.1 Strategic risk planning
Here, we observed an even spread of our sample between L3 and L4. Strategic
risk planning is primarily concerned with the development of a risk management
framework. In essence, these frameworks were observed to set out the rationale,
procedures and responsibilities for the discipline. At L3 and L4, we observed that their
development may be characterised as the evaluation and adaptation of external risk
management standards. For example, one manager described how the forbearer of their
corporate-wide risk management framework was an adaptation of an occupational
health and safety management system, which has evolved drawing upon the AS/NZS:
4360 (Council of Standards of Australia, 1999) standard and broader experiences of the
sector. Another described how they were “trying to use the rationale, the basis of the
COSO (COSO, 2004) standard, but the methodology is one that’s been developed by
us.” We may consider the vetting of these frameworks (e.g. by the Board, internal
audit, etc.) as a form of output validation, however, it was unclear whether the process
by which they are developed, or more precisely adapted, is subject to oversight.
5.3.2 Establishing risk acceptance criteria
This process involves the development of criteria for evaluating the tolerability
and significance of risk. Here, we observed five L3 organisations, and one each at L2,
L4 and L5. At L2, risk acceptability is largely set with reference to regulations and
standards. Expanding on this, the L2 manager stated that “the corporate risk appetite
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is primarily perceptual and based upon broad guidelines established by upper
management, the Board, external auditors, stakeholders and bond-holders.”
An observed L3 practice was the allocation of risk tolerability criteria in
operational and financial areas. These included design standards informed by hazard
and operability (HAZOP) analyses; operating and maintenance practices informed by
reliability modelling; as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) criteria for evaluating
dam safety risk; the use of risk-based criteria to determine raw water treatment
requirements; and risk-adjusted discount rates applied within financial analysis models
to balance investment returns with uncertainty. However, it appeared that the processes
through which these criteria are established reside within organisational functions (e.g.
engineering, finance) and thus lie outside the remit of the corporate risk manager. As
one manager noted, tolerability criteria may exist “within discrete areas of the
business…but they exist as islands with no…overlaying risk management policy or
strategy.”
Further, we observed the development of risk ranking techniques which outline
the criteria by which organisations assess the significance of risk both at the corporate
level and, in some cases, specific to organisational functions such as asset management.
Tolerability criteria were often embedded within these techniques (e.g. low risk:
manage by routine procedures; high risk: management response required). These
techniques were typically derived from risk management standards. Observed
adaptations included the alignment of consequence criteria with corporate objectives
(e.g. environmental, financial, etc.); the tailoring of impact descriptors; and the
assignment of costs to impact categories.
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5.3.3 Risk analysis
Here, five utilities were evaluated at L3, three at L4. Risk analysis involves the
identification and assessment of risk. Our sample indicates two distinct categories of
risk analysis: a generic strategic technique; and a series of discrete methods applied in
operational areas. The former may be characterised as the application of qualitative
risk ranking techniques to analyse the risks inherent to managing a water utility as a
business. The latter included a raft of industry standard and best practice tools, both
qualitative and quantitative. Those observed included HAZOP studies; hazard analysis
and critical control points (HACCP) evaluations; failure mode, effect and criticality
analyses (FMECA); and Monte Carlo simulation of financial variables.
A prerequisite for process definition (L3) is that the application of these
techniques is guided by formalised procedures – a practice intended to ensure the
consistency and rigour of analysis. Regarding strategic risk analysis, best practice may
be described with reference to the electricity utility. Here, a range of risk identification
techniques are available, and their selection depends upon “the depth and breadth of
activities under review and the extent to which the business context is new.” Listed
techniques include strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis;
scenario analysis; value chain analysis; benchmarking; control self assessments; audit
reports; etc. Risk categories are used as a further prompt for identification (strategic,
regulatory, financial and operational). It was common practice across our sample to
assess strategic risks via a combination of expert judgement and, where available,
historic data to determine a range of parameters (e.g. probability, consequence,
development time, triggers, control design and usage, etc.). The electricity utility’s use
of the Delphi technique (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963) in risk assessment is notable. Here,
facilitated discussions and iterative anonymous voting were applied to generate expert
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consensus. The method’s explicit recognition of human judgment as a legitimate input
is particularly valuable where data is limited. Furthermore, characterised as it is by
group participation, anonymity and feedback loops, it minimises bias and dogmatism
(i.e. reduces the reluctance of staff to abandon previously stated views). A caveat: it
appears that in many cases strategic risk analysis tends to be as one manager stated
“shepherded by the corporate risk team” rather than guided in a mechanistic manner.
This contrasts with the more procedural approach adopted operationally (e.g. in
occupational health and safety), and perhaps reflects the perceived value of creativity in
strategic risk analysis.
A further observed L3 characteristic was the use of criteria for the selection and
application of risk analysis techniques. The strategic risk ranking tools were typically
initiated within business and strategic planning as well as on an ad hoc basis as new
risks arise, whilst various nodes (e.g. the concept design stage for application of
HAZOP) served as initiating criteria for the various operational methods. Observed
selection criteria included the use of financial thresholds to delineate the application of
Monte Carlo simulation from simple checklists to evaluate financial risk within
programme management. Basic verification mechanisms are a further L3 characteristic.
This is reflected in one utility’s requirement for supervisors to review risk assessments
of minor construction and maintenance works prior to “sign off.” Similarly, one
manager highlighted the role of their “systems certification process” in ensuring
procedural compliance. Here, a taskforce “conducts certification audits, checking the
business practices of each system, making sure that they’re in concert with our way of
doing business; one element of which is that they’re doing risk assessments and that
they’re doing it properly.” Another interviewee described a tri-partite approach to
auditing. Here, in addition to external auditing by their parent company, “internal
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audit come in every year, to check that we’re process compliant by drilling down from
risk reporting at the highest level, right down through identification, assessment…also
as a [risk management] team, we do our own local audits to make sure that people are
up to speed…and [we] tackle non compliance.” The importance of such checks and
balances was highlighted by one participant’s contrasting of the inconsistencies
surrounding their locally managed sanitary surveys with the consistency of their
centrally managed barrier surveys. Furthermore, several managers related concerns
that analyst bias may lead to distortions of risk analysis outputs. Whilst underscoring
was the most commonly noted threat, one manager revealed that their adoption of a
risk-based capital investment programme has led to a significant likelihood of asset
managers “over-egging” their analyses to attract greater funding for their regions. To
address this, verification should extend to audit the quality of analysis undertaken.
This enhanced role for verification was observed at L4, as reflected in one
utility’s “quality assurance consistency checks” within asset management. Here, risk
analysis outputs and their underpinning assumptions were systematically reviewed and
challenged by a multi-disciplinary team of experts. The interviewee noted that the
value of this procedure extends beyond quality assurance of analysis outputs to
highlighting common errors in applying the methodology itself: “we’ve had some
problems with people using [the methodology], some were misinterpreting it, we
spotted this from the data and [the consistency checks]. Some asset managers score the
probability of an asset failing, some score the probability of an asset failing and
[leading to a defined] impact; the latter is what we want.” We now highlight the subtle
distinction between verification, which seeks to evaluate whether the process has been
followed correctly, and validation, which is concerned with whether the process itself is
correct (e.g. validating the risk analysis techniques). Both of these aspects were
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enshrined in one utility’s application of a “common sense screen” at the end of their
water quality risk analysis process. Here, if analysis outputs appeared at odds with
experienced operational knowledge, the reason behind the “false” score was
investigated, and the process and score adapted where appropriate.
Although engagement of a broad range of stakeholders is characteristic of L4
maturity, broad internal stakeholder engagement was characteristic of each utility’s
approach to strategic risk analysis, which was typically conducted within cross-
functional forums. However, the engagement of external stakeholders appears to occur
on a far more selective basis. One L3 manager commented that there were “no formal
procedures for external risk reporting” and that, beyond the outcomes of security-
related risk assessments, the “regulator has shown little interest”. Two of the L4
interviewees expressed a greater recognition of the need to engage external actors in
risk analysis, both where risks have high external stakeholder implications (e.g.
political or environmental) and where expert guidance is required. In contrast, one
manager explained their reticence to engage external bodies by noting that “risk
assessments are a risk for ourselves, if we identify something as a business risk,
particularly if its environmental, hazardous, or regulatory, that’s out there, if you don’t
address that, it’s going to come back at you.”
Finally, the sufficiency of resourcing within each L4 company was evidenced by
their active research and development in risk analysis. One was researching the
integration of predictive GIS tools with continuous and event-based monitoring data for
application in catchment risk analysis. In contrast, one L3 interviewee highlighted
resource constraints as a limitation: “one issue is the complexity of our analyses, we
have ten water systems and thirteen catchments [which are] diverse in [size and]
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nature…for a small organisation that serves only about 15,000 customers, resourcing
these sorts of studies is not easy.”
5.3.4 Risk based decision making and review
Risk based decision making involves the identification and evaluation of
solutions to manage individual risks. Here, six of our sample were evaluated at L3
maturity, with one each at L2 and L4. At L3 maturity, we observed procedures to
ensure that risk analysis outputs explicitly inform decision making. These ranged from
the integration of the risk analysis and decision making processes within strategic risk
management workshops, to the risk analysts’ role of briefing non-technical decision
makers in operational areas. We further observed decision making frameworks. This is
reflected in one utility’s adoption of a predefined hierarchy of occupational health and
safety hazard control measures: elimination (does the work have to be done);
substitution (can it be done in a less hazardous way); engineering controls (isolation,
containment); administration (procedures, trained staff); personal protective equipment
(respirators, helmets); and warning signs. This structures the identification of solutions.
In a more generic context, the electricity utility categorizes risks by the extent to which
their exposure can be managed: controllable (e.g. financial or health and safety risks)
and influenceable (e.g. competition, regulation). Seven “risk treatment” options are
then applied to structure the identification of solutions: retain; retain but change
mitigation; increase (risk exposure is increased, for example, where the current controls
are not cost-effective); avoid (e.g. withdrawal from a business area); reduce likelihood;
reduce consequences (e.g. through emergency preparedness); and transfer (e.g. through
insurance or outsourcing). However, inherent in many risk assessment methodologies
is a decision making structure. Consider one utility’s catchment to tap methodology.
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Here, the assessment links hazard type (e.g. physical – turbidity and colour) to their
causes (erosion) and to events (landslip, storm). Clearly, by identifying the underlying
mechanisms through which hazards are realised, rather than simply evaluating their
probabilities and consequences of occurrence, the identification of preventative
measures (e.g. stabilise gullies, isolate draw-off) is facilitated.
A further L3 characteristic is the establishment of objectives for risk based
decisions. However as one manager stated “with the exception of large projects, the
majority of the goal-orientation will focus on cost and physical output”, rather than risk
reduction. In contrast, one L3 utility adopted a goal setting regime for risk reduction at
both the asset and strategic level. In the former, asset planners attached cost estimates
and risk reduction targets to a range of potential capital, operating or maintenance
strategies to address risks across their sites, which were then prioritised on the basis of
risk reduction per pound spent.
Quality assurance of decisions, whilst characteristic of L4, was observed to an
extent within each utility, ranging from the peer review format of cross-functional
strategic risk management workshops to more formalised challenge procedures. For
example, one manager noted that a central role of their “executive leadership team” –
comprised of the president, vice presidents and union leader – and “business owners’
council” – comprised of business unit representatives – was to provide input to and at
times critique risk management decisions taken at the corporate and business unit levels
respectively.
5.3.5 Risk response
Risk response is the implementation of risk based decisions. Here, six of our
sample were evaluated at L3 maturity, with one each at L2 and L4. An L3
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characteristic is the systematic allocation of responsibility, tasks, timescales, guidelines
and resources for the implementation of risk based decisions; this was observed, e.g.
within the development of “action plans.” Within the electricity utility, these include a
description of the: risks to be mitigated; business objectives threatened; required
actions; risk champion; target date of completion; residual risk rating; cost estimate;
ease of implementation; and what could go wrong. Returning to a more operational
context, we observed emergency management plans detailing the procedures required
to minimise the impacts of, for example, plant failure (check component connections,
check for blockages, review raw water for turbidity, taste, odour and algae, etc.). In
practice, we observed that implementation processes were often not unique to risk
based decisions, i.e. there existed models for implementing capital or operational
solutions, not models for implementing risk based decisions per se. Indeed, the
electricity utility manager emphasised that his role as a risk manager was not to act as a
“central policeman,” and that implementation was a matter for individual business
units and functions.
5.3.6 Risk monitoring
The sample contains one L2, five L3, and two L4 companies in risk monitoring.
The L2 interviewee characterised risk monitoring as “the weaker part of our scheme;
we don’t do much beyond the quarterly reviews, the exception being some particularly
critical risks.”
Our sample indicates that risk monitoring may be partitioned into two tiers: the
first involving the re-evaluation of risk analyses outputs, the second relating to the
tracking of discrete parameters which describe the evolution of risks. The former was
observed to occur by procedure at L3 and L4, through both cyclical requirements and
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event-driven initiators (e.g. changes to technical processes). The importance of such
procedures was emphasised by one manager’s revelation that prior to their introduction
of a central asset risk register with clear requirements for cyclical reviews of analysis
outputs, risk analyses were not regularly updated, instead being performed for a
specific purpose at decision making points. Good practice was further illustrated in one
utility’s adoption of reporting protocols for communicating the results of strategic risk
re-evaluations; here: co-ordinators reported on the evolution of significant exposures at
monthly management meetings; significantly increased risks were escalated to unit
directors within thirty six hours; and the risk management function reported to the
Board on a monthly basis. We further observed verification of procedural compliance,
most commonly achieved through risk register oversight.
One might argue that this first tier of risk monitoring is indistinct as a process
from risk analysis, as the revision of previous risk assessments is an element of the
feedback loop within the latter process. The distinct second tier was observed to be
most prevalent within drinking water quality management and network planning and
operation. In the former context, risk monitoring includes both the standard regulatory-
driven tracking of primarily lagging water quality parameters (i.e. verification of water
quality, e.g. coliform testing at customer taps), and, where the water safety plan
approach is adopted, extends to include leading indicators devised in accordance with
the HACCP (Havelaar, 1994; Deere et al., 2001) model (i.e. operational parameters
describing the effectiveness of control measures designed to mitigate water quality
hazards, e.g. pH residuals at and post disinfection). It should be noted that HACCP has
the inherent characteristics of L4 maturity. To illustrate, within one adopter we
observed: weekly reviews supported by in-depth periodic audits to ensure compliance
with the established monitoring protocol (i.e. verification: ranging from requirements to
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review online turbidity data to the calibration of analysis and measurement equipment);
formal peer reviews of established operational parameters and their target and action
limits (i.e. validation: exploring, for example, the rationale behind setting 2000
cells/mL of cyanobacteria as an action limit for controlling taste and odour related
hazards); and annual reviews of the protocol taking account of modifications to
processes, industry standards, regulatory guidelines and operating licenses (i.e.
feedback mechanisms).
5.3.7 Integrating risk management
Here, seven of our sample were evaluated at L3, with one at L4 maturity. Our
discussion is restricted to one facet of integration: institutionalisation. Our model views
institutionalisation as dependant on risk management “enablers” and “evaluators.”
Enablers include the provision of guidelines, procedures, systems, tools and training for
the discipline (L3), whilst evaluators include verification, validation and feedback
mechanisms (L4). We have explored these within the context of the individual
processes, here, we seek to evaluate whether this is a sufficient explanation.
Indeed, the influence of culture on institutionalisation, an aspect not explicitly
represented within our model, was highlighted by several participants. One noted how
staff perceptions ranged from “those going through the motions, to those more
cognisant of how [risk management] supports the broader organisational processes.”
The participant further noted the importance of engaging and empowering operational
staff in creating a risk management culture. Here, this took the form of expert
practitioners supporting front-line staff to fulfil their risk management obligations (e.g.
jointly conducted risk assessments) and actively seeking and considering their feedback
in revising existing processes (e.g. adapting risk evaluation criteria to reflect
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operational expertise). We further observed that a prerequisite for cultural change is
commitment from executive and senior management, which is often dependent on
external events. One manager noted that “[the risk management team] have finally got
the attention of our organisation; early on we couldn’t get much dignity…then a series
of events occurred in the [United States] which made risk assessment more important,
which resulted notably in the Sarbanes Oxley legislation, we have several members of
our board who are very much attuned to that…once we got top level buy in, the rest
followed.” Similarly, one participant reflected that “Enron, Barings…showed that
companies can go under if their controls fail, [whilst] Railtrack showed that companies
could lose their [license to operate]. [Another] wake up call was the idea of corporate
manslaughter; [this] made us focus our efforts on…assets with low likelihood of failure
but high consequence, for example critical reservoirs.”
5.3.8 Supply chain risk management
This process addresses both the way utilities obtain the raw components required
to develop products and the management of services provided by organisations
throughout the supply chain (e.g. outsourcing agreements). Here, we observed two L2,
two L3, and four L4 utilities. One L2 manager revealed that supply chain risk
management was primarily “left to procurement,” with formalised approaches to risk
management tending to apply only to larger, discrete projects. Similarly, one L3
interviewee stated that risk management was only explicitly involved in supply chain
management in relation to products and services critical to their continued operation,
further noting that “although [we] evaluate, qualify and support [our] critical vendors
and suppliers, this is not within the context of a formal risk based process.” In
contrast, within one L3 utility risk management was explicitly interwoven within
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procurement policies and procedures. Inspection of their contracting and tendering
policy revealed that in contrast to the traditional approach of selecting lowest cost
suppliers once basic standards are met, a broad range of pre-qualification standards are
applied as appropriate, including those that address risk explicitly (e.g. occupational
health and safety, commercial risk, delivery risk) and implicitly (e.g. quality
management accreditation). Furthermore, prior to binding acceptance, the probability
of failure of the chosen tender to satisfactorily adhere to the contract, and the potential
effects of such a failure, were formally assessed and reported.
We obtained limited data on the practices of those L4 utilities, however, we
observed that one required all contractors to utilise a formal risk management
framework, whilst another adopted criteria to ensure that the “risk attitude” of capital
partners aligned with their own.
5.3.9 Change risk management
This process is concerned with identifying and managing the risk implications of
organisational (e.g. re-engineering) and technical change. Here, we evaluated one
utility at L2, and three each at L3 and L4. We observed the expected lack of process
definition within the L2 utility, whose respondent noted that where changes to e.g.
operating or asset standards are considered, “risk would be part of the decision making
process, although the level of formality would vary.” Regarding organisational change,
the interviewee stated that “whilst the utility has a team dedicated to providing support
and education for the implementation of business process improvements, it does not
focus on the risk implications of change.” At L3 and L4, we observed the undertaking
of risk analysis to evaluate the expediency of planned technical changes; the use of
SWOT analysis to evaluate the “business environment” for changes that may constrain
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utility operations and management; application of environmental impact assessments
for projects that modify existing processes or introduce new processes, activities or
equipment; and regular analyses and reviews of risks and interdependencies within
organisational change programmes.
5.3.10 Education and training in risk management
Here, we observed one L1 organisation, two at L2, and five at L3. An ad hoc
approach was observed within the L1 utility, with no formal process in place to develop
or maintain risk management skills and knowledge, and limited cognisance of the
required competencies for effective undertaking of the discipline. As the L1 manager
noted “we recognise we have an issue here…we took over one hundred people through
risk training in 2000/01, [but we’ve] done nothing since…the next logical step was to
cascade it across business…which we haven’t.” Emphasising the importance of this
deficiency, he noted “we recognise some people have no knowledge of the [risk
management] process, yet are expected to prioritise capital investment on the back of
it; [but the] only hint of training is when they get shot down at [the consistency
checks].”
The defining characteristic of the L2 organisations was their limited process
scope, with limited internal training in risk management (e.g. addressing occupational
health and safety), supported by attendance of externally delivered courses for key
managerial and operating staff (e.g. risk management conferences, HACCP training for
operating staff). For example, one L2 utility’s site induction procedures sought to
ensure that staff understood site-specific hazards and the precautions required to protect
their safety and the quality of service. These covered basic issues such as the isolation
and lock out procedures required for machinery during maintenance works, site
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emergency procedures, confined space entry procedures, and the location of the first aid
kit. This was supplemented by video-based training on: risk management planning for
drinking water supplies; job safety analysis; and safety leadership. Indeed, this
emphasis on “on the job” training was a common theme at L2, the logic perhaps being
that staff learn best through real life, hands on examples, rather than lectures and
presentations. As the electricity utility interviewee noted, “most of the education and
indoctrination was [achieved] by running [risk management] workshops. At one time
my staff were running forty to fifty workshops a year, so all the executives and
managers were constantly exposed to this whole methodology of identifying,
prioritising and mitigating risk; [towards the end], they’d come and borrow our
anonymous voting equipment and run their own workshops.”
Valuable insights regarding the formalisation of education and training may be
gleaned from one L3 utility. Here, two dedicated risk management training packages
were observed: an introductory course provided to key strategic members of the
business, and a more comprehensive programme delivered to “team leaders.” Of
greatest interest is the latter, which was structured around a formal definition of the
competencies required for effective risk management, ranging from an understanding of
corporate governance to a grasp of the technical aspects of the risk assessment
techniques adopted. Both packages were initiated by procedure, with oversight from
local management and the risk management team to verify compliance. Furthermore,
effective delivery of the process was verified through cyclical evaluations of the ability
of staff to act on the training received. These evaluations partly underpinned
succession routes, providing a strong catalyst for learning. Supplementing these
programmes, ad hoc training workshops were provided by risk management staff on
request.
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In a more operational context, one L3 manager described how in addition to
externally delivered HACCP training for key staff, internal training on the
fundamentals of drinking water quality management focussed specifically on
embedding the risk-based approach inherent in their operating and management
principles. Furthermore, their post-incident analyses included an explicit evaluation of
the a priori risk management strategy, which the interviewee emphasised breeds
familiarity with the methodologies and processes of risk management and, by focussing
on real examples (or plausible scenarios), highlighted the practical implications of the
discipline to front-line staff.
5.3.11 Risk knowledge management
Here, we observed three utilities at L2, and five at L3. Risk knowledge
management may be considered as the collection, storage and access of the data
underpinning and accumulated from the broader risk management processes, i.e. the
input and output data. One L2 manager stated that input data requirements for risk
management were not well defined, and noted that they “do not maintain detailed risk
information beyond that which is accumulated during risk assessments or that inherent
in the normal conduct of business.” The interviewee assigned this to both a “resource
driven inadequacy” and inadvertent constraints imposed by legislation: “in the public
sector…we’re subject to open records request…you don’t want [your risk analyses
appearing] in the newspaper the next day, how we store those documents and record
our decisions is a strategy in itself, we try to limit circulation, which may be counter-
productive to traditional risk management.”
At L3, we observed procedures governing the use of software packages which
serve as tools for the collection, storage and access of output data collected throughout
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the life-cycle of risk management. However, pre-defined strategies of input data
collection were restricted to select operational risks, particularly those whose
management was underpinned by formal analytical methodologies (e.g. reliability
modelling), or, as one manager noted, subject to regulatory drivers (e.g. asset
management, drinking water quality management). The electricity utility interviewee
suggested that this is dictated by pragmatism, as “raw data requirements are fluid and
evolve with the perceptions of management.” However, we contend that in the absence
of predefined requirements, risk data collection is likely to be ad hoc, and largely
restricted to the requirements of “business as usual.” Indeed, one manager described a
reliance on “expert judgement; without senior experienced people, I’m not sure we
have the data to underpin [risk management].” A further observed L3 characteristic
was the lack of expertise for validation (i.e. to ensure that the correct data is being
collected); to the extent that it is applied, it is informal and ex-post.
5.4 CONCLUSIONS
We have described the application of a capability maturity model to benchmark
risk management within eight water utilities. The findings provide utility managers,
technical staff, chief finance officers and regulatory officials with a systematic
understanding of how to implement and improve risk management. This is timely work
for a sector grappling to adapt to evolving regulatory and governance arrangements.
Furthermore, the research provides a basis for evolving the model from a prescriptive to
a descriptive state, which will ultimately render it fit for industrial ownership.
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ABSTRACT
Risk analysis in the water utility sector is fast becoming explicit. Here, we
describe application of a capability model to benchmark the risk analysis maturity of a
sub-sample of eight water utilities from the USA, the UK and Australia. Our analysis
codifies risk analysis practice and offers practical guidance as to how utilities may more
effectively employ their portfolio of risk analysis techniques for optimal, credible, and
defensible decision making.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
The provision of safe, reliable drinking water, the overarching goal of the
international water utility sector (AWWA et al., 2001), is arguably well within the
bounds of the developed world’s science, technology, and financial resources.
Nevertheless, water quality related outbreaks remain depressingly prevalent (e.g.
Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004), with their causes ranging from technical failures through to
lapses or even criminal negligence on the part of operating or managerial staff. Risk
analysis can help prevent such failures through proactively identifying and assessing
the mechanisms through which they may arise. This concept of preventing failure
through understanding failure extends beyond the design and operation of a water
supply system to encompass the full range of utility functions (e.g. from plant
operations to strategic investment; Figure 6.1).









 Water resource planning
 Microbial risk assessment programme
 Catchment protection programme
 Security risks/emergency planning
Strategic
 Individual compliance/consent risks
 Project risk assessment
 Site health and safety
 Maintenance planning
 Process design reliability
 Strategic investments





Indeed, the introduction of water safety plans, codes of good corporate
governance and the debate on self-regulation are promoting a shift in the approach to
risk analysis to one increasingly explicit and integrated with other business processes.
Risk analysis now extends beyond its traditional preserve in occupational health and
safety and public health protection to embrace corporate level decision making, asset
management (Booth and Rogers, 2001; Lifton and Smeaton, 2003), watershed
protection (IMPRESS Management, 2002; WHO, 2003; Lloyd and Abell, 2005) and
network reliability (Stahl and Elliott, 1999; Stevens and Lloyd, 2004). When supported
by initiation criteria and formal procedures, using personnel with appropriate skills,
experience, and resources, risk analysis can provide utilities with benefits ranging from
an improved understanding of treatment reliability to an explicit appreciation of project
financial risks (MacGillivray et al., 2006a). Applied inappropriately, whether due to
ill-defined procedures or deficient institutional capacities, risk analysis is not a subset
of risk management but its panacea.
As such, a reasonable research question is: how can we assess and improve
organisational competencies in risk analysis? In this paper, we report on the
application of a maturity model to benchmark risk management within the international
water utility sector, focussing on the findings relating to risk analysis.
6.2 RESEARCH SCOPE
Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain what we mean by risk analysis and
risk management. Risk is widely accepted to consist of a combination of probabilities
and consequences. A more pragmatic approach is to consider risk as the potential for
deviation from desired outcomes (e.g. business objectives, design intentions). We
consider risk management to be a series of processes for identifying, evaluating and
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responding to these uncertainties. Risk analysis involves the identification and
assessment of risk. Given the varying contexts within which risk analysis is applied,
we view the juxtaposition of both the technical and managerial aspects of the prior art
as central to providing a well-rounded examination of its application within the sector.
6.3 METHODS - RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY MATURITY
MODEL
Capability maturity models (Paulk et al., 1993) codify industry practice so
distinctions can be made between organisations and improvements made. Our risk
management capability maturity model (MacGillivray et al., 2006b) adopts five levels
of maturity, from learner to best practice. Its design has drawn on wide-ranging
literature reviews, structured interviews with utility managers and prior knowledge of
maturity modelling in similar utility sectors. The model includes, in part, an evaluation
of the maturity of implementation of risk analysis, one feature of an organisation’s
capability to manage risk. Attributes describing the maturity of all risk management
processes, including risk analysis, and the specific descriptions of maturity levels 3
(L3) and 4 (L4), as they refer to risk analysis, are in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Basic descriptions of the attributes characterising risk analysis maturity
Attribute Attribute description Attribute at level 3: Risk analysis Attribute at level 4: Risk analysis.
Scope The execution of key practices, and the
breadth of process implementation across
the organisation.
A defined, documented process is in place containing criteria, methods and
guidelines for the identification, assessment and evaluation (with respect to
acceptance criteria) of a broad range of risks across core business areas, guided by a
risk register. The organisation is conversant with and goes beyond the regulatory
requirements for risk analysis.
A controlled process is in place containing detailed criteria, methods and guidelines to
manage the identification, assessment, evaluation (with respect to acceptance criteria),
establishment of causality and linking (common cause and dependent) of risks at all levels
of the company and across all functional boundaries of the business, guided by a company-
specific risk register.
Integration The level of process embedment within the
organisation.




Verification refers to ensuring that the
process is being performed correctly,
validation refers to ensuring that the correct
process is being performed.
Basic mechanisms are in place to verify that risk analysis is performed as required,
largely reliant on lagging indicators. The expertise for validation is generally
lacking.
Verification and validation systems are in place to verify the efficiency of risk analysis
activities and to validate their expediency (e.g. the organisation tracks that tools and





The manner in which feedback, both
internally and externally sourced, is
collected and used to question and revise
processes.
The risk analysis tool suite is reviewed and modified on an event-driven basis. Feedback is actively used to improve the execution of risk analysis (e.g. gaps identified
and risk analysis tools and techniques improved in response).
Stakeholder
Engagement
The process of engaging stakeholders, both
internal and external, with the purpose of
leveraging the process.
Risk analysis processes generally reside within the responsible unit, with limited
cross-functional or external consultation.
Risk analysis processes generally reside within affected disciplines, and stakeholders work
together to define and implement an integrated approach to risk analysis, capitalising on
synergies and collective knowledge.
Competence The organisational qualities and abilities,
both implicit and explicit, which influence
process performance.
Detailed knowledge of risk analysis resides only within the responsible unit. Most involved staff exhibit a good level of competence in the selection and application of
risk analysis tools and techniques, and have access to support from internal or external
expert risk practitioners.
Resources Extent and use of resources (e.g. people,
pounds and tools)
Adequate resources are provided in support of risk analysis, with both qualitative
and quantitative tools and techniques available.
Sufficient resources are provided in support of risk analysis, a portion of which is made
available for R + D for risk assessment. A broad range of qualitative and quantitative




Documentation and reporting of risk
information.
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and disseminated in a format that supports
decision-making.
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and disseminated in a clear, concise and actionable
format that supports real-time decision-making, and their reporting is co-ordinated with
other risk reporting mechanisms (e.g. risk status updates).
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6.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We have applied the risk management capability maturity model to the water
sector in the US, the UK Canada and Australia and, for a sub-sample of eight utilities
providing high quality data, have captured common, good and best practice in risk
analysis. Benchmarking comprised three components: self-assessment by
questionnaire; semi-structured interviews; and document analysis. With respect to risk
analysis, contributors to this sub-sample were described as being at either L3 or L4,
though we do not suggest this reflects risk management capability for the sector as a
whole. A key finding of our research is that risk analysis is not best viewed as an
overarching process, but rather as a series of discrete processes within which distinct
analysis methodologies are applied, which themselves reside within organisational
functions. We therefore discuss our observations on a function-specific basis.
6.4.1 Process engineering
A prerequisite for process definition (L3) is that the application of risk analysis
techniques is guided by formalised procedures – a practice intended to ensure the
consistency and rigour of analysis. We observed this within process engineering in one
utility, where a technical guideline had recently been devised for the application of
hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). HAZOP systematically evaluates the process
and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities in order to identify the hazards
that may arise due to deviations from design specifications (American Institute of
Chemical Engineers, 1992). Typically, a carefully selected team examines a process
(e.g. disinfection) subdivided into “nodes,” at each node, the team applies guidewords
(e.g. low) to process parameters (e.g. ozone levels) to identify ways in which the
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process may deviate from its design intention, before evaluating the causes and
consequences of the deviation. The logic of process definition is that specifying the
stages in the design process for the application of HAZOP, proceduralising the tasks
and activities central to its execution, and providing staff with the requisite expertise
(e.g. through workshops), creates a process infrastructure that supports its execution
beyond the tenure of experienced staff. This is particularly important in an industry
characterised by regular restructuring and high levels of staff turnover.
6.4.2 Business planning
We now turn to discuss the strategic approach to risk analysis which focuses on
“business risks”, i.e. those primarily non-technical risks with the potential for causing
deviation from high-level business objectives. Within one utility, we observed this to
be proceduralised within the second of two business planning workshops. The first
addressed the market and competitor environment, including: social, technological,
environmental, economic and political (STEEP) analysis; strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis; strategic objectives; and strategic options.
From this, the “strategic direction” was set for each business area, which served as the
initiation point for the risk analysis workshop. Here, the outputs of the previous
workshop, allied with brainstorming and knowledge of historic risk analyses, informed
the identification of risks to achieving business objectives (e.g. in finance: impact of
adoption of International Accounting Standards). A qualitative risk ranking matrix was
then applied to assess their potential impact and likelihood of occurrence.
However, in common with the remainder of our sub-sample, this strategic risk
analysis tended to rely more upon expert judgement rather than being underpinned by
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extensive data analysis. One manager opined that as their strategic risk portfolio tended
to evolve over time and with the perceptions of management, a predefined strategy of
data collection to support its analysis was not pragmatic. As such, the role of internal
audit and the risk management group in facilitating and providing quality assurance
(L4) of these workshops, observed within one utility, is critical to ensuring that
strategic risk analysis provides utilities with an improved understanding of the risks that
they are seeking to manage, rather than simply being an exercise in fortune telling
blindly undertaken to satisfy corporate governance regulations. In another utility,
quality assurance had historically encompassed the use of a “professional support
group” – comprised of experts drawn from multiple disciplines (e.g. legal, insurance,
finance, environmental and quality, health and safety) who were independent of the risk
analysis process – to peer review the strategic risk analysis.
6.4.3 Asset management
Balancing risk and resources has long been an implicit component of asset
management, and is becoming increasingly explicit owing to growing pressures for
utilities to exhibit financial self-sufficiency, meaning that they can no longer seek to
over-engineer facilities with the presumption of screening out technical risk
(MacGillivray et al., 2006a). A risk-based approach to asset management requires an
integrated, systematic process drawing upon a broad range of methodologies for the
identification, analysis and prioritisation of assets-at-risk, from the process to the
component level (e.g. Booth and Rogers, 2001). Within one utility we observed the
undertaking of failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) studies across
their water supply systems. FMECA is an engineering technique that tabulates failure
modes of equipment and their effects on a system (American Institute of Chemical
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Engineers, 1992). The failure mode describes how equipment fails (open, closed, on,
off, leaks, etc.); failure effect is determined by the system’s response to the equipment
failure. Its application allows the utility to identify and prioritise risks across their asset
portfolio (e.g. various mains, raw and treated reservoirs, treatment works etc.), enabling
them to focus attention on the most serious threats to system performance. We
observed that their procedures for undertaking and updating FMECA studies were
initiated on a cyclical basis. The interviewee highlighted the value of this requirement,
noting that prior to its introduction, supported by a central asset risk register, risk
analyses were not regularly updated, instead being performed for a specific purpose at
decision making points.
We further observed mechanisms for ensuring procedural compliance and
proving quality assurance of risk analysis in recognition of its central role in shaping
capital investment programmes. This was driven by a desire to ensure consistency in
application and to correct for analyst bias. Within one utility, whilst “experts in the
field” regarding asset condition principally undertook the analysis, this was supported
by a programme of facilitated workshops to ensure consistency. Additionally, the
administrator of the asset database conducted spot check audits and was further
responsible for the ongoing moderation of analysis outputs.
6.4.4 Drinking water quality management
The revised WHO guidelines (WHO, 2003) are promoting the implementation of
water safety plans for water quality management from catchment management, through
treatment, distribution and on to the tap. Central to this is the hazard analysis and
critical control points (HACCP) methodology, namely the determination of “critical
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control points” whereupon risks can be monitored and reduced (Codex Alimentarius,
1993; Hellier, 2000). We observed the implementation of this approach within our sub-
sample. In one utility, the process begins with the division of the water system into
subsystems (e.g. catchment, treatment, distribution, etc.). Across each subsystem (e.g.
catchment) hazard types (e.g. physical: turbidity and colour) and their associated causes
(e.g. erosion) and driving events (e.g. landslip, storm) are identified and rated via a
qualitative risk ranking matrix. Those deemed most significant were evaluated further
for their critical control points (operational parameters describing the effectiveness of
control measures designed to mitigate water quality hazards, e.g. ph residuals at and
post disinfection). Assessors then identified the critical limits (e.g. 2000 cells/mL of
cyanobacteria for taste and odour related hazards), monitoring programmes and
corrective actions for each CCP.
We now highlight the subtle distinction between verification, which seeks to
evaluate whether the process has been followed correctly, and validation (L4), which is
concerned with whether the process itself is correct (e.g. validating the risk analysis
methodologies). Both of these aspects were enshrined in one utility’s application of a
“common sense screen” at the end of their HACCP-based process. Here, if analysis
outputs appeared at odds with experienced operational knowledge, the reason behind
the “false” score was investigated, and either the process and score adapted where
appropriate.
6.5 THE PRACTICAL LESSONS
So what does this mean for utility managers? How can they assess their current
maturity in risk analysis and identify practical steps to improve? Given that risk
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analysis is best treated as a function specific, not overarching discipline, we suggest
that they gather representatives from their various functional areas and ask them “the
four questions.”
What methodologies do you apply to identify and assess risks?
A self-explanatory question, but care should be taken to delve deeply, as the
authors have experience of utility engineers viewing risk analysis methodologies as
something that “the corporates” apply, neglecting to consider their own use of HAZOP.
Have you defined how these methodologies are applied and supported?
Specifically, this seeks to determine whether: initiation criteria are formalised;
procedures exist detailing how the methodologies are to be applied; and whether the
requisite resources (e.g. data inputs, skills) are predefined and available. As we have
noted, this creates a process infrastructure which ensures consistency and stability of
execution.
Do you verify that risk analysis is undertaken, and undertaken correctly?
This seeks to establish whether risk analysis is controlled as a process. Ensuring
that risk analysis is undertaken as required can be attained through, for example,
supervisory “sign off” of completed assessments. Ensuring that risk analysis is
undertaken properly (i.e. quality assurance) may be achieved through peer reviews.
Where HAZOP is applied, for example, questions for the reviewers to pose may
include: did the analysts work their way through the HAZOP study systematically, or
did they overlook important scenarios, components and process flows; were all stages
and operating modes of the process considered (e.g. startup, shutdown and transitioning
to partial operation); and was adequate time spent on the analysis.
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Do you know whether your risk analysis process is valid?
In our experience, this is the most difficult question to answer. Regardless,
managers should not shy away from examining whether, for example, the application of
HACCP within drinking water quality management constitutes good practice, or if
recourse to quantitative methodologies is justified. Validation appears a weakness of
the sector, and managers should not be distracted by justifications as to why staff think
that their process is valid, but instead focus on whether objective evidence exists.
Methods for validation include external audits, benchmarking, or statistical techniques
in the case of quantitative methodologies.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
Our benchmarking results provide utility managers, chief finance officers and
regulatory officials with valuable insights into the developing risk management culture
within water utilities and a systematic understanding of good risk analysis practice. Of
course, there is a trade off between the investments required to become leading-edge in
risk analysis and the benefits to be obtained. Risk analysis remains a largely expert
discipline, and many organisations are more comfortable with their historic implicit
approaches. However, this does not absolve them of their obligation to understand how
mature their risk analysis processes are, and how they may be improved. Only then can
the cost-benefit implications of progression up the maturity scale be evaluated.
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ABSTRACT
We synthesize the principles of risk analysis, decision theory and capability
maturity modelling with empirical observations to present a model for benchmarking
and improving the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making. We
describe the model’s case study application within a water and wastewater utility,
providing a comparative analysis of the practices of risk analysis and risk based
decision making across a cross-section of organizational functions and, crucially, their
maturity of implementation. The findings provide academics, utility professionals, and
regulatory officials with a deeper understanding of the practical form and theoretical
underpinnings of risk management, and how distinctions can be made between
organisational capabilities.




The provision of safe, reliable drinking water, the overarching goal of the
international water utility sector (AWWA et al. 2001), is within the bounds of the
developed world’s science, technology, and financial resources. Nevertheless, a
nagging prevalence of water quality-related outbreaks remains in the developed world,
with “causes” ranging from technical failures through to institutional lapses and in the
extreme, negligence on the part of operating and managerial staff (e.g. see Hrudey and
Hrudey, 2004). Regardless of the particular manifestation of these incidents, they all
derive from limited organisational capacities, or appetites, to learn how to prevent
failures, in other words, to manage risk.
Conventionally, utilities manage risk through codifying their basis for safe
operations within standard design and operating procedures. These procedures develop
with: (i) the introduction of improved methods and technologies (e.g. novel treatment
processes); and (ii) experiences gained from reflecting on past mishaps. From a risk
management perspective, we are concerned with the latter. This begins with a
contamination event or near miss, following which incident analysis is undertaken to
determine its root cause, and ends with a technical, operational or administrative
solution (e.g. adapting design standards or operating procedures) designed to prevent its
recurrence. This cycle exists at both the utility and sector level, the latter being
reflected in changes to national or industry-wide codes, standards or regulations where
learnings are generalisable. As Lee (1998) notes, whilst this retrospective approach to
managing risk is necessary, it is a mistake to consider it sufficient. Procedures,
guidelines and regulations can proliferate to the point where they become
incomprehensible and, absurdly yet predictably, resources are diverted towards
preventing incidents that have happened, rather than those most likely to happen (Lee,
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1998). Furthermore, a reliance on learning by trial and error in isolation of more
proactive strategies is arguably unsound where public health is at stake (i.e. if it is not
too little, it is certainly too late). Although illustrated in a water quality context, this
argument is generalisable to all aspects of the design, operation and management of
utility systems (e.g. from process engineering to occupational health and safety
management) and across the utility sectors.
Recognition of the limitations of post-hoc analysis has brought a paradigm shift
within the water sector from reactive to proactive risk management, wherein utilities
have sought to identify potential weaknesses and eliminate root causes of problems
before they cause a failure (as reviewed in MacGillivray et al., 2006a; Hamilton et al.,
2006a,b; Pollard et al., 2004). This shift is being driven by the introduction of water
safety plans, codes of good corporate governance, the debate on self-regulation and,
more broadly, a growing recognition that the provision of safe drinking water deserves
to be treated as a “high reliability” societal service (Pollard et al., 2005). With this
changing landscape in mind, a challenging research question is: how can we assess and
improve organisational competencies in risk management? In this paper, we introduce
a model for benchmarking and improving the processes of risk analysis and risk based
decision making, and describe its case study application within a water and wastewater
utility.
7.2 RESEARCH SCOPE
As the lexicon of risk is at times bewildering, we now define some key terms
and so clarify the scope of our research. A hazard is any situation, event or substance
that has the potential to cause harm. Risk is the likelihood of a hazardous event
occurring within a specified time period and leading to a defined consequence severity.
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We define risk management as “learning how to prevent failures.” Whilst, to our
knowledge, a novel definition, the theme underlies the myriad elaborations offered by
others, and succinctly captures both the philosophical heart and practical value of the
discipline (as learning implies both an improved understanding and a change in
behaviour). Drawing upon the unlikely source of Confucius, we conceptualise three
means by which water utilities learn to prevent failures, through: (i) reflecting on their
past mishaps, which is bitterest; (ii) reflecting on those of other utilities, which is
easiest; and (iii) a priori, using foresight to reflect on potential future mishaps, which is
noblest. Our research addresses the latter on a premise that prevention is better than
cure. A priori or proactive risk management is comprised of three processes: risk
analysis; risk based decision making; and implementation of decisions. In short, risk
analysis looks to the future to determine what can go wrong, the potential consequences
and their relative likelihood, and the overall level of risk. Risk analysis informs risk
based decision making, which involves the identification and evaluation of risk
reduction options and, where deemed necessary (i.e. where the risk is considered
unacceptable), selection of the optimal option(s). Of course, fine decisions are hollow
gestures if left unimplemented, and so implementation completes the cycle. Our
research focuses on risk analysis and risk based decision making.
7.3 A CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL FOR RISK ANALYSIS AND
RISK BASED DECISION MAKING
Capability maturity models codify industry practice so distinctions can be made
between organisations and improvements made. We have reported the design
(MacGillivray et al., 2006b) and application (MacGillivray et al., 2006c) of such a
model for benchmarking risk management practice within the water sector. The model
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was a prescriptive codification of water sector risk management practice, within a
process-based maturity hierarchy. Its design drew on wide-ranging literature reviews
(MacGillivray et al., 2006a; Pollard et al., 2004; Hamilton et al., 2006b), structured
interviews with utility managers, and prior knowledge of maturity modelling in similar
utility sectors. We have since substantially revised the model towards a descriptive
state, through an iterative synthesis of:
(i) the capability maturity modelling literature (Paulk et al., 1993; SEI,
2002a/b; Sharp et al., 2002; Strutt et al., 2006; Sarshar et al., 2000);
(ii) risk analysis and management frameworks, specific to the sector
(NZMOH, 2001; NHMRC, 2001, 2004; WHO, 2002, 2004) and beyond
(AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; COSO, 2004; UKOOA, 1999; FERMA, 2003;
NIST, 2002; MHU, 2003; Joy and Griffiths, 2005; NEA/CSNI, 1999);
(iii) decision theory (Slovic et al. 1977; Clemen, 1996; Watson and Buede,
1987) and its application to risk based decision making (Aven et al.,
2006; Rosness, 1998; Arvai et al., 2001; Aven and Kørte, 2003,
Bohneblust and Slovic, 1998; Amendola, 2001; Renn, 1999);
(iv) quality management principles (Crosby, 1979, 1996; Hoyle, 2001; ISO,
2000); and
(v) empirical observations derived from a prior case study and
benchmarking study (MacGillivray et al., 2006c) and the case study
described in this paper.
The current model incorporates the processes of risk analysis and risk based
decision making. These processes are composed of a series of practices. Risk analysis
(Figure 7.1; Table 7.1) comprises system characterisation, hazard identification, hazard
precursor identification, control evaluation, consequence evaluation, likelihood
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evaluation, and risk evaluation. Risk analysis is always part of a decision context
(Aven and Kørte, 2003). Thus, risk based decision making (Figure 7.2; Table 7.2) is
concerned with the identification and evaluation of risk reduction alternatives, followed
by the application of managerial review prior to selecting the optimal risk reduction
measure(s). These are informed by criteria establishing the acceptability of risk and
setting out stakeholder values and concerns used to assess the relative merit of
alternative risk reduction options. Both processes are separated into five maturity
levels, from ad hoc to adaptive. These levels (Table 7.3), characterised in terms of the
practices undertaken and attributes reflecting their maturity of implementation (Table
7.4), codify the extent to which each process is repeatable, defined, controlled and
adaptive. Whilst the characterisations of the maturity levels (Table 7.3) and the process
maturity attributes (Table 7.4) provided are specific to risk analysis, the same principles
apply to risk based decision making. Note that to achieve a given maturity level, all
positive requirements of that level and those preceding levels must be satisfied.
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Figure 7.1 Flow chart of the practices which comprise the risk analysis process. Those
encased are considered key rather than critical practices, an important distinction in
evaluating process maturity
*Note that whilst it is sometimes held that the ordering of consequence and likelihood evaluations is unimportant, we believe it critical that the former
precedes the latter. Our reasoning is simple: risk assessment involves determining the likelihoods of a range of potential outcomes, or the likelihood
of one potential outcome. Thus, the outcome(s) should be defined prior to any evaluation of its (their) likelihood of occurrence. If these steps are
performed in reverse, likelihood evaluation will inevitably be concerned with the likelihood of a hazardous event occurring (e.g. the probability of
asset failure), rather than with the likelihood of an event occurring and leading to a defined outcome (e.g. the probability of an asset failing and









Figure 7.2 Flow chart of the practices which comprise the risk based decision making
process. Those encased are considered key rather than critical practices, an important
distinction in evaluating process maturity
Establish criteria for evaluating alternative risk
reduction options
Identify risk reduction options
Evaluate options
Managerial review and option(s) selection
Establish risk acceptance criteria
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Table 7.1 Descriptions of the risk analysis practices and of the rationale for their






To establish and describe the system with which risk
analysis is concerned (e.g. workplace, engineering
process, project).
A comprehensive system understanding is a sine qua non for




Identifying situations, events, or substances with the
potential for causing adverse consequences, i.e.
sources of harm or threats to the system.




Whilst hazard identification is concerned with what
can go wrong, precursor identification focuses on
how and why things can go wrong, in other words
identifying possible routes to and causes of failure.
The potential existence of a hazard does not in itself constitute a
risk, as each hazard requires a process or pathway (precursor) to
lead to its realisation. Thus, the value of this practice lies in both
confirming the existence of pathways to failure (and therefore
that a risk exists) and informing the development of risk
reduction options focussed at root causes.
Control
evaluation
The identification and assessment of existing
technical, physical and administrative controls which
may either reduce the likelihood of a hazardous
event occurring, or serve to mitigate its severity of
consequences. Assessment should address both the
criticality of the controls (e.g. based on their inherent
capacity to reduce risk, whether they are proactive or
reactive, etc.) and their adequacy of design,
management and operation.
An evaluation of existing controls: informs the evaluation of
associated risk levels; serves to inform the development of risk
reduction options through identifying latent and active control
weaknesses (i.e. through serving as a gap analysis of existing risk




Identifying the nature of the consequences of a
hazardous event occurring (e.g. financial,




The evaluation of the likelihood (i.e. frequency or
probability) that a hazardous event will occur and
lead to a defined severity of consequence.
Risk evaluation Combining measures of likelihood and consequence
severity to derive an overall measure of risk, either
qualitative (e.g. high, low) or quantitative (e.g.
expected loss of life, value at risk).
Deriving and combining measures of consequence and likelihood
are required to establish the overall level of risk associated with a
given hazard, so that management resources may be allocated
accordingly and to assess the desirability of potential risk
reduction measures (e.g. to see if they satisfy the ALARP
criteria).
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Table 7.2 Descriptions of the risk based decision making practices and of the rationale for







Establishing criteria for evaluating
the acceptability of risk.






Establishing criteria used to
evaluate the relative merit of
alternative risk reduction options
(e.g. forecast risk reduction,
technical feasibility, cost of
implementation, latency of effects,
environmental impacts, etc.) and,
where deemed appropriate (e.g.
where multi-attribute analysis is
subsequently undertaken),
weightings to establish their relative
importance.
A range of risk reduction options may be considered for a particular decision context;
the decision as to which is considered the best option is influenced by many factors.
Different concerns and values often need to be considered simultaneously, and their
relative importance may be valued differently by various stakeholders (Faber and
Stewart, 2003). Making this explicit in the form of criteria can improve the credibility
and defensibility of decision making, minimise the possibility that decisions will be
second guessed or that their rationale be forgotten, remove barriers to stakeholder buy-
in, and ensure the existence of an audit trail (SEI, 2002). More broadly, it enables
value rather than “alternative focussed” decision making, the latter being characterised
by the selection of an “optimal” option from a set of implied or poorly defined criteria
(Arvai et al., 2001).
Identify risk
reduction options
Generating alternative solutions for
the decision problem.
Options not generated are excluded from subsequent evaluation and, ultimately,
implementation.
Evaluate options There are three elements to this:
forecasting the impact of each
option against the individual
evaluation criteria, determining the
cumulative “goodness” of each
option (e.g. via cost-benefit
analysis, multi-attribute analysis);
and determining risk acceptability.
Systematically evaluating the individual and cumulative merits of alternative options
should provide for more credible, defensible and rational risk based decision making.
Determining risk acceptability follows as it is risk reduction options, not risks, which
are unacceptable or acceptable (Fischoff et al., 1981), i.e. the acceptability of risk
cannot be determined without considering the costs and benefits of maintaining vs.




The application of managerial
judgement in reviewing the
premises, assumptions, and
limitations of analyses, prior to the
final decision (after Aven et al.,
2006).
In line with Mintzberg (1994), we consider that decision analysis should compliment,
but not replace, the knowledge, intuitions and judgement of decision makers, and
further, that risk based decisions should not reflect theoretically or analytically derived
perspectives that run counter to sound professional judgement (Hrudey and Hrudey,
2003). More specifically, given that risk is, at a fundamental level, an expression of
uncertainty, and that the analysis of risk and decision alternatives is further subject to
aleatory, epistemic and operational uncertainty (Amendola, 2001), the outputs must be
treated diagnostically rather than deterministically, i.e., they should provide decision
support, not decisions.
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Table 7.3 Descriptions of the risk analysis process maturity hierarchy, from ad hoc to
adaptive
Validation A broad range of mechanisms are in place to capture feedback potentially challenging the
validity of the risk analysis process (e.g. benchmarking surveys, professional networks,





Norms and assumptions underpinning the design of the risk analysis process are openly
questioned, critically evaluated and, where appropriate, revised in light of validation
findings (i.e. double loop learning).
Verification Verification extends beyond rigorous mechanisms to ensure procedural compliance (e.g.
sign offs supplemented by in-depth audits) to provide formal quality control of risk analyses





Root and common causes of errors in the execution of risk analysis (e.g. deficient
communication, overly complex procedures, lack of education and training) are identified
and resolved. Modifications to the design of the process are identified, evaluated and
implemented within periodic and event-driven reviews, but remain largely reactive and
externally driven (i.e. mirroring changes to codes, standards, guidelines, etc.).
The critical and key risk analysis practices are explicitly undertaken.
Procedures Procedures exist to guide the execution of risk analysis, with an appropriate degree of
standardisation, detail, and complexity.
Roles and
responsibilities




Cyclical and event-based criteria are in place to guide the initiation of risk analyses.
Resource
management
The requisite monetary, human and technical resources are identified, acquired and
deployed in support of risk analysis.
Input data
management
The requisite data inputs are identified, acquired and deployed in support of risk analysis.
Output data
management
Risk analysis outputs are collected, stored and disseminated in a manner that supports
decision-making, satisfies audit requirements, and facilitates organisational learning.
Verification Basic mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with risk analysis procedures,
focussing on outputs rather than tasks performed (e.g. sign offs on receipt of completed risk
analyses).




Non-compliances with risk analysis procedures are resolved on a case by case basis (i.e.
treated as isolated errors requiring sanction to prevent their recurrence). Improvements to
the design of the risk analysis process are implemented in a reactive, ad hoc manner (e.g. in
response to changes in codes or regulations).
Stakeholder
engagement
A broad cross section of internal and external knowledge, experience, skills and




Competence Staff exhibit adequate knowledge, skills and experience in risk analysis. Education and




The critical risk analysis practices are explicitly undertaken.
LEVEL 1:
Ad hoc
Risk analysis is absent; or the critical practices are implicitly or incompletely performed.
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Table 7.4 Descriptions of the risk analysis process maturity attributes and their rationale for inclusion within our model
Attribute Description Rationale Key aspects
Procedures The rules guiding the execution of risk
analysis.
Procedures serve to capture and disseminate knowledge of the
optimal conduct of risk analysis so that it is maintained within the
organisational memory rather than as hidden expert knowledge
(NEA/CSNI, 1999), and so ensure its consistent, efficient conduct.
Appropriate standardisation and formalisation of procedures taking into account
personnel experience and knowledge; participation of end users (e.g. risk
analysts) in their development; matching detail with complexity of work;
making explicit the rationale for conducting risk analyses; being based on an




Assignment of personnel to risk analysis
roles and responsibilities.
To avoid the “not my job” phenomenon (Joy and Griffiths, 2005),
and ensure risk analysis receives appropriate focus and resource
allocations.
Matching role descriptions and assignment of responsibilities with personnel
competencies and authorities (NEA/CSNI, 1999). Supporting well meaning
statements that “risk management is everyone’s job” with specific requirements.
Initiation
criteria
Stages or conditions which initiate risk
analysis.
To ensure risk analyses is undertaken as required, rather than being
initiated on an ad hoc, over zealous, or reactive basis, or
marginalised as “make work.”
Identifying where risk analysis is necessary vs. where adherence to codes and
standards can be said to discharge the duty (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003;
UKOOA, 1999), and making this explicit in cyclical and event-based criteria.
Resource
management
The planning, acquisition, and
deployment of funds, techniques and
staff in support of risk analysis.
Resourcing of risk analysis is particularly critical during periods of
reduced budgets and downsizing, which may bring an emphasis on
economic rather than safe operation (NEA/CSNI, 1999).
Sufficiency and availability of financial resources; access to sufficiently
competent human resources; and a range of risk analysis techniques which
reflect the complexity of the organisation’s activities and working environment
(Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003).
Input data
management
The identification, collection, and
storage of risk analysis data inputs.
The systematic identification and capture of data requirements
serves to ensure analyses are underpinned by objective data
evaluation, rather than reflecting best guesses in the guise of
“expert judgement.”
The definition of data requirements / data sources for risk analysis, either at the
process level or, where not practical, on a case by case basis, and mapping these
to data collection and storage systems.
Output data
management
The collection, storage and
dissemination of risk analysis outputs.
Risk analysis outputs must be systematically recorded to inform
decision makers, for audit and training purposes, and to facilitate
future reviews (COSO, 2004; CSA, 2004). Further, this ensures
staff have current knowledge of the human, technical,
organisational and environmental factors that govern system safety
(Reason, 1997).
Documenting in-depth the risk analysis outcomes, not simply the overall level of
risk (e.g. sources of data, assumptions used, methods followed, etc.). Although
in theory the storage media is unimportant as long as the outputs are easily
retrievable (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003), IT-based data systems (risk
registers) have significant advantages, particularly in facilitating information
flow between and across layers and boundaries of the organisation (COSO,
2004).
Verification Ensuring compliance with risk analysis
procedures, and providing quality
control of the execution of risk analysis.
The mere existence of procedures is not in itself enough to ensure
that staff actions will be consistent with them (Hoyle, 2001; ISO,
2000). Errors of omission or commission (e.g. due to
Implementation of mechanisms to ensure adherence to procedures (e.g. auditing,
“sign offs”) and to sanction non-compliance. Quality control mechanisms (e.g.
peer reviews, Delphi panels) should be implemented with explicit methods for
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misunderstanding instructions, carelessness, fatigue or
management override), may cause deviations. Similarly,
procedural compliance does not ensure the quality of execution of
risk analysis.
controlling (e.g. establishing group consensus iteratively) or evaluating (e.g.
quality criteria) the quality of analyses. An appropriate balance between the
resources required, the constraints of bureaucracy, and the benefits of process
control should be struck.
Validation Assessing the fundamental correctness
of the risk analysis process design (e.g.
that the correct techniques are being
applied, that the correct initiation
criteria are in place).
The willingness and means to question the validity of current risk
analysis practices is required to show due diligence and ensure that
current practices are legitimate, and is further a prerequisite to the
continual improvement of risk analysis.
Formalised approaches to validation include: statistical or mathematical
approaches to validating technical methodologies, independent peer reviews,
and benchmarking surveys; and informally may draw upon: professional
networks, trade and scientific literature, etc.
Organisational
learning
The manner in which the organisation
identifies, evaluates and implements
improvements to the design and
execution of risk analysis.
Mechanisms for verification and validation are mere panaceas if
their findings are not acted upon, i.e., if they are not used to rectify
deficiencies in the design and execution of risk analysis.
Reviews should: be undertaken at specified intervals and on an event driven-
basis; consider a broad range of internal and external feedback; focus on
improving the validity of the risk analysis process and the effectiveness of its
execution, not on ensuring it complies with a given standard; treat errors of
omission or commission in the execution of risk analysis not as isolated lapses
requiring sanction to prevent their re-occurrence, but as opportunities to identify
and resolve root and common causes of error; and be supported by a learning
culture, wherein current methods and approaches to risk analysis, and their
underlying assumptions, are open to question and critical evaluation.
Stakeholder
engagement
The engagement of stakeholders, both
internal and external to the utility, for
the purpose of harnessing a broad range
of perspectives, knowledge, skills and
experience.
The legitimacy of risk analysis outputs depends upon appropriately
broad stakeholder engagement, as risk is an intrinsically multi-
faceted construct, whose comprehensive understanding is often
beyond the capabilities of individuals or small groups.
A team approach to risk analysis which pools the knowledge, skills, expertise
and experience of a range of perspectives is preferable (Health and Safety
Laboratory, 2003; MHU, 2003; Joy and Griffiths, 2005). External stakeholders
may be engaged to: capture expertise (e.g. consultants); confer additional
legitimacy on the analyses; communicate due diligence (e.g. regulators); and
capture community values and ensure they are incorporated within the analysis.
Competence The ability to demonstrate knowledge,
skills, and experience in risk analysis to
the level required (Health and Safety
Laboratory, 2003).
The legitimacy of risk analyses outcomes depends to a large extent
on the capacity of staff to critically evaluate available information
and to supplement it with their own knowledge and plausible
assumptions (Rosness, 1998) , i.e. on staff competencies.
Definition of required staff competencies in risk analysis; evaluation and
implementation of appropriate education and training vehicles to develop /
maintain those competencies (e.g. class room learning, external workshops);
providing “on the job” training under adequate supervision; designing and
implementing methods for evaluating the efficacy of educating and training (e.g.
for measuring that the required competencies have been imparted).
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7.4 RESEARCH METHODS
One utility responsible for the provision of water and wastewater services
participated in this study. The provision of safe, reliable drinking water depends on a
range of organisational functions spanning the design, operation and management of
water supply systems from catchment to tap. We therefore view the juxtaposition of a
cross-section of functional risk analysis and risk based decision making capabilities as
central to providing a well-rounded examination of the utility’s capacity to protect
public health. Although the focus of our research is water supply, by the nature of the
utility’s organisational design, it extended to embrace aspects of their wastewater
services (as, for example, the project management and engineering functions deliver
both water and wastewater system designs and projects). We consider this a valid
extension, as the underlying principles of risk analysis, decision theory, and capability
maturity modelling remain constant regardless of the application context.
The sample comprised of seven organisational functions: engineering; project
management; drinking water quality management; network planning; asset
management; emergency management; and occupational health and safety
management. The research methods included interview and document analysis as
described below.
A semi-structured interview template was refined based on our previous
research and here adapted on an interview-specific basis to fit the function (e.g. asset
management) and, where relevant, functional discipline (e.g. dam safety management)
under examination. The questions were designed to explore the practical form of risk
management in each function (e.g. “what is the process for identifying health and safety
hazards within workplaces?”) and the relative maturity of its implementation (e.g. “are
there mechanisms for quality control of risk analyses?”). Interviews (mean approx. 45
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minutes, ranging from 25-85 minutes) were conducted in situ (32) and by ’phone (1),
recorded, and subsequently converted into verbatim transcripts (with two exceptions,
where notes were taken). The transcripts were returned to each interviewee, providing
them an opportunity to comment. Finally, a range of pertinent supporting company
documentation was obtained from interviewees, the corporate intranet, and the public
domain (e.g. internet, conference articles). Those obtained included risk management
policies and frameworks, risk analysis procedures and methods, accident and incident
statistics and reports, water safety plans, risk analysis outputs, etc.
Each function’s process maturity was determined according to the lead author’s
judgement based on the data obtained. Recall that to achieve a given maturity level, all
positive requirements of that level and those preceding levels must be satisfied.
However, caution is required. Whilst effort was expended to clearly define each
process maturity characteristic, there remained an element of subjectivity in
determining their attainment. Further, the purpose of the case study was to both refine
the model and illustrate its application, not to derive a maturity assessment of auditable
rigour. Thus, the value of this research lies in its synthesis of normative and
behavioural theories with empirical observations to codify the processes of risk analysis
and risk based decision making, placing these within a maturity framework that
facilitates their assessment and improvement, and then illustrating these aspects with
reference to a cross-section of water and wastewater utility functions.
Mechanisms to validate our findings were adopted. This was achieved through
sample anonymity and triangulation. Anonymity removed the potential for conflicts
with the fundamental goal of adding to the body of knowledge (as opposed, e.g., to the
participant’s desire that the findings reflected positively upon their organisation).
Triangulation was achieved through interviewing a range of representatives from each
254
function and cross checking for inconsistencies in accounts, cross checking interviewee
accounts with documented sources, and providing the interviewees an opportunity to
comment on drafts of the research outlined in this paper (and subsequently reflecting
those comments in redrafts). Thus, we ensured consistency between interviewees,
between interviewees and document sources, and between the researchers’ and
interviewees’ perspectives. Indeed, of the sample of seven functions, emergency
planning was removed from the analysis due to contradictions in the data and the
limited sample of interviewees (two, compared to a minimum of three elsewhere),
whilst network planning was discounted owing to limited documentation obtained.
7.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We begin by summarising and discussing the sub-sample’s risk analysis
practices, before evaluating their relative maturity of implementation. We then turn to
risk based decision making, where we repeat the same structure of discussion.
7.5.1 Risk analysis: observed practices
Table 7.5 summarises the undertaking of each risk analysis practice within the
sub-sample, on a function specific basis.
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Table 7.5 Summary of the undertaking of each risk analysis practice within the sub-sample
Asset managementDrinking water quality management Occupational health and safety management




Schematics of water supply systems were
produced. Data was obtained to
characterise the following system elements:
catchment (e.g. geomorphology, climate,
land uses); source water (e.g. surface or
ground water, flow and reliability, seasonal
changes); storage tanks, reservoirs and
intakes (e.g. detention times, design);
treatment and distribution systems (e.g.
processes, configuration, monitoring);
current operational procedures; point
sources of pollution; and consumers (e.g.
population, demand patterns).
Checklists were used to interrogate characteristics
of the work spaces and the type and methods of
work to be undertaken (e.g. existence / location of
pits, shafts, ducts, pressure vessels, access and
egress routes, ventilation, isolation and lockout
















Project options were characterised
through scope development and value
management workshops. These
detailed the project need and relevant
assumptions and constraints, before
characterising each option in terms
including their: functional
specifications, capacities, required
inputs and outputs, and relative costs
and benefits.
Prior to the application of HAZOP
studies, process and
instrumentation diagrams – which
show the interconnection of
process equipment and the
instrumentation used for process
control – were created.
Hazard identification Chemical, microbiological, physical and
radiological water quality hazards (e.g.
chlorine sensitive pathogens) were
identified on a system and sub-system (e.g.
catchment, treatment) specific basis through
a checklist-based approach.
Hazards were identified via the use of task,
substance and workplace specific checklists.
Where deemed relevant, this was supplemented by
systems engineering techniques, incident and near





Hazards threatening the delivery of
the project option(s) on time, to
budget, and within the required
quality parameters, were identified
through facilitated brainstorming,
structured with reference to generic
hazard categories.
HAZOP studies identified
potential deviations from process
design intent (i.e. hazards)
through the application of guide
words (e.g. low, high, none) to




Knowledge of the environmental behaviour
of hazards and the system under
examination, technical judgement, incident
reports, survey maps, and monitoring
records were synthesised to link hazards
(e.g. chlorine sensitive pathogens) to their
sources (e.g. dairy farming or grazing) and
to the events which may lead to their
realisation (e.g. runoff or percolation from
land based activities).
There was an absence of explicit provisions for
identifying the precursors to identified hazards,
one exception being for hazards arising from
manual handling activities, where checklists
examined which aspects of the actions and
movements, workplace layout, and working






pumps) to their direct
causes (e.g. not enough
capacity to hold or
evaporate sludge received)
for each component and for
the plant as a whole.




No inference possible. Hazards (e.g. aqueduct erosion) were
linked to their direct causes (e.g.
major storm runoff; water release
from failed stormwater dams).
Engineering judgement was
applied to identify potential
causes of deviations from design
intent (e.g. human error: acts of
omission or commission;
equipment failure; and external
events).
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Control evaluation Actions, activities and processes applied to
mitigate the introduction or transport of
hazards from catchment to customer tap
(e.g. catchment protection, pre-treatment,
ozonation) were identified via a checklist-
type approach applied to system
schematics. Critical controls were
identified via set criteria. Technical data,
consultations with operators, and site visits
informed survey-based evaluations of their
adequacy of design, management and
operation with reference to key attributes
(e.g. infrastructure; planning, procedures
and legislation; monitoring; and auditing).
Health and safety risk controls were identified
with reference to a control hierarchy which
established their relative criticality: engineering
(e.g. substitution, isolation, design modification,
guarding), administrative (e.g. training,
supervision, procedures), and personal protective
equipment. No explicit provision for evaluating
their adequacy of design, management or
operation.










event trees, dam break
modelling, etc.).
Not observed to have been explicitly
undertaken.
Systems or procedures designed to
prevent, detect, provide early
warning, or mitigate the
consequences of a deviation (i.e.
safeguards) were identified. No
explicit provision for evaluating




This may be generalised as the judgement-based interpretation of limited data sets describing the nature and severity of consequences of past hazardous events (e.g. in occupational health and safety: cost of claims, lost time due to incidents)
to derive a credible evaluation of the potential consequence(s) of uncertain future events. Evaluations were near uniformly characterised with reference to descriptors of the nature (e.g. environmental, financial) and severity of consequences
of events enshrined within the utility’s portfolio of risk ranking techniques. However, isolated applications of mathematical modelling (e.g. event tree analysis, dam break modelling, inundation mapping, and economic impact evaluations in
major dam risk analysis; event tree analysis in one occupational health and safety risk analysis application) were observed.
Likelihood
evaluation
May be generalised as the judgement-based interpretation of data pertaining to the frequency of past hazardous events (e.g. water quality exceedence frequencies) in light of analyst(s) knowledge, experience, and assumptions. Evaluations
were near uniformly characterised with reference to likelihood benchmarks within risk ranking techniques. However, isolated applications of mathematical modelling were observed (e.g. in major dam risk analysis, network reliability
analysis, etc.).
Risk evaluation Outside of isolated risk analyses driven by consultants (e.g. notional costs of risk and statistical lives lost were derived in major dam risk analysis), risk was expressed in qualitative terms (extreme, high, medium or low) derived by
combining estimates of consequence severity and likelihood on a risk matrix.
* Note that this describes the overarching portfolio risk analysis of major dams, which itself is supplemented by a more detailed risk analysis at the component and sub-component level.
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Below, we provide a comparative analysis of the strengths and limitations of a
selection of these practices.
7.5.1.1 Hazard identification
The sub-sample adopted a range of hazard identification methods, each with their
own strengths, limitations and application contexts. Consider occupational health and
safety management, where hazard identification was concerned with those physical,
chemical and biological threats inherent to workplaces and work practices. These were
primarily identified via checklists linking known hazards with processes, equipment,
workplaces, or operations. Checklists are useful means of capturing and passing on the
experiences of others, and so their application is most relevant where there is a
significant body of knowledge or experience on the range and nature of potential
hazards (Joy and Griffiths, 2005). However, they may tend to suppress lateral thinking
(MHU, 2003), and hazards not incorporated within them are likely to be excluded from
identification (Joy and Griffiths, 2005). As such, occupational health and safety
management procedures required that the use of checklists was supplemented with:
“judgement formed from experience and knowledge of the work, past incident records,
brainstorming, and system engineering techniques.” This acknowledges the above
limitations and the notion that it is inappropriate to base hazard identification solely on
lessons learned from the past, as some hazards may be present that have never been
realised, or there may have been changes to workplaces or work practices such that
historic data is no longer a valid representation of the hazard potential of the current
system (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003).
In practice, the application of system engineering techniques was the remit of the
engineering function. Here, hazard identification was concerned with determining
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ways in which engineered systems may fail to operate within design specifications.
This was reflected in their use of hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). In brief,
analysts examined a process (e.g. disinfection) subdivided into nodes, at each node, the
analysts applied guidewords (e.g. low, high) to process parameters (e.g. temperature,
pressure, flow) to identify ways in which the process may deviate from its design
intention. In contrast, neither prescription nor a definitive methodological structure was
evident in project management’s approach to hazard identification, which was
concerned with threats to the delivery of projects on time, to budget, and within the
required quality parameters. Acknowledging that projects and their related hazards are
by definition unique, the function adopted facilitated group brainstorming, informed by
generic risk categories (e.g. economic / business risk: the risk of exceeding project
budget due to, for example, the impact of unfavourable exchange rates on the cost of
minerals), to stimulate dialogue and encourage a systematic yet creative approach to
hazard identification.
7.5.1.2 Hazard precursor identification
The potential existence of a hazard does not in itself constitute a risk, as each
hazard requires a process or pathway (here, termed a precursor) to lead to its
realisation. Whilst hazard identification is concerned with what can go wrong (e.g.
introduction of hydrocarbons within a water supply system), precursor identification
examines how and why things can go wrong (e.g. off-take water contaminated via oil
emissions from inadequately maintained pumps or pipes; due to an absence of
procedures or inadequate supervision and training of maintenance staff); in other words
identifying possible routes to and causes of failure. Consider the drinking water quality
management function, wherein risk analysis was based on an adaptation of the hazard
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analysis and critical control points (HACCP) methodology. This method seeks to
provide a basis for understanding and prioritising health and aesthetic hazards within
the water supply chain from catchment to tap (see Deere and Davison, 1998; Deere et
al., 2001; Hamilton et al., 2006a). Within the function, knowledge of the
environmental behaviour of hazards (e.g. transportability) and the system under
examination, technical judgement, incident reports, survey maps, and monitoring
records were synthesised to link hazards identified within each subsystem (e.g.
catchment: chlorine sensitive pathogens) to their sources (e.g. dairy farming or grazing)
and to the events which may lead to their realisation (e.g. runoff or percolation from
land based activities).
Whilst variable in rigour and method, a common theme was that each function’s
approach to precursor identification (where evident) tended to focus on how failure
events may arise, rather than addressing their in-depth causes and reasons. In other
words, they neglected to explore the reasons why human or technical systems may fail.
This is flawed in that easily predictable causes of failure are often simply specific
manifestations of deeper, underlying weaknesses (Reason, 1997). This is an important
observation in that an inability to understand causal paths to failure constrains the
development of risk reduction options targeted at the root causes of risks.
7.5.1.3 Consequence evaluation
This practice involves identifying the nature of the consequences of a hazardous
event occurring (e.g. financial, environmental) and assessing their severity of impact.
There are a range of techniques for consequence evaluation, from quantitative
modelling to qualitative ranking techniques, the span of which were observed within
the sub-sample. However, applications of the former were largely restricted to asset
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management (e.g. event tree analysis, dam break modelling, inundation mapping, and
economic impact evaluations in major dam risk analysis), with the majority of
evaluations being single point estimates framed by risk ranking techniques. These
ranking techniques separated consequences on one axis according to the nature of their
impact (e.g. financial, environmental), with the other axis being a graded scale of
severity expressed by descriptive benchmarks. Such categorisation can substantially
reduce subjectivity in consequence evaluations (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003).
Their practical application within the sub-sample was not typically underpinned by an
analytical method per se, instead relying upon the interpretation of limited data sets
(e.g. in occupational health and safety: cost of claims, lost time due to incidents) to
derive a credible consequence evaluation. We do not consider the subjectivity inherent
in this as a limitation, because in principle one single point estimate is as good – or as
bad – as another. In other words, as in this case consequence evaluations serve solely
to anchor single point estimates of risk at points on implied isocontours, they are
required only to be credible (i.e. to lie within the curve; Figure 7.3). In contrast, greater
accuracy is required of likelihood evaluations, as they are concerned with finding
specific points on isocontours (i.e. the likelihood of occurrence for a given severity of
consequence). This is an important observation as the resource-intensive nature of data
collection and analysis dictates that it must be pursued on a rational rather than
dogmatic or uninformed basis.
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Figure 7.3 The reciprocal correlation between consequence severities and their
forecast cumulative likelihoods of occurrence for a given adverse event (e.g. the release
of hazardous chemicals to the environment due to a deviation from design intention in
process engineering)
NB: Cumulative likelihood is the likelihood that the event will occur and lead to a defined consequence
severity or greater. A fundamental assumption of single point estimate risk analysis is that the gradient
of this relationship, when expressed on log10 scales, approximates -1. Thus, at any point on the curve, the
product of likelihood of occurrence and consequence severity is uniform. Consequently, the location on
the curve at which the single point estimate is taken does not influence the risk evaluation. This
relationship is sometimes referred to as an “iso-risk contour,” and is often held to characterise the
behaviour of most hazards. Whilst intuitively attractive, the authors are unaware of its theoretical
underpinning, whilst its empirical basis (e.g. Hirst and Carter, 2002) is to our knowledge limited.








x1 × y1 = z
x2 × y2 = z
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7.5.1.4 Likelihood evaluation
This practice involves evaluating the likelihood that a hazardous event will occur
and lead to a defined severity of consequence. Its undertaking within the sub-sample
may be generalised as the judgement-based interpretation of data pertaining to the
frequency of past hazardous events in light of analyst(s) knowledge, experience, and
assumptions. These evaluations were categorised either numerically
(probability/frequency gauges) or descriptively (e.g. “will only occur in exceptional
circumstances”).
Consider first water quality risk analysis, which was concerned with the
likelihood that specific hazardous events may occur and cause an exceedence of water
quality or operational targets. Here, historic frequencies of exceedence of water quality
and operational parameters formed the baseline data inputs (e.g. turbidity data, e-coli).
Where deemed appropriate, this was supplemented by statistical analysis. For example,
an evaluation of the likelihood of climatic and seasonal variations leading to excess
levels of suspended solids in source waters was informed by correlating historic
loadings of suspended solids with flow and rainfall data. However, whilst
comprehensive monitoring of water quality parameters within the catchment, source
waters and at the customer tap was routine, the absence of an overarching operational
monitoring philosophy at the treatment and disinfection plant level meant that datasets
characterising the behaviour of hazards within water supply systems were interspersed
with black boxes. As one interviewee noted, “we do have online monitoring…but
traditionally it’s been a fairly ad hoc process…no-one has really taken a holistic view
of the whole state and said – I think we should have online monitors here, chlorine
residual analysers at these following locations or online pH…or ammonia [monitoring]
at the following locations [and] for these reasons.” This knowledge gap was being
263
remedied through identifying those operational parameters (e.g. free chlorine levels)
which described the effectiveness of control measures (e.g. maintenance of residual
chlorination post disinfection) designed to mitigate water quality hazards (e.g. entry or
regrowth of chlorine sensitive pathogens within the disinfection system), and
integrating them within existing monitoring programmes.
A similar theme emerged from occupational health and safety management,
whose risk analysis procedure stated that likelihood evaluations “may be determined
using statistical analysis and calculations,” but “where no past data exists or is
available, subjective estimates will be required to reflect an individual’s or groups
degree of belief” that a particular severity of consequence will occur. It further
specified that incident records, experiments and prototypes, and economic, engineering
or other models may be used to minimise subjective bias. However, our research
revealed that, in practice, modelling (e.g. event tree analysis) was restricted to isolated
applications, whilst the availability of historic data (e.g. frequency rates by injury type,
mechanism of injury, etc.) was constrained by the organisation’s good health and safety
record: “the amount of information that we generate doesn’t produce sufficient data for
us to analyse…and that’s not necessarily because of a lack of reporting, it’s just
that…we actually don’t produce that many incidents.” This was offset in part by
reference to external data sources (e.g. national health and safety databases), however,
these inevitably failed to reflect the unique nature of the utility’s design, construction,
operation, and maintenance practices, and, more broadly, their working culture; and,
furthermore, are often skewed by the under-reporting of incidents and near-misses
(Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003).
Our final illustration refers to asset management’s application of risk analysis to
prioritise replacements of below ground major water mains. All pipeline systems are
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subject to an array of internal and external loading conditions (e.g. from the soil,
ground movement, traffic loads). Additionally, pipe materials degrade due to
environmental factors (e.g. corrosiveness of ground water in conjunction with soil
properties). Thus, the causes and modes of failure can be complex and varied,
depending on the pipe material and its operating environment. This complexity,
coupled with the relatively high consequence severities of major main failures,
provided the rationale for a data-intensive approach to likelihood evaluation. An initial
screening evaluation was undertaken using pipe details from the geographic
information system to assign each major main a “risk score” based on factors relating to
either their likelihood or consequence of failure (e.g. pipe diameter, material, age, etc.).
Detailed analysis was then undertaken of high priority main sections. Subsequently,
likelihoods of failure were determined through a predefined relationship between pipe
material and years of service. Although predefined, this was not prescriptive, being
open to adaptation where professional experience, overseas studies, or internal
investigations (e.g. test coupon, linear polarisation) relating to the failure rates of
particular mains questioned its validity.
7.5.2 Risk analysis: maturity of implementation
Having summarised (Table 7.5) and discussed the sub-sample’s risk analysis
practices, we now consider their maturity of implementation. Within each function, the
requirements of L2 maturity in risk analysis were satisfied (Figure 7.4).
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Key: DWQM: drinking water quality management; AM: asset management; OH&S: occupational health
and safety management; ENG: engineering; PM: project management.
Figure 7.4 Spider diagram illustrating the maturity of implementation of risk analysis
(left) and risk based decision making (right) within the sub-sample (insufficient data
was obtained to evaluate risk based decision making within engineering)
That is, a repeatable process was in place, characterised by the explicit
undertaking of the critical risk analysis practices. However, L2 is limited in two
fundamental ways. One is that the key practices of hazard precursor identification and
control evaluation may be absent or implicitly undertaken. With the exceptions of
engineering and drinking water quality management, this was true across our sub-
sample (see Table 7.5). This is a significant observation, as knowledge of the processes
or pathways through which hazards are realised, and of the weaknesses in the design,
operation and management of existing controls, are prerequisites to developing risk
reduction options targeted at common and root causes of failures yet to arise. A further




















practices are performed depends in large part upon the individuals executing and
managing the work, and may vary considerably. In addition, the methods and
techniques adopted may be retrospective and historical, regardless of their applicability
or currency. This is because they do not fully satisfy the requirements of a defined
(L3), controlled (L4) or adaptive (L5) process. However, fully is the key word, as we
observed each function to exhibit some higher level maturity attributes, and so the prior
characterisation may be somewhat harsh. We do not dwell on precisely what prevented
our sub-sample from attaining higher levels of maturity, given the limited interest to the
reader. Instead, we now discuss our most noteworthy observations.
7.5.2.1 Procedures
One L3 requirement is that risk analysis is guided by procedure, making explicit,
for example, the tasks, methods and assumptions to be adopted. In our sub-sample,
these procedures were observed within project management, asset management, and
occupational health and safety management to varying levels of completeness, detail,
and prescription. As one interviewee noted, project risk analysis was facilitated by the
corporate risk management group rather than being guided by a “prescribed and
definitively defined procedure,” perhaps an implicit acknowledgement that risk analysis
is, as Garrick (1988) suggested, a thinking business which should not be fully
prescribed or cook booked. This lay in contrast to the more prescribed approach to risk
analysis within occupational health and safety management, perhaps reflecting its
inherent potential for standardisation (i.e. that it is by nature repetitive), along with the
need for legislative compliance. Bureaucracy has negative connotations in today’s
world, however one must recognise that procedures do not exist for their own sake, but
as a means of capturing organisational experience, guiding staff in process execution,
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and of showing due diligence to key stakeholders (e.g. regulators, shareholders). The
underlying principle is that as staff accumulate experiences and become more expert in
the application of risk analysis, they find better or the best ways of doing so. However,
if this hidden knowledge is not made explicit and documented, it will remain within
their minds and theirs alone (NEA/CSNI, 1999). This is particularly important during
periods of internal restructuring or high employee turnover. The implications of this
had not gone unnoticed within the drinking water quality management function: “I
think there is a gap [in process documentation]…obviously you’re aware that we’ve
had some recent structural changes and we are sitting in a precarious position where
we need to ensure that information is transferred…to ensure that this work continues
and [that] we improve on it.”
7.5.2.2 Initiation criteria
Within many sectors, there are accepted standards of performance and codes of
practice that, if adhered to, provide high degrees of control (Pollard et al., 2004). These
are applied in familiar and well-characterised situations where uncertainties and system
vulnerabilities are well understood. Here, adhering to the historic basis for safe
operations can be considered to discharge the risk analysis duty (Health and Safety
Laboratory, 2003; UKOOA, 1999). Returning to our sub-sample, this concept was
reflected in the electrical engineer’s comments: “electricity is a dangerous thing, it’s a
source of high energy that can be released instantaneously, obviously you need to be in
control and protected satisfactorily, to make sure that there’s no risk to personnel or
the property…because the technology is very mature…we have our own design
guidelines [for electrical engineering] that actually emphasise…issues like lifecycle
cost, security of operation, reliability, safety…[and so] I don’t think it is necessary to
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have a formalised [risk analysis] process [in electrical engineering], because it’s part
and parcel of the detailed design anyway.”
However, complex, uncertain and novel systems, with the potential to deviate
from routine operation, may require risk analysis, so as to better understand what drives
the risk from or to the plant, process or operation (Pollard et al., 2004). This principle
extends beyond the design and operation of technical systems to embrace all aspects of
managing a water utility. As such, an L3 attribute is the existence of initiation criteria:
predefined stages or conditions which initiate the application and revision of risk
analysis. In a world becoming obsessed with “the risk management of everything”
(Power, 2004), the absence of clear criteria may drain resources as staff initiate analysis
without first considering whether adherence to good practice would serve as a sufficient
proxy for risk management, or at the other extreme, analysis may be applied reactively,
perhaps even to provide ex post justifications of investment decisions (e.g. Health and
Safety Laboratory, 2003). To illustrate, initiation criteria observed within our sub-
sample included: undertaking project risk analyses prior to full financial approval
depending on the cost, complexity and novelty of the project (and updating them at
project delivery milestones); undertaking manual handling risk analyses in occupational
health and safety management for novel, altered or relocated processes, or in response
to high frequency injury records or employee requests; undertaking hazop studies
within engineering for complex or costly processes at set stages of design
completeness; whilst timescales for revising risk analyses of various asset classes were
observed in asset management (though not uniformly). Critically, these criteria
acknowledge that risk analysis is not a one off activity, but is instead one requiring
regular revision to reflect system changes and the improved understanding of risks that
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inevitably develops over time (e.g. from monitoring data, increased operator
experience).
7.5.2.3 Stakeholder engagement
A further positive characteristic of the utility’s approach to risk analysis was the
reflection of a broad spectrum of knowledge, skills, experience, and perspectives within
each function’s approach to risk analysis. Input from stakeholders with diverse skills
and backgrounds serves to minimise analyst bias and creates synergies of knowledge
and expertise. Furthermore, one benefit of our sub-sample’s primarily qualitative
approach to risk analysis was that it ensured that non-technical experts, specifically
what one interviewee referred to as “the people that use the systems, use the equipment
and undertake the processes,” could participate in or critically scrutinise the process.
This is key, as engaging those grassroots staff who have practical knowledge of the
hazards under examination ensures that they have a sense of ownership and
engagement within the process, as opposed to it residing within a core set of experts
isolated from operational realities, the latter being a pitfall common to risk analysis
(e.g. Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003).
7.5.2.4 Input data management
One notable observation was the general absence of predefined strategies of data
collection to inform each function’s approach to risk analysis. By this, we mean that, at
the process level, risk analysis was not typically informed by a prior consideration of
the data requirements and methods of capture; instead, data collection was undertaken
on an ad hoc or case by case basis, except where analytical methodologies were
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applied. By way of practical illustration, consider project management, where one
interviewee reflected that the majority of risk evaluations were based on “the
judgement of people,” although raw data was sourced where deemed appropriate.
Illustrating this, he reflected on a project concerned with the construction of a new
pipeline, wherein the hazard of striking rock during excavation was identified. As the
level of risk associated with this would largely determine the provision of project
contingency funds, bore-log samples were undertaken along the planned pipeline route
to maximise the accuracy of the analysis. This illustrates that seeking to predefine the
data collection strategy for project risk analysis is simply not pragmatic given the
inherently unique nature of projects; it is further flawed in that it fails to recognise
human judgement as a legitimate input.
7.5.2.5 Competence
As Rosness (1998) notes, the accuracy of risk analyses depends to a large extent
on the competency of analysts to critically evaluate available information and to
integrate it with their own knowledge and assumptions. Thus, regardless of the
technical complexity of the methods adopted, risk analysis remains in many respects an
expert discipline. Reflecting this, and the growth in the application of risk analysis, we
observed the recent development of education and training programmes in the
discipline within the sub-sample. These ranged from internally delivered training
modules within occupational health and safety, comprising an overview of the relevant
legislation, the process itself, and practical exercises; to external modules for hazop
facilitators and project managers. This is in contrast to a reliance on “on the job”
training with asset and drinking water quality management. Nevertheless, the
importance of this learning by trial and error should not be marginalised, as competence
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is broadly held to be a combination of knowledge, expertise and experience (e.g. Health
and Safety Laboratory, 2003). However, a broader point is that absent a formal
definition of the competencies required of risk analysts within the sub-sample, and of
metrics for assessing whether they exist or have been imparted, on what basis is
education and training in risk analysis initiated (i.e. targeted to areas of greatest need),
assessed and improved?
Education and training can further serve to embed a cultural acceptance of risk
analysis through tackling residual perceptions of it as make-work, which appeared to
persist within the sub-sample, as reflected by one interviewee’s comments: “you could
describe [risk management] as something that’s in vogue at the moment, it’s
considered it’ll probably be a passing phase, so a lot of people don’t get too excited
about it.” This was reflected in the risk manager’s planning: “I’m looking at
developing…risk awareness training and risk culture training…[and] that would be
aligned with our regulation and governance business plan to get funding…[at present,
we’re largely restricted to on the job training]…and that’s very limited
because…[some people] tend to get a psyche that – well [the risk manager has] done
the risk assessment, therefore that’s it, [and don’t recognise their obligation to monitor
changes in risks]…what I’m looking for from a cultural point of view…[is] that people
view it more as their responsibility.”
7.5.2.6 Verification: procedural compliance
The mere existence of procedures guiding risk analysis is not in itself enough to
ensure that staff actions will be consistent with them, as errors of omission or
commission will inevitably arise. Thus, there is a need for verification of procedural
compliance, achieved within our sub-sample through means ranging from “sign offs,”
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to audits, to expert facilitation of risk analysis workshops. This is crucial in resource-
constrained environments where the role of risk analysis can be marginalised by staff
seeking to attend to more immediate operational realities, as reflected in one
interviewee’s comments: “Operational realities…and financial realities…[mean]that
the things that aren’t immediately obvious tend to fall off first…[staff] worry about
fixing the burst water main and doing [their day] job and then [think], oh, well, [risk
analysis], that’s paperwork…[so] we’ve got to try and coerce, employ…whatever
[methods] we can to…make sure [that] they’re up to date [with their analyses], and of
course there’s always the stick later on when there are audits.”
7.5.2.7 Verification: quality control
One weakness was the limited nature of our sub-sample’s risk analysis quality
control mechanisms. Quality control of risk analyses is intended to enhance their
credibility and accuracy through ameliorating those inherent uncertainties, both
epistemic, due to lack of knowledge, and operational, derived from the use of
knowledge (e.g. analyst bias, judgements, human error; see Faber and Stewart, 2003;
Amendola, 2001). For example, peer reviews of risk analysis were observed to be
executed in a largely informal and unsystematic manner, rather than being guided by
explicit quality evaluation criteria (refer to Joy and Griffiths (2005) for an example of a
hazop technical audit, and Rosness (1998) for a more general discussion of quality
criteria for risk analyses). In contrast, the use of facilitators within project risk analysis
and hazop studies was noteworthy. Our interviews emphasised that their role was not
to drive any particular outcomes or to provide technical input, but to guide analysts in
the application of the methods and to focus on the quality of process execution (e.g.
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challenging outliers during consequence evaluation, and ensuring all relevant risk
categories were considered during hazard identification).
However, as formalised quality control mechanisms were the exception rather
than the norm within the sub-sample, there was an implicit reliance on analyst
competencies and the perceived validity of the methods adopted. However, we have
already noted the limited nature of education and training in risk analysis; furthermore,
all risk analysis methods have inherent limitations and are based on assumptions rarely
made explicit, whilst their applications are not scientific in the classical sense, instead
drawing upon the accumulated experiences, knowledge and bias of analysts (Aven et
al., 2006 ). It is in this context that the utility’s prior use of the Delphi technique
(Dalkey and Helmer, 1963) within project risk analysis is worth noting. Here,
facilitated discussions and iterative anonymous voting were applied to generate expert
consensus in risk evaluation. The method’s explicit recognition of human judgment as
a legitimate input was particularly valuable given the often data sparse environment in
which project risk analysis was conducted. Furthermore, characterised as it is by group
participation, anonymity and feedback loops, it minimises bias and dogmatism (e.g.
reduces the reluctance of staff to abandon previously stated views). Indeed, one
interviewee suggested that since its application had been rescinded, evaluations often
reflected the subjective judgement of lone experts, which “typically went
unchallenged.”
7.5.3 Risk based decision making: observed practices
Table 7.6 summarises the undertaking of each risk based decision making
practice within the sub-sample (note that the engineering function was discounted due
to limited data).
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Table 7.6 Summary of the undertaking of each risk based decision making practice within the sub-sample
Drinking water quality management Occupational health and
safety management
Asset management Project management
Establish risk acceptance criteria Corporate policy was to reduce risks to a level “as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).” The ALARP principle recognises that it would be possible to spend infinite time, effort and
money attempting to reduce a risk to zero, and reflects the idea that the benefits of risk reduction should be balanced with the practicality of implementation. However, ALARP was not
referred to within individual functions’ risk management procedures, with the exception of OH&S and in major dam safety management. In the latter, risk acceptability considered three
criteria: life safety criteria; ALARP, and the de minimis risk concept, in order of stringency.
Establish criteria for evaluating
alternative risk reduction options
Not explicitly defined. Interviewees
referred to cost, time and effort required
for implementation; forecast risk
reduction; regulatory compliance; risks
introduced (e.g. disinfection by-
products); geographical and technical
feasibility (e.g. site constraints);
operability; manpower required; and
social and political concerns.
Not explicitly defined.
Forecast risk reduction, cost
of implementation, and
technical feasibility were
referred to by one
interviewee.
Defined for below ground major water mains:
qualitative risk reduction, cost of implementation,
and latency of effects; for major dams: cost of
implementation, and forecast reduction in
statistical lives lost and economic losses from
dam failure events (weighted to ensure preference
for reducing statistical lives lost). Not explicitly
defined for wastewater treatment plants.
Not explicitly defined. Note that although project
managers were explicitly required to take a cost-benefit
approach in evaluating risk reduction options, the
scope of these considerations, i.e. the criteria with
which costs and benefits were determined with
reference to, was not defined.
Identify risk reduction options* Options (e.g. infrastructure upgrades,
fencing off sensitive catchments,
educating and training operators) were
generated by groups responsible for the
risk analysis of each sub-system (e.g.
catchment) in consultation with relevant
specialists (e.g. engineering, operations).
Options (e.g. introducing
standard work practices) were
typically generated in
brainstorming sessions
involving a broad cross-
section of regional /
departmental staff, and, where
relevant, OH&S staff.
Options (e.g. for wastewater treatment plants:
capital projects, alterations to operating or
maintenance regimes, contingency plans; for
dams: structural and non structural measures,
such as installing external back up seals on
concrete faced rockfill dams, or early warning
systems, respectively) were generated by those
groups responsible for the risk analysis of each
asset class in consultation with operating and
maintenance staff.
Options were typically generated by the project
manager in consultation with relevant stakeholders
(e.g. engineering staff, environmental representatives),
or within the risk analysis workshops through group
brainstorming. This was informed by predefined
measures for: reducing likelihood of occurrence (e.g.
audit and compliance programs, training, preventative
maintenance); reducing impact of occurrence (e.g.
contingency planning, engineering and structural








Methods ranged from the application of professional judgement, to the revision of risk analyses (i.e. to derive the forecast risk reduction), to stakeholder consultations, cost-estimations,
and engineering studies (e.g. feasibility studies in major dam safety management). However, given that in most cases the evaluation criteria were not explicitly defined, the undertaking of




Methods for determining the cumulative goodness of each option were again largely informal and judgement-based, although the use of formal cost-benefit analysis was observed within
asset management’s approach to prioritising major dam safety upgrades, whilst cost effectiveness evaluations informed prioritisations of the replacement of below ground major water







Note that cost-benefit analysis of risk reduction options is central to determining whether risks are “as low as reasonably practicable.” However, the limited application of this method in
the context of evaluating risk reduction options within the sub-sample meant that the determination of risk acceptability was typically based on judgement rather than data.
Managerial review and option(s)
selection
Limited data was obtained characterising this aspect. Thus, whilst our interviewees referred to peer reviews of varying degrees of formality as helping to shape the final option(s) selection
across our sub-sample, the data obtained does not allow for a meaningful analysis of the roles of judgement, experience, bias, power structures, etc. in shaping the decision outcomes.
*Refer to Table 7.5 for detail on the risk analysis inputs to the identification of risk reduction options. The most relevant practices are: hazard identification, the sine qua non for developing risk reduction measures;
hazard precursor identification, as an understanding of what drives hazards is key to informing the development of remedial measures; and control evaluation, which identifies where controls are absent and
inadequacies in the design, operation and management of existing controls, and so is a crucial input to developing risk reduction options.
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Below, we provide a comparative analysis of the strengths and limitations of a
selection of these practices.
7.5.3.1. Establish criteria for evaluating alternative risk reduction options
A range of risk reduction measures may be considered for a particular decision
context. Consider drinking water quality management; options for reducing the risk to
public health posed by chlorine sensitive pathogens include: enhancing monitoring of
indicator organisms in source waters (e.g. e-coli), catchment protection measures (e.g.
fencing, or exclusion zones for livestock), infrastructure upgrades (e.g. filtration flow
control), and operator training. The objective of each option is to reduce the risk to a
level considered acceptable; however, the decision as to which is considered the best
option(s) is influenced by many factors. In best practice organisations, these factors are
reflected in criteria used to evaluate the relative merit of alternative options.
As cost benefit analysis is closely linked to the determination of whether risks, or,
more accurately, risk reduction options satisfy the “as low as reasonably practicable”
(ALARP) criteria adopted within the sub-sample, it is tempting to consider the
balancing of costs and benefits as their evaluation criterion. However, we propose that
cost benefit analysis is best viewed as an evaluation methodology, being in essence a
normative theory for measuring the relative utility of an option with respect to various
criteria, which it does not presume to define. In this context, it does not prescribe
whether one should simply balance the financial expense of implementing an option
with the benefits of the qualitative risk reduction forecast, or whether one should
incorporate broader, often less tangible, aspects such as technical feasibility, social
values, and political concerns. Whilst our research revealed that a broad range of
criteria implicitly guided the evaluation of risk reduction options within our sub-
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sample, they were only made explicit within asset management’s risk-based approach
to prioritising major water mains replacements and major dam safety upgrades (Table
7.6). As such, one can expect what Arvai et al. (2001) termed “alternative focussed”
decision making to predominate within the sub-sample, characterised by first an
analysis of available alternatives followed by selection of the “optimal” option from a
set of implied or poorly defined criteria. Of course, it is not desirable for a process to
dictate or prescribe decisions, as too mechanical an approach to decision making would
fail to recognise the important role of management in performing difficult value
judgements under uncertainty (Aven et al., 2006). However, expressing the criteria
against which those judgements should be taken could improve the credibility and
defensibility of decision making, minimise the possibility that decisions will be second
guessed or that their rationale be forgotten, remove barriers to stakeholder buy-in, and
ensure the existence of an audit trail (SEI, 2002a).
7.5.3.2. Identify risk reduction options
This practice is concerned with generating alternative solutions for the decision
problem. Within the sub-sample, it was typically undertaken within creative workshops
involving a diverse range of stakeholders. The value of this collective brainstorming,
which seeks to stimulate innovation through open interaction and feedback, was cited
by various interviewees, with one noting that it “empowers people to think; the worst
[thing] that you can do is take away people’s creativity.” Furthermore, engaging
stakeholders with diverse skills and backgrounds can help to identify and address those
assumptions, constraints and biases which can have a significant influence on the
generation of alternatives (Aven and Kørte, 2003). Whilst primarily creative, within
some functions this practice was informed by classifications of risk controls or risk
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influencing factors, which may be viewed as de facto cheat lists for generating risk
reduction alternatives. One example was occupational health and safety management’s
hierarchy of risk controls, which classified: engineering controls for hazard removal
(e.g. substitution, isolation, modification to design, guarding and mechanical
ventilation); administrative controls for preventing the occurrence of hazardous events
(e.g. safe work practices, or procedures, training, supervision, nominating maximum
exposure times); and personal protective equipment for minimising their severity of
consequences.
However, perhaps the most important factor was the depth and rigour of the risk
analyses themselves. Consider risk analysis within drinking water quality management.
Recall that hazards identified within each subsystem (e.g. catchment: chlorine sensitive
pathogens) were linked to their sources (e.g. dairy farming or grazing) and to the events
which may lead to their realisation (e.g. runoff or percolation from land based
activities). Subsequently, detailed surveys were undertaken exploring the adequacy of
design, management and operation of those actions, activities and processes applied to
mitigate the introduction or transport of said hazards from catchment to customer tap
(e.g. catchment protection, pre-treatment, ozonation, etc.). We propose that
systematically identifying the underlying mechanisms through which hazardous events
may occur, before evaluating the latent and active weaknesses in their control
mechanisms, promoted a rational, evidence-based approach to identifying risk
reduction options. This is an important observation as it reminds us that the
overarching purpose of risk analysis should be to develop a better understanding of the
factors governing system reliability, and should not be treated solely as a “numbers
game” (e.g. to satisfy quantitative risk acceptance criteria; Faber and Stewart, 2003). It
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is in this former guise that risk analysis represents a most efficient tool for improving
system safety and performance.
7.5.3.3. Evaluate options
We now turn to the evaluation of risk reduction options. There are three elements
to this practice: forecasting the impact of options against each evaluation criteria (e.g.
technical feasibility), determining the cumulative “goodness” of each option; and
determining the acceptability of the risk. Methods for achieving the former included
applying professional judgement, revising risk analyses (to derive the forecast risk
reduction post-implementation), stakeholder consultations, cost-estimations, and
engineering studies (e.g. feasibility studies in major dam safety management). That
said, recall that in most functions the evaluation criteria were not defined, and so this
element often tended towards the informal or implicit.
For the second element, the cost-benefit approach was observed to be a sub-
sample-wide guiding principle in measuring the relative utility of alternative risk
reduction options. The cost benefit method itself is concerned with assigning financial
values to a range of burdens and benefits, and summarising the optimality of
alternatives in, for example, the expected Net Present Value of costs and equivalent
monetary values of benefits and burdens (Aven and Kørte, 2003). Such an explicitly
mathematical analysis was applied to evaluate the cumulative goodness of risk
reduction options in isolated cases (e.g. in major dam safety management). More
commonly, managerial judgement was used to balance their costs and benefits, at times
informed by cost-effectiveness evaluations (e.g. forecast risk reduction per dollar
spent). Thus, the determination of whether risks satisfied the ALARP criteria was
typically judgement-based, rather than being informed by an explicit evaluation of the
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costs and benefits of reducing vs. maintaining risk levels, the latter being central to the
evidence-based determination of whether risks are “as low as reasonably practicable,”
because, as Fischoff et al. (1981) noted, it is not risks, but options, which are acceptable
or unacceptable.
We present two rational justifications for the variable rigour and formality that
characterised this practice: that the resources expended in decision analysis must be
justified by the benefit of producing better decisions, and so detailed analysis is neither
desirable nor justifiable in every decision context; and that evaluation criteria
incorporating intangible dimensions are innately difficult to incorporate within the
strictly mathematical framework of cost benefit analysis. However, a more critical
analysis would suggest that as the criteria for both evaluating risk reduction options and
selecting from the range of evaluation methods (e.g. formal cost benefit analysis vs.
cost-effectiveness evaluation vs. heuristics or rules of thumb) were typically not
explicitly defined, the logical corollary is that option evaluation may be expected to be
undertaken in an informal or even ad hoc manner.
7.5.4 Risk based decision making: maturity of implementation
The sub-sample’s risk based decision making profile maturity mirrors that of risk
analysis (Figure 7.4). However the decision making processes, or frameworks, were
qualitatively less mature, in that they were characterised by a lesser degree of formality.
However, rather than focus on findings relating to the individual process maturity
attributes, we restrict ourselves to summarising the general implications of this lack of
definition. Most critically, we may expect a lesser degree of rigour and formality in
risk based decision making. This perhaps reflects an organisational culture that values
the judgement, intuition, and inherent need for creativity of decision makers, over any
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perceived moves towards prescription. However, our decision making framework is
intended to guide, not prescribe, decision making, with the objective of ensuring a level
of consistency, credibility, and confidence in achieving desirable outcomes. This is
supported by a wealth of empirical evidence suggesting that, in the absence of a clear
framework, people struggle to identify their full range of values and concerns in a given
decision context, and are ill-equipped to make those complex trade-offs common to risk
based decision making (Arvai et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 1977; Payne et al., 1992;
Slovic, 1995; Matheson and Matheson, 1998). This is manifested in the selection of
sub-optimal risk reduction options; sub-optimal, as they fail to address the full range of
stakeholder concerns and values (Bohneblust and Slovic, 1998).
7.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a capability maturity model for benchmarking and
improving risk analysis and risk based decision making, and illustrated its application
to a cross-section of water and wastewater utility functions. The contribution to
knowledge is three-fold, we have: synthesized empirical observations with behavioral
and normative theories to codify the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision
making; placed these processes within a maturity framework which distinguishes their
relative maturity of implementation from ad hoc to adaptive; and provided a
comparative analysis of the methods, techniques, and maturity of risk analysis and risk
based decision making across a range of water and wastewater utility functions. The
findings provide researchers, utility managers, engineers, asset managers, occupational
health and safety representatives, public health officials, project managers, chief
finance officers and regulatory officials with a deeper understanding of the practical
form and theoretical underpinnings of risk management, and how distinctions can be
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made between organisational capabilities. This is timely work for a sector grappling to
adapt to evolving regulatory and governance arrangements. Of note is the model’s
potential for facilitating a step-change in the approach to regulating risk management
within the water sector from its current synthesis of reactive, outcome based approaches
(e.g. water quality standards) and prescriptions (e.g. codes and regulations), towards a
proactive, capability based approach.
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